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
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NOTES
ON
MENTAL & MORAL PHILOSOPHY;
WITH AN APPENDIX,
CONTAINING A SELECTION OF QUESTIONS SET AT THE
INDIA CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS,
Between the Years 1856 and 1864,
AND REFERENCES TO THE ANSWERS IN THE TEXT.

BY
H. COLEMAN, B.A., OXON.



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P R E F A C E.

THE composition of this little book was suggested by the difficulty experienced in procuring any work in the English Language suitable for the instruction of pupils in Mental and Moral Philosophy according to the requirements of the India Civil Service Examinations.

The works of Reid, Paley, Stewart, Whewell, Bain, and Morell, excellent as they are in many respects, are too voluminous and full of details for the purposes of instruction, besides presenting generally to the reader only one view of a subject.

The compiler was therefore led (at first for his own use, in lecturing to his pupils,) to make a collection of extracts from various authors, and to supplement them with the remarks which seemed necessary to connect them together. Little by little the work assumed its present shape, and having been found useful in preparing Candidates for the India Civil Service and other Examinations, it is now presented to the suffrages of a larger audience in the hope

that it may prove serviceable, not only to the Student reading for any special object, but also to that portion of the general public who may desire to obtain some knowledge of those great questions, the discussion of which has left such broad traces in the literature of all countries.

Brevity of expression and simplicity of style have been the chief points aimed at in the composition and arrangement of the work; it is not pretended that subjects of so wide a range could be exhaustively treated in so limited a space, but it is hoped that fair attention has been given to all the more prominent topics, and for those who may desire more detailed information, references are appended at the close of each chapter. It only remains for the author to acknowledge his obligations to the writers mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and to the learned publications of M M. Cousin, Remusat, and Thiel. In the part on Moral Philosophy great use has been made of the Ethics of Aristotle, the moral writings of Cicero, and of Brown's Moral Philosophy.

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NOTES ON MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

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K PHILOSOPHY, or the love of wisdom as the name literally signifies, is the science which treats of mental and natural phenomena, the general laws of both, and their reciprocal action on each other.

A field for investigation so vast as that presented by the domains of nature, mind, and matter, cannot be the subject of any one science, but is mapped out between those of Psychology, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, and others not within the scale of the present inquiry. Psychology is the science which investigates the faculties and operations of the human soul: it furnishes an answer to the question what am I? given the human soul as an object of inves-

tigation, account for the phenomena it exhibits ; such in a word is the subject matter and aim of Psychology.

Metaphysics is the science which investigates the most lofty subjects of which the mind is capable ; treats of the existence of God and of his attributes, of the laws of mind and matter, and of cause and effect.

Moral philosophy or ethics furnishes an answer to the question—What is the bond which unites me to mankind ? It views the feelings and faculties of the mind, not abstractedly, but in reference to human action ; as to the motives which give rise to actions, and what renders one class virtuous and another vicious.

There is a remarkable sameness as to the order of time in which the attention of mankind in various countries is devoted to the various branches of philosophy ; first came speculations on cosmogony, inquiries of a physical nature. The subject which would naturally first attract the attention of mankind, when an interval of peace from foreign wars and internal dissensions—the ordinary attendants of every infant society—allow them leisure for mental cultivation, would be the earth on which they stand and the powers of nature by which they are surrounded ; rude theories to account for the world's existence, attempts to elucidate the more apparent phenomena of matter presented to their senses, and that vague longing gaze on the orbs of heaven, the infancy of astronomy,

such are the problems for which the mind of man first seeks a solution.

Moral philosophy supposes a more settled state of society; it is essentially the offspring of experience and of social and political life. When men are collected together in such number that their collective action becomes an object both of curiosity and importance, attention could not fail to be directed to the motives of human action, to the circumstances which constitute any particular action virtuous or vicious. From an investigation into the mental faculties as seen in practice and action to a consideration of these same faculties taken absolutely: from an inquiry into mental products to the mind which causes these phenomena is only a step soon traversed.

We have spoken of psychology as the science which investigates the process by which we acquire and become possessed of our mental furniture; and one of the earliest subjects for investigation is, how we acquire our notions of time, space, virtue, beauty, and others equally abstract. According to the answer we give to this question, we must necessarily embrace one of the two opinions which have divided, and still divide, philosophers from the earliest periods. The easiest and most obvious way of accounting for the origin of these notions or ideas, is through the medium of the five senses, seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and touching. Man is indebted for so much of his knowledge to these

instruments, and such an extensive use is made of them at every moment, that the notion of accounting for mental phenomena on the supposition that they are the product of the senses exclusively was not an unnatural one. The mind in the language of these philosophers is a *tabula rasa*, a sheet of white paper, having nothing inscribed on it, but capable of receiving every impression: abstract ideas are nothing but the generalizations of experience and observation, commenced from the earliest period of childhood and carried on imperceptibly throughout life. Such are the views of the philosophers called Sensualists, and such will always appear the first in the philosophy of any country.

To many these opinions will appear vague and unsatisfactory; granting, they will say, that we owe much of our knowledge to the senses, it is denied that it is possible to acquire universal principles or ideas in this way; the soul possesses them on its entrance into the world; they are the forms and exemplars of all knowledge, and as without them, man could only obtain an acquaintance with particulars furnished by the senses, he would be hardly better off than the animal creation, which also possess the five senses, and in some instances in much greater perfection than man. Moreover, if our ideas are the result of observation by means of the senses, what is the verifier of the correctness of our inductions? Experience? Experience of what? of the same results when observed in

other minds, but reasoning analogically, and going back to the first human being who trode this earth there is no reason to believe that he was devoid of these ideas. How, then, could experience be a verifier when experience did not exist. Such are the views of the Idealist school which branches off into an infinite number of sects, opposed in many respects, but agreeing in their opposition to the positions of the sensualists.

The points of view presented by these schools furnish hardly any possible approximation, and an active polemic ensues between the votaries of either opinion, in the course of which their respective tenets are pushed to their utmost limits.

As a consequence of this warfare between the two schools, a third sect gradually arises, the Sceptical, which subjects to a severe test the arguments, often *a priori* of either side, and places in the crucible of investigation the theories and hypotheses of previous inquirers. The advantages obtained to truth and philosophy from the Sceptical school, so long as its investigations are confined within proper limits, are great and important; it brings to the test of trial the pretentious statements and vague declamations of celebrated authorities; in vain are great names and great reputations paraded to cover fallacies and confusion.

Animated by a hardy desire of innovation and an ardent hatred of falsehood, it applies the

axe of independent inquiry to many a tree of fair growth without, but cankering unsoundness within. The advantages, however, obtained from Sceptical philosophy are purely of a negative character: it is potential to destroy, but can create nothing; it furnishes no resting place for the human mind, which, wearied with its excesses, and disgusted with a system without support, consolation, or solidity, is prone to fly to the opposite extreme, and hence arises the mystics, who either in connection with theology, or in the regions of pure thought, oppose the forms of an *a priori* and ultra-transcendental philosophy, to the withering principles of Scepticism.

Such, according to the views of one of the most able of modern philosophers (M. Cousin) are the forms through which thought must pass, such the process which is continually going on. There is a certain amount of truth in the statement, but as a whole, it is rather ingenious than exact. We cannot allow that the scheme furnishes an outline of the track philosophy must traverse, although it *may* happen that it does so.

Moreover, the division of philosophy into these four schools appears to be a cross one, and not based upon any radical distinction, so far as regards the two last. The division of Psychology into the schools of the Sensualists and Idealists is an exhaustive one, and every man must, in the treatment of these questions, show

that he belongs to one or the other; there is no middle course. The Sceptics and Mystics, however they may appear to vary from the preceding two, must necessarily incline to either hypothesis; although the former may seem to blame the extravagancies of both with equal impartiality, and the latter to confound the sentiments of both in high-flown and extravagant language, still there must be a leaning to either hypothesis; accordingly, on examining the chief authors of the Sceptical school, there will be found a strong leaning to sensualism, and on the mystics an even more pronounced feeling in favour of the Idealists. In fact, it could not be otherwise, for the Sensualist philosophers as they proceed upon the principles of observation and experiment have a close affinity with the Sceptics, who profess to be opposed to all speculative and *a priori* reasoning, whilst there is an equally strong bond of union between the more subtle and speculative principles of Idealism and the raptures of the Mystics.

In a word, instead of there being four separate schools of philosophy, there are but two.

Scepticism and Mysticism are merely Sensualism and Idealism pushed to their utmost limits. The distinction, however, of philosophy into these four schools, though not founded, as it appears to us on fact, is useful as serving for a convenient classification of philosophers.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

Moral Philosophy.—Definition.—Inseparably bound up with human actions.—Two preliminary questions to be considered: 1. As to the existence or not of a Moral Faculty; 2. As to Necessitarianism and Free Will. 1. Arguments in favour of the Moral Faculty.—Objections to these arguments.—In what the strength of the objection consists.—Suggestions for the elucidation of difficulties.—Modifications required to the theory of the Moral Faculty.—Presents less difficulties than any other hypothesis.—Quotations from Dugald Stewart and Dr. Whewell. 2. Necessitarianism and Free Will.—Arguments in favour of each view.

MORAL Philosophy is the science which treats of the rightness and wrongness of human actions; why certain acts are called vicious and others virtuous, and the motives which lead men to perform the one and avoid the other: to act, in a word, in agreement with virtue and vice.

Much has been said concerning the nature of virtue in general, its origin, definition, and effects; but such discussions are more curious than profitable: for virtue and its opposite are merely relative terms, inseparably bound up with human action.

When we talk of such an act being virtuous or vicious, our minds insensibly connect the notion of virtue or vice with an agent performing virtuous or vicious acts, and which we by our moral perception pronounce to be in accordance with or opposed to our standard of right and wrong.

There are two fundamental questions which stand at the entrance of any discussion of morals : — 1st. A discussion concerning the theory of a moral sense. 2. The controversy connected with Necessitarianism and Free Will.

1. The Moral Faculty or Sense.*—In accordance with what principle or theory do we pronounce certain actions to be virtuous and others vicious? Is it from any interior perception by which the soul instinctively apprehends between what is right and wrong in human action, and magisterially orders us to perform the one and refrain from the other? or is our standard something *ab extra* — Utility, Benevolence, Expediency, Self-love?

It will be thus seen that there are two great divisions as to the ground of moral action.

1st. Those who support the doctrine of a moral sense or conscience.

2nd. Those who base moral action on some other theory.

Arguments in favour of a moral sense :—

The moral sense is a certain capacity born

* The terms Moral Sense and Moral Faculty are generally used as synonyms ; the latter is the more appropriate term.

with man, by which he approves or disapproves of certain actions as virtuous or vicious; and this both with reference to his own acts and those of others. When employed on the actions of others, it is called the moral sense; when turned inwardly on our own, conscience.

The arguments in favour of the existence of a moral sense are derived from consciousness—from the universality of a perception of right and wrong, and from the general agreement of mankind, however much they may differ in other respects, on the broad principles of right and wrong.*

1. From Consciousness.—Every one is conscious within himself of a principle leading him to pronounce some actions to be virtuous and others vicious. The existence of this feeling is an *a priori* argument of the existence of the faculty, unless it can be shown that such feeling can be otherwise accounted for.

2. The perception between right and wrong is universal. No tribe is so barbarous in its habits or so deficient in its language that it does not possess this perception and find words to express it. The general agreement of these words in all languages with the actions they denote shows the universality of the distinction.

3. Mankind, viewed as units, agree universally in the broad distinction of right and wrong,—when perhaps no two individuals could be found to coincide in any other view.

* See also Appendix 1. Note A.

When brought together in masses in the theatre or senate, where virtue and vice are visibly represented before them, they instinctively apprehend and applaud in common the one and reject the other, even though their own lives may not be in accordance with the standard they set up.

Those who deny the existence of a moral faculty as a distinct principle of human nature endeavour to invalidate these arguments by a variety of objections.

1. By an appeal to experience. So far, they say, from man having an instinctive apprehension of right and wrong, there is no subject on which there is a greater diversity of opinion. What is enjoined in one country is forbidden in another, and "a river is as often the boundary of a virtue as of a province." Theft was publicly enjoined as meritorious at Sparta; the Hindoo considered it no crime to expose his aged parents to the waters of the Ganges; female children are commonly murdered in China; and only a few years ago civilized Europe permitted murder when committed in a duel under a mistaken notion of honour.

2. Children do not appear to possess the perception of right and wrong, but experience from their earliest moments the influence of rewards and punishments.

3. Certain barbarous nations have been discovered which appear to be quite without any moral perception as to the difference between right and wrong, which they ought to possess

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infringement of its laws may, for reasons particular and special to a nation, be allowed.

2. The answer to the second objection would appear to be more difficult, and that in this rather than the first the strength of the argument against the moral sense chiefly lies. A candid observer of the habits of children will find it difficult to maintain in anything like a general sense that children at an early age possess the faculty of discerning between right and wrong, or that they do not derive their impressions on such subjects from those with whom they associate.

But perhaps the objection may be met by the consideration that the moral faculty acts after the analogy of the five senses, and is not developed in the early years of childhood. We know that young children, though possessed of the power of vision, cannot accurately distinguish distance or colours, and that the sense of smell exists only imperfectly at first.

And as the child insensibly, by comparison, acquires a notion as to the relative distance of objects and accuracy in discriminating colours, so the moral sense existing in the germ may require a certain condition of things to call it into action. The moral sense is conversant about actions performed by moral agents, and it may be that its functions remain dormant in some sort until evolved by communication with the society of moral agents. And as no one would deny that a child could see because

its notions as to distance were imperfect or erroneous, so the circumstance that children do not appear to act upon principles of right and wrong is no proof that the moral faculty may not exist in germ, to be further developed by an experience of the actions about which it is conversant.

3. The answer to the third objection is of two kinds. 1st. It is denied that any nation or tribe has ever been discovered which was not possessed of some glimmering notion of right and wrong ; and 2nd, it is maintained that even if such had been discovered, or should be, it would not militate against the generality of a rule observed in all other known instances. The doctrine of the moral faculty will be further considered in reviewing the authors who have maintained other opinions. Meanwhile, in looking over the arguments adduced for and against the existence of a moral faculty, those in its favour would appear greatly to predominate. It is not that there are not some difficulties to be got over, and some weighty objections to be rather attempted than answered ; but still, as will be shown hereafter, the difficulties and objections are much fewer than would attend any other hypothesis. Difficulties we must expect to meet with in a subject so obscure as man's moral nature, but none sufficiently formidable to invalidate the general principle asserted.

The theory of a moral faculty thus asserted and maintained would, nevertheless, appear to

require some modifications; for we know by experience that the conscience may be so deadened by repeated transgressions of the laws of morality as to be for all practical purposes weak and inefficient to prevent the commission of crime: we may also find in the annals of nations repeated instances of practices carried on and transgressions of the moral law permitted which cannot be explained but by some modification of the views here supported of the moral faculty.

Perhaps some reflections as to the nature of man will furnish a clue enabling us to reconcile the existence of a moral faculty with the undoubted aberrations met with in practice.

Man is a political and social being, led by an inevitable necessity to connect himself with his fellows in the performance of certain actions, liable to influence their opinions and to receive the reflex action of theirs.

The moral faculty with which he is born endowed remains wholly or partially dormant until called forth by the exercise of family and social relations. The family tie is undoubtedly the earliest; from it spring not only the duties of parent and child, husband and wife, but also the virtues evolved in the performance of these duties, filial affection, chastity, temperance.

The advantages arising from the practice of these virtues, approved as they are by the natural perception of the difference between right and wrong, are soon perceived. A collection of

families forms a state or community, liable to acts of oppression from other states, and with a capacity by association of repelling common dangers by united efforts. So states arise, and from the exercise of the various duties of citizens—the qualities of courage, dexterity, prudence, and other virtues, social and political.

An explanation of many of the apparent violations of the moral law met with in history will be found in a consideration of the gradual rise of the virtues in proportion as man emerges from a state of barbarism to that of family and political relations, and thence onwards through the various phases of civilization. These instances are generally met with in those countries where, from the family and political relations being but little developed, the moral faculty is in a great degree in a dormant state, not having a suitable sphere of action.

In civilized countries, though the moral faculty has attained its full maturity, it meets with some checks from the peculiar organization of man, which do not, indeed, stifle the voice of conscience in the individual, or obliterate the main distinctions between right and wrong in the community, yet undoubtedly contribute to occasional aberrations in both.

1. There is a liability in man to a violent access of some passion or other, during the continuance of which the voice of conscience is lost in the outburst of impetuous feeling. The mind, swayed by passion, is no longer balanced,

reason has lost its hold, and conscience for a time is dead.

2. The tendency of some special institution in a country whereby practices contrary to morality are sanctioned by authority or long-continued observance: the annals of every country are fruitful in such instances. The practice of duelling, the last relic of an age of violence, continued long beyond the period when any excuse could be pleaded for it, is an instance in point.

We do not find that persons who, from a mistaken sense of the obligations imposed upon them by the tone of society, took away the life of an intimate friend for some hasty word spoken in passion or intoxication, appear to have suffered any more from the pangs of conscience than they did in the estimation of society.

3. There is the power of association. Men by living under a peculiar set of laws and fixed institutions have their minds insensibly moulded to a certain form, and view things under a particular aspect.

The views held generally in England as to the due observance of Sunday differ essentially from those on the Continent, and cause a corresponding difference in the way in which the conscience of an Englishman or a foreigner will consider this part of his conduct.

4. As civilization progresses, certain advances are made in our standard of morality as regards

particular actions which have a reflex action on the conscience. One hundred and fifty years ago, the practice of selling negroes for slaves was so far from being considered wrong and immoral, that the right of importing them into the Spanish Colonies was conceded by the Treaty of Utrecht to this country. Gradually the practice began to be looked upon with feelings of distrust and suspicion, and the exercise of it was abandoned to the lowest class in the community. Still, a lengthened period elapsed before the public conscience became sufficiently enlightened to put a stop to the practice of exporting slaves by legislative enactment; and a still further lapse of time was necessary before the name of slave-dealer acquired the odious and contemptible meaning now so happily attached to it. And even now the views of a people akin to us in blood, religion, and customs are diametrically opposed to our own.

Some extracts from Dugald Stewart and Dr. Whewell are appended in confirmation of the views here taken.—*

“Education,” observes Dugald Stewart, “may vary in particular cases the opinion of individuals with respect to the beautiful and sublime. But education could not create our notions of beauty or deformity, grandeur or meanness. In like manner, education may vary our sentiments with respect to particular actions, but could

* “Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man,”
pages 22—239.

not create our notions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit. If there be really no essential distinction between virtue and vice, whence is it that we conceive one class of qualities to be more excellent and meritorious than another? Why do we conceive pride, or vanity, or selfishness to be less worthy motives of conduct than disinterested patriotism or determined adherence to what we believe to be our duty? Why does our species appear less amiable in one set of philosophical systems than in another?"

"The virtuous actions performed by other men not only excite in our minds a benevolent affection towards them, or a disposition to promote their happiness, but impress us with a sense of the merits of the agents; we perceive them to be the proper objects of love and esteem, and that it is morally right that they should receive their reward. On the other hand, when we are witnesses of an act of selfishness, or cruelty, or oppression, whether we are the sufferers or not, we are not only impressed with anger and hatred towards the delinquent, but it is difficult to restrain our indignation. In our own case, when we are conscious of doing well, we feel that we are entitled to the esteem and attachment of our fellow-creatures, and we know with the evidence of a perception* that we are entitled to the esteem

* By percept or perception is meant an idea or notion in the mind derived by the senses from the external world.

and attachment of our fellow-creatures, and that we enjoy the approbation of the invisible Judge of our conduct. The feelings of remorse, on the other hand, which accompany the consciousness of guilt involve a sense of ill desert and an anticipation of future punishment."

It is absurd, therefore, to ask why we are bound to practise virtue. The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation *το μὲν ορθὸν νόμος ἔστι βάσιλικος*.

2. Controversy connected with Necessitarianism and Free Will.*

The second question we have to discuss is that connected with Free Will, or the liberty of the moral agent.

The arguments in favour of the freedom of the moral agent may be thus summed up:—

1. Man has by his constitution a natural conviction or belief that he acts freely—a conviction so early, so universal, and so necessary in most of our natural operations, that it must be the result of our constitution and the work of Him who made us. Deliberation about a future action, entering into a contract to perform some future act, all presuppose our freedom of action.

2. Man is an accountable being. There is a real and essential difference between right conduct and wrong conduct, between what is just and unjust. The most perfect rectitude is

* For some account of the views of Aristotle see Appendix I, Note 8.

ascribed to the Deity, to whom man, as an accountable being, is responsible for his actions. The accountability of man is a truth proclaimed by every man's conscience, and forms the basis of every system of morals.

3. Man is able to prosecute an end by a long series of means applicable to it: he has the power of carrying on wisely and prudently a system of conduct which he has before conceived in his mind, and resolved to prosecute. Hence he must have power over his volitions. A regular plan of conduct, as it cannot be contrived without understanding, so it cannot be carried into execution without power; and therefore the execution as an effect, demonstrates with equal force both power and understanding in the cause.

4. To these considerations it may be added that man's accountability is inconsistent with the Necessitarian hypothesis. Man could neither be justly rewarded nor punished for acts which were not the effect of his own volitions; and to conceive God as punishing a man for a course of conduct he had no power to alter shocks every idea conceived as belonging to the Supreme Ruler.

The arguments in favour of Necessitarianism are thus stated:—

1. Human liberty has respect only to the actions that are subsequent to volition. Power over the determinations of the will is inconceivable, and involves a contradiction.

2. Liberty is so inconsistent with the influence

of motives that it would make human actions capricious, and man ungovernable by God or man.

3. (a.) That liberty of determination is impossible. (b.) That it would be hurtful. (c.) That, in fact, man has no such liberty.

A. To prove that the liberty of determination is impossible, the doctrine of a "sufficient reason" was employed by Leibnitz:—"For every existence, for every event, for every truth, there must be a sufficient reason." The freedom of the will, it is also said, implies an effect without a cause.

B. Freedom of the will is hurtful. If man's actions were voluntary, they would be capricious, and the influence of rewards and punishments be destroyed.

C. Man is not in effect a free agent. The most formidable argument of this class is derived from the prescience of the Deity. God foresees every determination of the human mind; what he foresees must certainly take place, and therefore must be necessary.

In considering these arguments, we may observe that those of the sufficient reason and of the influence of motives are not inconsistent with the freedom of the will. For in every subject of moral deliberation there must be at least a choice of alternatives, a variety of motives presented to man; he exercises his freedom of will in following that which appears most advantageous.

All human laws proceed upon this supposition. A certain penalty is imposed upon the exercise of some gratification, and the influence of motives is left to determine man in gauging the disadvantages of the punishment with the advantages of the gratification. The choice which he makes is certainly an act of moral volition.

In reference to the theological argument of the prescience of the Deity, the domains of theology and morals ought to be kept distinct; at any rate the difficulty of conciliating the fore-knowledge of God with the freedom of man is not so great as in reconciling His justice with the punishment of man for actions for which he is not accountable.

NOTE.—The reader desirous of further information on these subjects is referred to Brown's "Ethics;" Dr. Whewell's "Elements of Morality;" Dugald Stewart's "History of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," Vol. I.; M. Thiel's "Cours de Philosophie;" and V. Cousin's "Cours de l'Histoire de Philosophie."

CHAPTER II.

Leading views of English Moralists.—May be divided into two classes: 1. Those who place the morality of actions in some external principle; 2. Those in favour of a Moral Faculty.—1. Those who place the standard of morality *ab extra*: Hobbes.—Selfish System.—Extract from his works.—Leading propositions.—Principle of Utility: David Hume.—Extract from his works.—Objections to the preceding Systems: Paley.—Principle of Expediency.—Quotation from works.—Points of approximation in the three Systems.—Special objections to Paley's view: Mandeville.—Paradoxical views. Influence of Pride.—Objections to his theory: Dr. Clarke.—Fitness of Things: Mr. Wollaston.—Conformity to the truth of things: Bishop Cumberland.—Correspondence between Moral Action and the Laws of Nature: Dr. Adam Smith.—Principle of Sympathy: Bentham.—Utility. 2. Moralists in favour of a Moral Faculty: Shaftesbury.—Hutcheson.—Bishop Butler.

HAVING in the preceding chapter given some account of the subjects, the knowledge of which is first of all necessary to the student, we shall in the present one place before him the views of the leading English moralists, both those who have advocated the existence of a moral faculty and those who have derived their standard of right and wrong from some other source.

And we shall first treat of the latter class of moralists, giving the precedence amongst them to Hobbes.

THOMAS HOBBES, 1588—1679.

This celebrated philosopher is the founder of what is called the Selfish System of Morals. He considers that right and wrong have no existence apart from human laws, which originated in a voluntary surrender on the part of man of some portion of his liberty, to procure the greater advantage of protection against the fraud and rapine of his fellows. No philosopher excels and few equal Hobbes in political sagacity and clearness of illustration; none also have more suffered from the mistaken prejudices of his countrymen and the jealousies of rival moralists.

To understand the moral speculations of Hobbes we must pay attention to his political theories, the two being so closely allied that in his opinion morality had no independent existence apart from human legislation.

“Whatever,” he says, “is the object of any man’s desire or appetite, that is it which he for his part calleth good, and the object of his hate or aversion evil; for these words of good and evil and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply or absolutely so, nor any common rule of good or evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth, or in a commonwealth from the person that representeth it, or person, or arbitrator, or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof.”

Hobbes distinguishes "good" into three kinds. "Good" in the promise, good in the effect, and good in the means, and the same of "evil."

His classification of our moral feelings, passions, and desires is very concise, and as perfect in every respect as any later classification.

He considers the natural condition of man without any civil government to be perfectly equal amongst each other; that thus though there may be found in the various members of the human family an inequality in strength or mental endowment, yet this disparity, considered in their aggregate capacity, is so trifling, so insignificant, when viewed in relation to a multitude of people that we are bound not to admit it as an element into reasoning, but are warranted in stating the general proposition that all men are equal. From this nearly perfect equality proceed diffidence, distrust, jealousy. Amongst individuals all possess the inherent desire to better their lot, but all cannot enjoy the same privileges, benefits, and pleasures; hence this perpetual aggrandisement, this perpetual craving for those things to which all men have an equal right with themselves, is a powerful predisposing cause of war, and every man begins to employ those means which he thinks most calculated to preserve his own existence and procure for him as large a share of power or comfort as he can obtain by force or persuasion, threats or contrivance. Competition, diffidence (distrust), and love of destruc-

tion, or admiration, or power form the elements of discord and strife ; the first maketh man invade for gain, the second for safety, and the third for reputation. After thus establishing the natural equality of man, he lays down what he considers the law of nature, which he looks upon as the sum of moral philosophy.

The consent of the majority is the commencement of a city which, in its legislative capacity, becomes as one person whose will or pleasure, by the consent of the greater number, is to be considered as the will and pleasure of each.

Hence, though good and evil are, in themselves, notions indifferent, yet when the state hath defined them in legislative enactments they are no longer indifferent, but must be obeyed by every member of such state. No man submits his personal liberty to another but for the sake of personal security, and no opinions must be promulgated which have direct or indirect effect to weaken or impair the supreme power. A prince may, by right, that is without injury, do what he thinks fit, only he cannot do it justly ; but if it be done, it must be done at the expense of a breach of the laws of nature.

The leading principles of the moral philosophy of Hobbes may be stated in the following propositions :—

1. That as the state of man is by nature equal, the leading object with each individual is to secure his own good, i.e., as much of actual

advantages, possessions, or privileges, as his means can compass.

2. That as all are anxiously desirous of improving their position by any means, the normal state of man is a state of war.

3. That mankind observing the inconveniences of this state of things agree to surrender some portion of their natural liberty to a legislator or legislators, who may define for them what is right and wrong.

4. That consequently right and wrong, as connected with human actions, have no existence apart from laws.

Opinions so novel as those here set forth, and supported with a power and clearness unknown in the previous philosophy, could not fail to attract attention, and accordingly for the next half century, we cannot open a book treating in any degree upon morals where the positions of Hobbes are not attacked or defended. His influence may be traced in quarters where we should not expect to find it, and systems of moral philosophy professing widely different views, are, in reality, based upon principles almost identical with those of Hobbes. We allude more especially to the systems of Hume and Paley, which we shall here consider out of their proper order, on account of their manifest connection with the preceding pages.

HUME, DAVID, 1707—1776.

The views of Hume are found in his Treatise concerning Human Nature, Essays Moral and

Philosophical, and Inquiry concerning Human Nature.

He considers that it is the utility of actions which constitutes them virtuous, and hence his system has been called the Utilitarian system. The following extract from his Essays will give a notion of his views :—

“ It seems so natural a thought to ascribe to their utility the praise which we bestow upon social virtues, that one would expect to meet with this principle everywhere in moral writings as the chief foundation of their reasoning or inquiry. In common life we may observe that the circumstance of utility is always appealed to, nor is it supposed that a greater eulogy can be given to any man than to display his usefulness to the public and enumerate the services he has performed to mankind and society. What praise even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance of its parts destroys not its fitness for any useful purpose. And how satisfactory an apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity if we can show the necessity of that particular construction for the use intended. A ship appears more beautiful to an artist, or one moderately skilled in navigation, when its form is wide and swelling, than if it were framed with a precise geometrical regularity in contradiction to all the laws of mechanics.”

The theory which supports a system of morals on the basis of utility is not without plausible arguments in its favour.

The principle of utility is undoubtedly of very wide application, and exercises a very great influence on human action; with the great majority of men it is the ruling principle, with all its effects are potential.

As the actual basis of morals, much may be said in its favour, but considered as the grounds upon which we decide upon human actions, pronounce them right or wrong, the principle of utility will appear insufficient. Is it the specific amount of their utility which we have in view when we pronounce actions to be virtuous or vicious; and to use the strong words of Adam Smith, "have we no other reason for commanding a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers?"

If the utility of actions be their moral standard, then it must be present to the contemplation of the agent himself when he morally prefers one mode of conduct to another, and to the contemplation of others when they morally approve or disapprove of actions.* For in every moral action that can be estimated by us, there are two sets of feelings which may be taken into account; the feelings of the agent willing the action, and of the spectator calmly considering it. Although the agent may perform the act under the impulse of strong feelings, yet the principle of approbation is essentially different in his mind. When he contemplates an action of his own, or one already performed

* Brown's "Ethics."

by another, and if it is not according to any measurement of exact utility, that the approbation and consequent moral will or resolution of the virtuous agent is performed, it must then be allowed to be a powerful presumption at least that the approbation of the spectator is not the result of such a measurement of good, that is to be added by that particular action to the general good of the world, or of the general utility of the principle from which it flows.

With respect to the views of the agent, it is beyond dispute that his views even when they seem most commendable rarely extend to such general interests. The exact scale of utility, in short, is not present to the mind as the principle of the action, as the standard by which he regulates his conduct. Can the fond devotion of a mother to a sick child, of a daughter to an aged parent be considered as proceeding from mere abstract motives of public utility?

Leaving the feelings of the agent, let us consider those of the spectator, and see if the approbation he bestows upon virtue, his indignation and abhorrence of vice in its circumstances of the greatest atrocity can arise from the mere feeling of the utility of the one and the disadvantages of the other to the community.

Our moral action, our approbation or disapprobation, proceeds not from a calculation of the probable consequence to the world if all men were so to act, but from an instant feeling of moral excellence which makes it impossible

for us not to approve or disapprove as soon as the action in all its circumstances is known to us; if we think at all of the utility of such a general mode of conduct, it is not before, but after the approbation. A very important consideration with regard to the theory of utility as the essence of virtuous actions is, that it does not profess to account for the origin of our moral feelings, but proceeds on our susceptibility of these as an undoubted principle of human nature. Yet why should any one love that which may be productive of benefit to all the individuals in the world rather than to one, or why should he love that which may be of advantage to one individual rather than that which may be injurious to every one but himself. The only answer which can be given on the theory which supposes virtue to be utility is, that it is impossible for us, by our very nature, not to feel approbation of that which is generally useful, disapprobation of that generally hurtful.

There is a moral principle, a susceptibility of moral emotion that is a part of our constitution which constrains us to approve or disapprove of certain actions, and so we should return eventually to the principle of a moral faculty, which would be inconsistent with the views of Hume.

PALEY, 1743—1805.

The moral theory of Paley is based upon the principle of expediency, and differs not essentially from that of Hume.

In fact, the terms expediency and utility have much the same significance in moral science.

There is, however, one important distinction between Paley and Hume.

The system of the latter is framed without any reference to the principles of morality contained in the Scriptures, whereas the former has reared his on the basis of divine revelation, and endeavours to show the harmony which subsists between the suggestions of natural reason and the will of God. The doctrine of utility, as advocated by Hume, was open to the objection that it afforded too weak and insufficient motives to deter men from immorality, and hence Paley deemed it necessary to enforce the obligations of virtue by the weighty arguments contained in the scriptural idea of a future state of rewards and punishments. Notwithstanding this great difference, so far as the ultimate end or subject of virtue is concerned, the good of mankind, these views are identical. The essence of the system of Paley is contained in the seventh chapter of his book "On the Nature of Virtue."

"Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness. According to which definition, the good of mankind is the subject, the will of God, the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive of human virtue. Virtue has been divided by some into benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. Benevolence

proposes good ends, prudence suggests the best means of attaining these ends, fortitude enables us to encounter the difficulties, dangers, and discouragements which stand in our way in the pursuit of these ends; temperance repels and overcomes the passions that obstruct.

The four cardinal virtues are prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice, but the division of virtues to which we are now-a-days most accustomed is duties towards God, as piety, reverence, resignation; gratitude, towards other men or relative duties as justice, charity, loyalty; towards ourselves, as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preservation of life, care of health, etc.

Although by the above definition it appears that the good of man is the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive and end of all virtue, yet may a man perform many acts without having either of these motives in his thoughts, just as a man may be a very good servant, without thinking at every moment of a regard to his master's will; but then he must have served for a long time under the actual direction of these motives to bring it to this, in which service his merit and virtue consist.

Man is a bundle of habits; there are habits of industry, attention, vigilance, of indolence, fretfulness, idleness; in a word, there is not a quality or function of mind or body which does not feel the influence of this great law of nature."

The chief objection to which this system, in common with that of Hume is open to, is that in proposing the good of mankind as the foundation of moral science, it does not attempt to account for how we acquired our notions of right and wrong. In order that man may determine, not only with reference to his own case, but as to the actions of others, what is for the good, and what for the disadvantage of mankind, he must have a certain standard by which to measure these actions. But utility and the good of mankind cannot furnish us with this standard, because, apart from our notions of right and wrong, no action could be determined to be either useful or for the good of mankind. To supplement even the system of these moralists, there must be a something, a perception, an instinct of right and wrong, which is no other than the moral sense.

The points of resemblance between the systems of Hume and Paley have been partially indicated, and are too obvious to require a more detailed examination, but their connection with that of Hobbes may not appear so plain, especially as Paley professed and probably believed that his views were entirely antagonistic to the selfish system of morals.

1. The three systems of Hobbes, Hume, and Paley agree in placing as the standard of morals something *ab extra*. They do not attempt to account for our notions of right and wrong, but

determine the actions of man to be so by some standard capriciously set up.

2. Performing actions for the sake of utility, for the good of mankind, is also performing them for our own good. If certain actions are useful to man, or for his good, they must be also good and useful for the single agent. The agent, therefore, in willing these actions, must have his own good in view as well as that of others, and that is the system of Hobbes. For we must not suppose that that philosopher, in making self the basis of his system, did not admit the concurrence of other motives.

Self and self-preservation is the principle which induces men to unite into societies and establish laws punishing some actions and rewarding others.

These actions are punished or rewarded as being contrary to or promoting the utility and good of mankind, and so, on an ultimate analysis, the three systems would appear to concur.

There is this further objection to be made to the system of Paley specially—that in assigning the hopes or fears of rewards and punishments in a future life as the motive for virtuous actions, it ignores the case of all those nations where the doctrine of a future state is not an article of faith.

In the civilized States of Rome and Greece, a future state of rewards and punishments, though speculated upon in the writings of some

philosophers, had not the smallest influence on the masses as a motive of virtuous action, even if at all known. And at the present day, perhaps a majority of human beings, in some sense moral agents, are not acquainted with this doctrine at all. Either, then, Paley must have limited his moral theory to those who accept the Christian Revelation (and, in that case, what are we to think of a system which ignores three-fourths of the human race), or there must be some other motive sufficiently powerful to induce virtuous conduct apart from any notion of a future state of rewards and punishments.

And if there is such a principle operating in some cases, how are we to know that it does not operate in all?

MANDEVILLE, 1670—1733.

The paradoxical views of the eccentric Mandeville have excited more attention from their novelty and the ability with which they were supported than from any intrinsic merit or probability they possessed.

The work which contains the moral system of Mandeville is entitled “The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turned Honest;” and in every page of it the author displays great penetration and knowledge of human nature, albeit of the darker side.

We may divide his system into two parts:—1st, his account of the origin of moral virtue; and 2ndly, his attempt to show that private

vices of individuals tend to public welfare. With the latter we need not here occupy ourselves.

His theory of moral virtue is as follows :— “ Man, like all other animals, has an irresistible inclination to follow the bent of his own desires. Force, though it may soften the rude features of his character, will prove inadequate to raise him to that state of moral and political improvement of which his nature seems capable. Hence the politicians and law-givers seeing how necessary it was that the passions should be circumscribed within limits, on studying the nature of his being, found him possessed of a vastly superior portion of pride to other animals, and perceived that the most effectual way to restrain his inclinations and make him labour zealously for the public welfare was by operating on this passion. Accordingly, having won an entrance to his heart by compliments on his sagacity and understanding, they begin to teach him the notions of honour and shame, representing the former as the highest good and the latter as the greatest evil which could befall him. The moral virtues do not owe their origin to any general principle, but are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride.”

Such is the celebrated theory of Mandeville, supported with a clearness and power of illustration worthy of a better system. The objections which present themselves to its reception are sufficiently obvious, and some of them have been indicated in the preceding pages.

A conclusive one is, as it appears to us, the following :—

Mandeville supposes that the legislators and politicians perceiving the desirability of controlling the inclinations of man, so as to work for the general benefit of society, operated upon his sentiment of pride, so as to induce him to follow some things and forego others. These legislators then and politicians must have been possessed of a certain moral standard, of certain notions of right and wrong, for otherwise they could not have directed and tempered the inclinations of those for whom they legislated.

But whence did these legislators get these notions of moral virtue, on the supposition of Mandeville that it is merely the political offspring of flattery begot upon pride? Granted, for the sake of argument, that this view will account for the notions of moral virtue by those legislated for, we are still at a loss whence to derive the moral standard of the legislators; clearly admitting to its full extent the supposition of Mandeville, these notions must have been derived from some other source than pride or flattery; and if this is admitted the whole scheme at once falls to the ground, since we could never be certain that the views of man generally might not as well be derived from these sources as those of the legislators must confessedly be.

DR. CLARKE, 1675—1729.

The moral theory of this divine presents a striking contrast to that we have been just considering. Whilst in Mandeville everything is attributed to the capricious working of education and habit, Dr. Clarke considers the fundamental principles of morality as eternal and unchangeable, engraved, as it were, by the finger of the Almighty on the hearts of men.

It is in his work on the "Arguments *a priori* for the existence of a Deity" that his moral precepts are found in a discourse on the unchangeable obligations of natural virtue. Virtue, he considers, consists in regulating our conduct agreeably to certain eternal fitness of things, or as he states, "That from the eternal and necessary differences of things there necessarily and naturally arise certain moral obligations, which are in themselves incumbent upon all rational creatures, antecedent to all positive institution and all expectation of rewards and punishments." The hypothesis that virtue consists in regulating our conduct agreeably to the fitness of things, may be viewed under three different aspects.

The passage just quoted may be said to contain his high or metaphysical account of the nature and origin of virtue.

2. His language may bear an impression that he was favourable to the instinctive principles of morality or a moral sense.

3. By saying that certain moral actions ought to be performed because they are fit and good,

he may be considered as countenancing the system of public utility or general expediency, maintained by later ethical writers.

Much of this confusion arises from the vagueness with which Dr. Clarke uses the term "fit" or "reasonable," merely because it was productive of benefit.

By fitness of things, he does not mean fitness in general, or make use of a phrase to express the various relations which exist among things in general; but he uses the term to express that virtue by its very nature is productive of pleasure and benefit, and vice productive of uneasiness and injury. "The true nature of the case is plainly this,—some things are in their nature good and reasonable, and fit to be done, such as keeping faith and performing equitable contracts. Others are in their nature absolutely evil, such as breaking faith, refusing to perform equitable contracts, cruelly destroying those who have never injured us, and the like."

By saying that it is fit and proper to perform certain actions, he means nothing more than that such performance tends to individual and general happiness. Fitness he employs as synonymous with good. Unfitness, on the other hand, is considered by him as equivalent to evil; that is, that certain acts he has named, such as breaking faith, &c., produce evil, either to the individual, to society, or to both.

The observation he maintains of the eternal laws of piety, justice, and equity does of itself

plainly and naturally tend to make all creatures happy, and the contrary practice to make them miserable.

"If all men were truly virtuous, and practised those rules in such a manner that the miseries and calamities arising usually from the numberless follies and vices of man were prevented, undoubtedly this great truth would evidence itself and appear experimental in the happy state of the world. On the contrary, neglect of God, abuse and unnatural applications of the powers of the mind and body fill the mind with confusion, trouble, and vexation; so that the natural constitution, order, and tendency of things is evidently enough fitted and designed to establish naturally a just and suitable difference in general between vice and virtue by their respective fruits and effects."

The ingenious view of Dr. Clarke is rather an attempt to enforce the practice of virtue as conformable to the nature of man than an elucidation of the morality of actions. The fitness of things, like the laws of Nature, is one of those sounding expressions used to conceal the weakness of human intellect. The principle enunciated, so far as intelligible, is clearly *a priori*. What is meant by this fitness of things? What are the things of which fitness can be predicated? Evidently, as we are engaged in Moral Philosophy, they must be human actions. Then what decides upon their fitness or their conformity to right and wrong? If this distinction

is naturally apprehensible by man, then we have the moral sense at once; and this, it would appear to me, is what Dr. Clarke intended, though, as the term moral sense, or faculty, was not then used in philosophy, he was led to clothe his meaning in the pompous and unintelligible expression of a conformity to the fitness of things.

If this fitness is not naturally apprehensible by man, how is it ascertained and acquired? From the things? But the things must be human actions, and how can we conceive of an action apart from some agent performing it? Then, if the distinction is not in the action it must be in the agent, and we again find ourselves in the theory of a moral sense.

WOLLASTON, 1659—1724.

Mr. Wollaston is another of those theorists who attempt to clothe their feebleness under the devices of language. His system, as expressed in his work. "The Religion of Nature Delineated," is not dissimilar from that of Clarke. "For a man to act virtuously, he must square his conduct according to the truth of things, or treat everything according to its real character, or as it really is." By acting according to the nature of things, Mr. Wollaston means acting according to reason. Man, being a being compounded of many discordant and widely different principles of good and evil, requires some check on his more violent impulses. This check is found in reason: by

cultivating this faculty he can alone hope if not totally to remove, at least to lessen the number and intensity of those evils which nature has doomed him to suffer.

CUMBERLAND, BISHOP. 1649—1718.

The basis of the moral system of Cumberland contained in his work, "Laws of Nature," may be briefly defined as a certain correspondence between moral action and the laws of nature. These laws of nature he defines to be, certain propositions of unchangeable truth which direct our voluntary actions about choosing good and refusing evil, and impose an obligation to external actions, even without civil laws, and laying aside all consideration of those compacts which constitute civil government. That some such truths are, from the nature of things and man, necessarily suggested to the minds of man, and by them understood and remembered (whilst the faculties of their mind continue intact), and that therefore they really exist. The whole of Moral Philosophy is finally resolvable into a knowledge of Nature, and the research into it must be prosecuted in the same manner as we would natural philosophy—by distinct and well-conducted observations and experiments.

The general law is expressed in the following:—"The greatest benevolence of every rational agent towards all, forms the happiness of every and all the benevolent, as far as is in their power, and it is necessarily requisite to the

happiness which they can attain, and therefore the common good is the supreme law."

This law of nature Cumberland considers is supported by the same degree of evidence as any mathematical proposition whatever; and in the following passage we find it laid down what are comprehended under the designation of benevolent:—

"Man's moral nature clearly evinces that he is a being fitted for society. There are two principles of universal influence amongst the species which must determine them to practise in some degree at least the duties of social life—first, the right of property, whether in things or labour, and secondly, the principle of care and benevolence which parents feel towards their children. By the operation of these two elementary or general laws of our moral nature societies of man, greater or lesser in number, must of necessity be formed. "Human nature," continues Cumberland, "suggests certain rules of life, in the same way that it suggests the skill of numbering: all men who come to maturity, except they labour under some distemper of mind, of their own accord reckon things by number—adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing them, if the numbers be small, without any rules of art. The sentiments of all nations are necessarily the same concerning the sum of two numbers found by addition, and concerning their difference by subtraction, how much soever they differ in the names and charac-

ters by which they express the numbers, which every nation fixes arbitrarily for itself. It seems to me that all in the same manner, under the same conduct of nature, necessarily acknowledge—

1. That the good of all rational beings is greater than the like good of any part of that aggregate body.
2. That in promoting the good of the aggregate good, the good of individuals is contained and provided.
3. That the good of every particular part requires the introducing and settling of distinct property in such things and such services of rational agents as contribute to the common happiness, that is to say such as are necessary to testify the honour we pay to good, or to preserve the life, health, and faculties of every particular man.

In these propositions we shall find the seed and force of all the laws to be contained.

Skill in numbering is much assisted by industry, by artificial characters and by their places, but these very trifles we owe to nature, nor can they ever cause that which, without art, we know to be true, and of necessary use in life to become false, useless. Whatever assistance we may procure from art, the whole effect is to be ascribed to nature rather than art. Just as after the art of cooking had fitted meat for nourishment, no one will deny that we are nourished by the power of nature, otherwise life itself were not natural.

In considering the hypothesis of Cumberland, we are strikingly reminded by his language that he lived in the times when the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton had given an objective reality to natural philosophy. The ambitious scheme of Cumberland aimed at making equally fixed and certain the conclusions of moral science, forgetting the difference between the uniformity of nature and the capriciousness of the human will.

What are we to understand by the laws of nature? Are they the obligatory principles of morals? Then how does man perceive them, and how in the case of two laws which appear to conflict, is he to decide upon the one having the best claim to his obedience. Presuming that an Englishman acquired a large slave plantation, and the repugnance which he felt to retain his fellow creatures in bondage was met on the part of his fellow planters by the arguments that slavery was "scriptural, and even for the good of the negro, in fact that it was a law of nature that the weaker race should yield to the stronger,"—how on the principles of Cumberland could he decide which law to obey.

The comparison which our author draws between the universal acceptance of the common principles of morality, and the laws of numbers, is not a happy one, for skill in numbering is undoubtedly an acquired power.

It is true that men of all nations accept the

result of a given combination of figures, but this is merely so, because numbers form a species of shorthand to which all nations agree to give an arbitrary signification. This signification has been handed down from father to son, and is as much a part of education as reading or writing. Are then the principles of morality equally arbitrary? Then how did man acquire a knowledge of them in the first instance? Because they correspond with the laws of nature? But the laws of nature are in themselves the principles of morality, and so we might go on arguing in a circle for any time.

SMITH, ADAM. 1723—1790. — Principle of Sympathy.

Dr. Smith, so well known as the author of "The Wealth of Nations," in which the principles of Free Trade were first asserted, proposed a new theory of morals in the principle of Sympathy. According to him, approval or disapproval of certain actions as beneficial or injurious does not commence immediately on our becoming acquainted with the intentions of the agent. The mind, before it expresses approbation or disapprobation, must go through another process, by which we seem for the time to enter into the feelings of the agent and of those to whom its action has relation and its consequences or intended consequences, beneficial or injurious. If by a process of this kind, on considering all the circumstances, we feel a

complete sympathy with the passions or calmer emotions that actuated him, we approve of the action as right, and feel the merit of the agent. If our sympathies be of an opposite kind, we disapprove of the action itself as improper—that is to say, unsuitable to the circumstances, and ascribe not merit but demerit to the agent.

With regard to our own conduct, we in some measure reverse the process. We imagine others sympathising with us, and sympathise with their sympathy; we consider how our conduct would appear to an impartial spectator; we approve of it if we feel that he would have approved of it; we disapprove of it if it be that which we feel by the experience our former emotions when we have in similar circumstances estimated the actions of others, would excite his disapprobation.

We are able to form a judgment of our own conduct, because we have previously judged of the moral conduct of others; that is to say, have previously sympathised with the feelings of others.

The objections to which this system lies open can be briefly stated:—

1. In proposing sympathy as a basis of morals, we are at once reminded that this sentiment, however amiable, is of an intermittent and capricious nature, and that whilst it exists to a considerable extent in some individuals, others are found almost totally destitute of it. Nay, this feeling, so far from being common to every

man, would seem to exist in some nations more than in others, and also to a greater degree at one period of life than another. Sympathy is in a great measure an acquired feeling resulting from a good moral training.

2. The adoption of Sympathy as a basis of Morality is in effect a *petitio principii*,* because it must assume certain moral feelings as existing, whilst it proposes to account for these very feelings. Unless man be possessed of a natural feeling of right and wrong, why should he sympathise with a good action and not sympathise with a wrong one? Granted that a moral faculty exists, and sympathy would naturally result, with all that is good and virtuous. Destroy this, and the principle of sympathy must fall with it.

BENTHAM, JEREMY, 1749—1832.

The moral speculations of this great thinker were only sent forth to prepare the way for certain systems of legislation and reform which he considered could not be understood by the public unless prepared by a comprehensive knowledge of the principles of moral obligation and duty.

His theory of morality is that of utility, i.e., "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." In his introduction to the "Principles of Morals and Legislations," he maintains that

* It is perhaps hardly necessary to remind any one reading this book that the logical fallacy, *petitio principii*, consists in the undue assumption of a premiss.

"nature has placed mankind under the government of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chains of causes and effects are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words, a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law.

"Systems which attempt to question it deal in sounds instead of sense, in darkness instead of light."

Bentham presents us with a Table of the Springs of Human Action, with fourteen elements, according to the pleasures to which our desires tend or the pains which we shun. These are the pleasures of the palate or taste; the sexual sentiment; of the senses in general; the pleasures of wealth; of power; of knowledge; of friendship; of reputation; of religion; and of the heart, or sympathy in general.

To these ten he adds four other elementary springs of action:—Anger; love of ease; fear of pain, and of death.

11. Moralists who have advocated the existence of a moral faculty.

SHAFTESBURY, 1671—1711.

Lord Shaftesbury is the first writer who maintains the existence of a moral sense, though not in terms so emphatic as Bishop Butler, and later moralists.

The credit of the assertion of this principle* first in moral philosophy was long given to Francis Hucheson (1694—1747), author of a work of merit entitled, "Inquiry into the Ideas of Virtue and Beauty;" but later research has rightly assigned the merit to Shaftesbury. The writings of this able author, though always studied and admired by a select class, have not obtained the reputation which often attends inferior productions. A notion of a certain looseness in morals is attached to the name of this author, whose presumed opinions have been vigorously opposed by a large and respectable class of writers. Since the time when the hypothesis of Hobbes amazed the learned world and alarmed the Church, more attention had been paid by the Clergy to philosophy, in which they already foresaw a formidable antagonist to theology. Shaftesbury was undoubtedly heterodox in his religious notions, and hence his opponents by a not unpardonable prejudice transferred to the domains of morals objections which would have been legitimate in theology. In the former point of view Shaftesbury

* For the views of Cicero, see Appendix 1. Note A.

cannot be objected to. His writings, so far from being inconsistent with revelation, are, in some respects, more consonant to it than those of preceding and more orthodox moralists.

His views on morals are contained in his work "Characteristics."

The following are his leading principles :—

1. He maintains a moral faculty in the strict sense of the word.
2. That virtue and vice arise from a proper balancing of our affections and passions.
3. He maintains the mere practice of virtue from lively perceptions of its innate beauty and sublimity.
4. That no action can be said to be a moral one which arises from a selfish motive, however refined ; it must be the result of pure benevolence, springing from no other motive than that of loving virtue for its own sake.

The mind, remarks Shaftesbury, observes not only things but actions and affections. The mind, which is thus spectator and auditor of other minds, cannot be without its eye and ear, so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound, and scan each sentiment or thought which comes before it. Thus observing, it must admire or condemn. It finds a foul and a fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here as in musical numbers or visible forms ; it cannot withhold its admiration and ecstacies, its aversion and scorn. To deny the common and natural sense of a sublime and

beautiful is mere affectation. And as this is true of the natural, so is it true of the moral world. The heart at such a spectacle cannot possibly remain neutral, however false and corrupt it judges other hearts to be.

Bishop Butler (1692—1752) is the author who has treated most systematically of the moral sense, and who has pushed his conclusions to the furthest extent.

In his "Sermons on Human Nature," in considering the constitution of man, he observes that "we shall find that besides the senses, passions, feelings, propensities, which he possesses in common with other animals, there is one thing which constitutes a very distinctive mark or feature in human nature, that which, in fact, makes him a different being altogether; and this power or faculty is sometimes called conscience, moral sense, reflection. This faculty or principle exercises a controlling or juridical power, so to speak, over the whole of our feelings and passions, and renders them subservient to its own suggestions and wishes.

"This is a universal principle, pervading human nature everywhere and under every clime; no possible concurrence of circumstances being ever able totally to suspend its authority; its still small voice is everywhere heard, whether we tread in the wilderness or live in the haunts of man. The general powers and faculties of our nature may be compared to different communities or principalities, enjoying their own

internal laws and modes of government, but cemented together under one federal head, and all acknowledging the supremacy of one common sovereign or controlling power, the moral sense.

“Conscience not only points out to us what is right and wrong, but excites in us an apprehension that if we violate its dictates and trample upon its authority, we shall be amenable to a higher tribunal in a future state of existence, where virtue is to receive its complete and final reward, and vice its suitable and everlasting punishment.”

The view of the moral sense thus proposed has been maintained with some slight modifications by Reid, Brown, Stewart, and Dr. Whewell, and opposed by Paley, Bentham, and Bain.

AUTHORITIES.—“History of Moral Philosophy;” Brown’s “Ethics;” Dr. Whewell’s “Lectures on Moral Philosophy;” “Essais Philosophiques de M. de Remusat.”

CHAPTER III.

ON DUTIES.

Preliminary Observations.—Division of Duties: 1. To God; 2. To Man; 3. To Ourselves.—Discussion concerning the origin of Society.—Democratical theory.—Objections.—Monarchical theory.—Difficulties.—True state of the case.—Man social and progressive.—Duties to Mankind; (a.) Negative. (b.) Positive.—(a.) Negative Duties.—Abstinence from injury to person and property.—Property.—Arguments in favour of the institution of property.—(b.) Positive Duties.—In what sense incumbent upon us.—Cardinal Virtues.—Explanation of the Moral System of Aristotle, “Habits and the Mean.”—What the Mean is according to Aristotle.—Conspectus of the Moral Virtues of that philosopher, with their analogous habits of Excess and Defect.—Quotation from Ethics of Aristotle.

MORAL Science we have defined as that which treats of the rightness and wrongness of human actions; why we call some virtuous and others vicious. The obligation incumbent upon every one to cultivate virtue is assumed in every system of morals. Rectitude is “a royal law,” was the ancient aphorism; and man as a social being shows his sense of its importance by punishing or excluding from commerce with his fellows those who manifestly violate its dictates.

Virtue, then, being incumbent upon us, is well divided into duties, concerning which

Cicero* has remarked that in every part and every variety of life there are peculiar and appropriate duties. The rise of the virtues would appear to be progressive in man, and to proceed primarily from the family relation, whence arise the virtues of chastity, obedience, and reverence.

Man, as a social being, has a natural instinct leading him to unite with his fellows for mutual protection and assistance, and so the virtues of friendship, courage, and finally patriotism are called into being.

The divisions of the virtues are various, but one of the most convenient will be into duties we owe to God, to society, and to ourselves. The discussion of the first of these heads does not fall within the province of moral science, but of theology; and we shall therefore commence with a discussion of the social virtues. It may be necessary to preface this part of our subject with some considerations as to the origin of society, and the motives which induce men to abandon some portion of their natural independency for the greater advantages of mutual co-operation.

We are met here by very conflicting theories on the origin of society, proceeding rather from the ingenuity of their authors than from any well-founded examination of the progress of society; whilst some would see in the origin of societies a monarchical principle, by which some

* *De Officiis*, lib. i. c. 2.

one in any tribe or nation, eminently distinguished by the possession of qualities of primary importance in a rude age, would naturally, *jure divino*, assume the supreme power and direct the wills of his fellows; others, enamoured of the principle of the natural equality of mankind, would make a kind of "social contract" the origin of society, whereby individuals agree to surrender their separate liberty for the security of person and property.

Neither of these theories can be supported, but the last is specially devoid of reasonable probability. Allowing the natural equality of mankind, we may observe that this equality is only so far as the law is concerned, and does not relate to the gifts of nature.

Each man has an equal right to the protection of the laws in his person and property; but then this implies that there are fixed laws and a settled state of society, from the existence of which it flows as a natural principle.

Men, therefore, could not agree to surrender their independence in return for the recognition of an equality which would have no existence at the time of the presumed compact. For by nature men are anything but equal; no two men exactly resemble each other in physical or mental endowments; and in the case of numbers the superiority of one or more becomes quickly apparent. Hence the tendency to monarchy in the origin of societies, and to democracy when they are more developed.

In an early and rude age, men readily recognise the possession in another of some eminent physical or mental quality, a reason for obedience ; but when a settled system of legislation, by extending an equal protection to all, has effaced those distinctions of superiority natural to an earlier stage of society, the equality of all before the law naturally produces democratic opinions. When all are conceived to be equal, that all should be so is the irresistible logic of the masses—not a necessary sequence, however. The truth about the origin of society lies in a nutshell. Man as a social being *must* unite himself to his fellows ; as a progressive being, he must go through certain stages natural to his being. To ask why man unites himself to his fellows is as absurd as to ask why he eats when he is hungry, or drinks when he is thirsty. He does so in each instance to satisfy natural wants, and in obedience to natural instincts.

To men thus united certain great primal truths, immediately perceptible by the moral sense, exist, as laws of conduct apart from legislators or legislation, which are sufficient for a time to secure something of order and government.* No tribe so savage or brutalized has ever existed which has not had this natural decalogue graven on the heart with more or less distinctness ; no nation where the broad

* *Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt prohibetque contraria.* Cicero *De Legibus.* Lib. i., chap. 6.

demarcations of right and wrong are not, at least, imperfectly developed. But as the population and wealth increase, these natural laws are found to be insufficient to guard against fraud or oppression, and some wise man arises, a Lycurgus or a Solon, to popularize into laws, written and fixed, the unwritten dictates of the conscience.

Nor is the monarchical theory, if taken in any wide extent, better supported than the other. This state of government is naturally suitable to an early stage of society, and therefore it is generally found existing under such circumstances. The state of infancy and childhood is also one of control and subjection to the will of the parent; but no one would argue from this that such a state of control and subjection is the normal condition of man. In a similar manner humanity, which in its collective capacity goes through changes analogous to that of each individual in his progress from infancy to manhood, will assume phases of government in accordance with its requirements at any particular period.

We shall now proceed to consider the first of our two divisions of duties, viz., those we owe to mankind. These might be comprehended under the one Evangelical precept of "doing to others as we would they should do to us," or under the great virtue "Justice." But it may be more convenient to consider these classes of duties under the heads of negative and positive duties.

(a.) Negative—such as lead us to abstain from all injuries to our fellows. (b.) Positive—those which conduce to our being actively useful. Under the class of negative duties will be comprehended abstinence from all wrong against person and property, including under person not only actual violence, but any action tending to the injury of the individual in his character or affections. The prohibition of all deeds of violence, as murder, assault, rape, is of primary importance to the very existence of society; not only is a great wrong done to the sufferer, but an injury is sustained by every member of the community. Where life, the most sacred of human possessions, is insecure, no progress in society can be hoped for, and the most persuasive argument to a life of honesty and industry is taken away when it is uncertain whether we shall enjoy the fruits of our labours to the natural term of life. Hence, therefore, in all countries, and under every regime, the sanctity of human life has been protected by the infliction of the highest penalties it is possible for society to award.

Nor is the prohibition to be confined to injuries destructive of life; assaults, and other injuries tending to the annoyance, discomfort, or degradation of the sufferer are equally unlawful.

Our second class of injuries are those committed against the property of another. That some should possess superfluity and abundance

of the goods of this life, whilst others are in want of the merest necessaries, appears at first sight a shocking inequality; yet, nevertheless, the institution of property is so universal as to appear almost a law of nature, and to be attended with advantages far superior to any that could result from an unnatural attempt at equality.

1. We may observe, in the first place, that property in some degree represents the prudence and good conduct of its possessors: originally it must have been acquired by the exercise of industry and care, and it cannot even be retained without the display, in some degree, of these qualities.

2. The institution of property operates as a most powerful incentive to industry and diligence. Were all the goods of this world common to all, "that common all would have little worth to the individual who would see nothing appropriated, indeed, but nothing enjoyed." Of what use, indeed, would be labour and industry when their legitimate fruits were not secured? The mass of mankind would sink into an apathetic idleness, seeing no utility in striving after a shadow when the substance was gone.

3. The influence of property as a civiliser of mankind is clear and undisputed. All works of art, and all that ennobles and delights humanity is only exercised in full reliance that the thing produced is the property of the pro-

ducer. Let this principle be once taken away, or even weakened, and who would care to produce that which might be taken from him by the will of some stronger person.

4. The contrary system of an attempted equality is plainly impossible. No two human beings resemble each other in an exact proportion of ability or prudence; and if the most exact distribution were made of property between all the dwellers in the world in the morning, there would be inequality before the evening: no arbitrary rule could make the fool wise or the spendthrift prudent.

An institution so universal and commended by such strong arguments must necessarily be zealously guarded by society. Any attempt to deprive an individual of what is justly his own is rightly considered not only as a wrong to the person, but as an injury to the community: the person from whom the property is abstracted is indeed injured, but a still greater blow is inflicted upon the commonwealth by the feeling of insecurity infused into the minds of its members. Hence, therefore, a large portion of the legislation of all nations is taken up with enactments tending to secure mankind in the lawful possession of the fruits of their industry. Under the head of Property may be considered all wrongs inflicted upon the character or peace of mind, the possession of which may be considered as much a matter of property as any material object. The baser vices of adultery,

and seduction, tending to wound man in his tenderest affections and unsettle the basis of society, as well as the less odious but dangerous attacks on the character of individuals, are equally prohibited. Detraction, calumny, scandal, may work evils of far greater moment than open wrongs to our persons and property; they are also the more dangerous because they cannot be guarded against by specific legislative enactments. Our assailants strike beneath a mask, and work the most deadly injury secure from detection. The effect of these vices should also be considered with reference to their influence on the agents, which is of a kind to destroy all that is estimable in the human character. Whilst history points out to us personages guilty of many deeds of violence who have not been without their noble traits, there is hardly an instance of one versed in the arts of calumny and slander whose name has been transmitted with any applause to posterity.

(b.) Positive Duties.—We have now to consider those more active virtues which lead us to be actively beneficial to our fellows. The duty incumbent upon us to be actively benevolent flows from the first principles of our nature. Man, as we have said, is a being destined for social and political life—a life of isolation and independence is contrary to his nature, and impossible; he must act, and be acted upon by the various influences of society.

As a member of the social body it is his duty to be useful and active towards his fellows, for it is on that condition alone that he has a right to be received as a member of it.

Malefactors and open evil doers are considered out of the pale of society, which can only be held together by the mutual good actions of its component parts. The leading or cardinal virtues, as they are sometimes called, are prudence, temperance, courage, and justice; and as in our definitions we propose to follow Aristotle, the most exact and systematic authority on morals, a slight sketch of his system is necessary.

The words which furnish us, as it were, with the key note to his system are, "Habits," and "the Mean." Mankind, in the opinion of Aristotle, but the words of a later writer* is, "a bundle of habits," and the great aim of moral philosophy is to further the acquirement of good habits.

Habit is that state which ensues from the reiteration or frequent performance of the same action, or in the words of Aristotle, "That by which we are said to be well or ill-disposed in reference to the passions, as with relation to being angry, if we feel it in excess or too little, we are ill-disposed, but if moderately, well-disposed, and in like manner in reference to other things. A habit differs from a faculty, in that the latter is implanted in us by nature, whilst

* Paley.

habit is acquired by voluntary exercise. The mean is that proportion between excess and defect which it is the aim of virtue to secure. The following extracts from Book 2, chap. vi., of the Ethics, will clearly point out the views of this writer. "Now, in every continuous and divisible quantity, it is possible to take the greater, the less or the equal, and these with either relation to the thing itself or ourselves. Now by the mean, with reference to the thing itself, I intend that which is equally distant from either of the extremes which is one and the same in all cases; but by the relative mean, that which is neither in excess nor defect. That 6 is the absolute mean between 10 and 2, for it is equally distant from both, but the relative mean is not to be taken in this manner, for it does not follow that if ten pounds were too much to eat, and two pounds too little, that six would be the quantity prescribed by the training master, for it would be too little for a Milo and too much for a novice. Thus, then, every man possessed of knowledge avoids the excess and defect, but seeks the mean and selects this, and the mean not after the thing itself, but in relation to ourselves." Aristotle, after observing that, as every science accomplishes its work by keeping the mean in view (for in a perfect work of art there is nothing to take away or add), continues, "Virtue, too, must tend to a certain mean; but I mean moral virtue, for it is conversant with passions and actions, and in

these there is excess, defect, and the mean; as for instance, we may feel too much fear or confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally it is possible to be pleased and grieved too much or too little, and both improperly. But the time when, and the circumstances for which, and the persons towards whom, and the motive and the extent of our indulgence of these feelings, constitute the mean and excellence. In like manner also, with reference to actions, there is an excess, a defect, and the mean, and virtue is conversant about passions and actions in which excess errs, and defect is blamed, but the mean is praised and is correct. Virtue then is a certain mean state, being disposed by nature to aim at the mean. And, moreover, it is possible to go wrong in various ways (for evil is of the nature of the infinite [*το ἀπειρον*], as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good of the finite), but we go right in one only, therefore the one (*i.e.* evil) is easy and the other (good) difficult.

It is easy to miss the mark, but difficult to hit it, and for these reasons the excess and defect belong to vice, but the mean to virtue, for we are good in one way only, but bad in all sorts of ways."

"Virtue, then, is a habit attended by deliberate preference in the relative mean defined by reason, and as the prudent man would define it. It is a mean state between two vices, the one on the side of defect, and the other of excess; and

that is because some of the vices fall short of, and others exceed, what is suitable both in passions and actions, but virtue both finds out and selects the mean. Therefore, with reference to its substance and that definition stating its convertible essence, virtue is a mean but with reference to the "Best,"* and the excellence an extreme.

In Book II., chap. 9, Aristotle gives some valuable practical rules how we are to attain to this mean.

"That then moral virtue is a mean, and in what way? and that it is the mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that it is such, owing to its being naturally disposed to aim at the mean, has been shown sufficiently. Wherefore, also, it is a work of difficulty to be a good man. For in every matter to seize hold of the mean is difficult, such as the mean (*i.e.*, the centre of the circle) is not within the ability of every one, but of the mathematician; thus, also, to get angry is in the power of every one, and easy; and to give money and expend, but [to expend]. to the proper person and in a proper quantity and time, and for a proper motive, and in a fitting manner, is not in the power of every one, nor is it easy; whence, therefore, excellence is rare, and praiseworthy, and fair. Whence, then, the man who aims at the mean should first retire aside rather from the extreme which is more contrary, as Calypso advised Ulysses.

* *το ἀριστον.*

“ ‘Keep your ship out of the smoke and wave.’ For of the extremes, the one is more liable to error, and the other less. Since, then, to obtain the mean accurately is a work of difficulty, we must endeavour as the second best course to seize the least of the evils. And this will be best effected in the manner we have described. And we must look with reference to those objects to which we are most easily inclined, for by nature we are born differently disposed to different objects. And this will be shown from the pleasure and pain which arises in us. And we must drag ourselves to the opposite direction, for by moving aside often from error we shall come to the mean, as they do who make straight crooked pieces of wood. And in everything we must be specially on our guard against what is agreeable and against pleasure, for we do not judge in an unprejudiced manner concerning it. Just as was the feeling of the Senators towards Helen, so must we feel towards pleasure, and in all matters give our sentence as they did,—‘To send her away;’ for so we shall be less likely to err. For by acting in this manner, speaking as it were summarily, we shall be best able to hit upon the mean.”

Before proceeding to consider more particularly the cardinal virtues, we present a conspectus of the moral virtues of Aristotle, with their analogous habits of excess and defect, and his definitions of the virtues.*

* Nicom. “Ethics.” Lib. iii, chapters 7—12. Lib. i, chap. 1 to end.

Excess.	Mean.	Defect.
Insensibility ..	Courage*	Cowardice.
Intemperance ..	Temperance ..	Without a name.
Prodigality ..	Liberality ..	Illiberality.
Vulgar Profusion ..	Magnificence ..	Meanness.
Vanity ..	Magnanimity ..	Little Mindedness.
Irascibility ..	Meekness ..	Apathy.
Over-Complacency ..	Friendliness ..	Boorishness.
Arrogance ..	Truthfulness ..	False Modesty.
Buffoonery ..	Versatility of Wit ..	Clownishness.
Two MEAN STATES OF THE FEELINGS.		
Bashfulness ..	Modesty ..	Impudence.
Envy ..	Indignation ..	Malevolence.

Courage is a mean state in reference to the subjects of fear and confidence. Temperance is a mean state on the subject of pleasure. Liberality a mean state on the subject of possessions or property. Magnificence is appropriate expenditure in great matters. Meekness is a mean state which has anger for its object. Friendliness friendship, *minus* the feeling of affection. Truthfulness is the virtue which has truth for its object. Versatility of wit, a virtue suitable for good society.

The sense of shame, Aristotle considers a passion rather than a virtue, and continence a kind of mixed virtue.

The Cardinal Virtues:—

In the consideration of the cardinal virtues, the first place must be given to Justice, inas-

* Of Courage there are two extremes of excess—one the excess in fearlessness—Insensibility; the other the excess in confidence—Rashness. Nicom. "Ethics." Lib. iii, chap. 7.

much as it may be said to comprehend in its signification all the negative virtues. But justice, so far from resting satisfied with mere abstinence from injury, urges us to the performance of active good to our fellow creatures.

To the consideration of this virtue Aristotle devotes the whole of the fifth book of the "Ethics." "Justice is that habit by which the just man is said to be disposed from deliberate preference to what is just, and disposed to distribute justly between another and himself and between two other persons, not in that way so as to retain more of what is desirable for himself and to give less to his neighbour, and contrary-ways in what is hurtful, but to take what is fair according to proportion, and to act in this manner likewise between two other persons. And injustice is contrary to justice."^{*}

† Justice, Aristotle divides into distributive and corrective. Distributive justice is that which is concerned in the distributions of honours or of wealth, or of every other of those things which can possibly be distributed amongst those sharing in the freedom of the State, for in these things it is possible that one man may have what is fair or unfair compared with another. The other kind of Justice, corrective, is that

* Nicom. "Ethics." Book v., chap. 5.

† Justice is spoken of by Cicero as "the cause of all virtues." De Legibus, Book i, chap. 18; and in other places he says, "The foundation of Justice is Good Faith, that is, constancy and truth in words and agreements." De Officiis, Lib. 1, chap. 9.

which has to do with the contracts or daily transactions between man and man. Corrective Justice is sub-divided into two parts with reference to the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions. The voluntary transactions are selling, buying, lending, pledging, borrowing, depositing of trusts, hiring. The involuntary transactions are secret, as theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering, assassination, perjury, and others accompanied with violence, as assault, imprisonment, death, robbery, mutilation; evil speaking, reviling language. Another division of Justice is into natural, and legal, or positive. Natural Justice is the law written in the heart—the broad principles of right and wrong common to all mankind, as “Thou shalt do no murder.” Legal and positive Justice has reference to a matter by nature indifferent, but the subject of some legislative enactment, and therefore binding on the members of that community where it is enacted; *e.g.*, to kill a partridge without game licence is naturally not against justice, but only in a legal sense as forbidden by the laws of the community. Legal Justice may be divided into perfect and imperfect laws: perfect, those which impose a penalty upon the violation of their dictates; imperfect, those which command without imposing any penalty for want of obedience.*

Instances of the latter kind were common in Roman jurisprudence, but are not often found

* See also Appendix 1. Note A.

in modern times ; laws, however, where the penalties attending their violation have either become obsolete or are designedly left in abeyance, may be considered instances of the kind in English laws, *i.e.* the law of Charles II. imposing a penalty for non-attendance at church is practically obsolete ; and the law prohibiting Roman Catholic prelates from taking territorial titles is not enforced.

The justice or injustice of any action depends in a great measure upon its being done voluntarily or involuntarily, and that which constitutes any man unjust is the deliberate preference of what is unjust.* A man may perform a wrong act and yet not be unjust, whence the legal maxim that the *animus furandi* in all cases of fraud must be proved.

A man, however, will not necessarily escape from the consequence of an act because it was done involuntarily, unless he appear to have used due caution to avoid the commission of it. In this point of view, injuries may be considered of four kinds :—

† 1. When the injury takes place contrary to expectation, it is called an accident.

2. When not contrary to expectation, but without evil intention on the part of the causer, a mistake.

* For the views of Aristotle on "The Freedom of the Will," see Appendix 1. Note C.

† Michelet, quoted by Browne, in translation of "Ethics," page 139.

3. When with fore-knowledge, but not with previous deliberation, an indirect injury, as manslaughter.
4. When knowingly and of deliberate choice, a direct injury, as murder.

AUTHORITIES.—Aristotle's "Ethics," Books iii, iv, v. Cicero De Officiis, Books i, ii. De Legibus, Book ii. De Inventione Ehet., Book i.

CHAPTER IV.

Courage, Physical and Moral.—The five forms of physical courage.—Temperance.—Definition.—Chiefly connected with the senses of taste and touch.—Where the duty of practising this virtue arises.—Prudence.—Definitions of Aristotle and Cicero.—An intellectual virtue.—Must be employed on fitting objects.—Prudence not inconsistent with the higher forms of intellectual excellence.—Benevolence.—Necessary to redress the inequalities of life.—Sympathy.—Truthfulness.—Importance of promises.—How promises are to be interpreted.—When not binding.

Courage is the mean state concerning the objects of fear and confidence.

Courage is divided into physical and moral courage, the first chiefly arising from temperament, and experience leads man to withstand danger and death. Moral courage is that which enables him to comport himself worthily under the attacks of misfortune, illness, or calumny.

Physical courage may be divided into political courage—that from experience, from anger, courage of the sanguine, and that of the ignorant.

1. Political or civil courage is that species of daring which leads men to perform acts of bravery, and devotion to their country's cause for its benefit, and to obtain its applause and honours. The patriotism of Leonidas, the excla-

mation of Nelson, "A Peerage or Westminster Abbey," furnish illustrations of this sentiment, which is necessary to the wellbeing of any country, and especially of a free State.

2. The courage derived from experience is that kind which arises when the mind from frequent participation in scenes of terror and danger becomes habituated to them, and the terror they at first excited is lost in the sentiment that we have hitherto gone through them in safety.

Joined to this passive feeling there is an active sentiment of security proceeding from the knowledge how best to comport oneself in the particular emergency. It is experience which makes the difference between the conduct of regular troops and citizen soldiers. The latter may be equally brave, and will certainly, as having a stake in the country, possess more of the true political courage, but the experience possessed by the former, the fruit of constant intercourse with danger, will render them more efficient soldiers in the field.

3. We have the courage arising from anger when the mind, swayed by some violent feeling, performs acts it would not venture to do when uninfluenced by such feeling. Acts of this kind are generally of an evil tendency to the individual and to society, as they emanate from the mind under the influence of passion.

4. The courage of the sanguine arising from a peculiar temperament of mind which leads

them to undervalue the extent of the danger and overestimate the means of escape. It resembles much the courage derived from experience.

5. We have lastly the courage derived from ignorance which appears to be of a stupid and apathetic kind. It is the lowest of the five forms, but is yet capable of producing considerable effects when under wise control, *i.e.*, a body of soldiers when unacquainted with the precise amount of peril they will be exposed to on some service of danger will sometimes perform acts of daring they would not have ventured upon had the full extent of the risk been clearly apparent.

Temperance.—“Temperance is the exercise of moderation in respect to things naturally pleasant” (Aristotle); “the moderation of the desires in obedience to reason.” (Cicero *de fin. Bon. Lib. ii., chap. 19.*)

It is chiefly connected with the senses of taste and touch, *e.g.*, we should not call men intemperate who derived even an extravagant pleasure from the senses of hearing and seeing. The excess even here is to be blamed, but the fault does not come under the name of Intemperance, but the senses of taste and touch, being of a lower and more contemptible order, it is in reference to them that the temperate man displays chiefly his power of control.

For as our nature is twofold, one part being common to us with animals and the other a higher or spiritual part, the temperate man will

seek to bring the first in subjection to the latter, nor allow that to rule which should be under just control. Yet in this respect moderation is to be observed, for any attempt at an ascetism contrary to nature will recoil upon the agent and work evils to himself and society greater perhaps than even the opposite extreme. But as the danger of lapsing into excess is much greater than the opposite extreme of ascetism (for we are by nature inclined to one extreme and not to the other) the temperate man according to the rule of Aristotle already given will endeavour to secure the just mean by departing from that extreme to which he is most inclined.

Prudence.—Prudence is that virtue which enables us to decide upon what is good for ourselves and others. It is defined by Aristotle as a "true habit joined with reason, which is practical on the subjects of human good and evil," and by Cicero (*de fin. Bon. Lib. v., chap. 6*) as "the art of living," and in another place (*de Inventione Rhet. Lib. ii., chap. 53*) as the knowledge of things good and evil, and which are good and which evil. Its parts he continues are memory, intelligence, forethought. Memory, by which the mind recalls the past. Intelligence, by which it perceives things present; and forethought, the knowledge of the future." Prudence was considered by the ancients to be an intellectual virtue, and to be specially conversant with the objects of moral action. Hence

statesmen are often called prudent men, because they are able to perceive what is good for themselves and for mankind.

It is necessary that this quality should be employed on fitting subjects, and under the control of the conscience, or it will degenerate into mere cleverness or cunning, the prudence of the vulgar.

There is not any opposition between prudence and the higher forms of intellectual character as might be supposed from common parlance, wherein a prudent man is supposed to belong to a type of character essentially different from intelligence or intellect. But this kind of prudence is nothing but disguised selfishness, and is rather cleverness or cunning than real prudence.

Prudence, in the real sense of the word, conduces to intellectual excellence, and is a part of it. For excellence in anything is but a choice of the best means adapted to an end in view; and all men who design anything—poets, authors, artists—must be prudent in this sense; and in proportion as they possess this quality will be the value of the thing produced. The misfortunes experienced oftentimes by men of genius are due as much as anything else to a neglect of those prudential measures in the concerns of life which necessity forces them to adopt in their art.

Benevolence.—After the four cardinal virtues, the next place is due to benevolence or charity

in the extended sense of the word. By benevolence is meant that feeling of the mind which prompts us to assist those distressed in mind, circumstances, or condition.

The condition of man in this world is necessarily one of inequality, and from this inequality evils must arise, which are not always owing to any fault in the person who suffers them. The institution of property, by which each man is entitled to be protected in what belongs to him, even though it may be vastly in excess of his legitimate wants, renders imperative the exercise of benevolence, by which this disparity is in some degree effaced. For even superior to the right of property is the right of existence. Every member of a community has a claim to be placed in a position by which he may earn his bread, and failing in this to be supported by those who have a superfluity.

This view of the case so evidently commends itself to the reason of man, that in all countries some provision is made by the state or governing body for the relief of the distress in the country. In England we have our poor laws, the expediency of which may be questioned, though not after such long duration the necessity. It may be questioned whether this compulsory charity, by removing all direct communication between the giver and the receiver, does not do away with one of its chief benefits, the maintenance of a good feeling and sympathy between the different orders of society; and, further, whether the relief

reaches at all the classes most deserving of our compassion. Be that as it may, that charity must certainly be most beneficial which calls into play all the active principles of our nature, and interests us in the object we benefit. Our charity, to be of use to society, must be discriminating and methodical; we must give to proper objects and at proper times, and avoid that kind of spasmodic liberality which by profuse and careless almsgiving perhaps causes more harm than the utmost extent of illiberality could effect.

In the exercise of benevolence, says Cicero (*de Officiis*. Lib. i., cap. 14), these cautions are useful. "First, we must take care that our benevolence is not really injurious to those whom it is intended to benefit; then that our benevolence should not be greater than our means; and, lastly that regard should be had to the circumstances in life of the person."

Finally, charity must not be restricted to the mere giving of alms. In the more extended sense of the term with which Christianity has made us familiar, it comprehends every gift or sentiment by which mankind may be benefited.

* Sympathy.—Closely allied with the virtue of charity is the virtue or faculty of sympathy, which leads us to take a friendly and compassionate interest in the fortunes or misfortunes of our friends and acquaintances, and even of those of whom we have no knowledge, when

* See also page 49.

their case is vividly presented to us. Of this virtue, so amiable and engaging, little need be said in commendation, except that more than others, perhaps, it tends to reconcile man to the evils to which his nature is subject.

Candour.—Candour or frankness may also be considered as one of the most engaging virtues. What evils to society and individuals would be avoided if an honest openness of expression were as much cultivated as a baneful and artificial system of reserve, tending to cause misconceptions and disputes between nations and individuals! In frankness there is something so engaging and attractive, that we need hardly wonder at the success in life of those who are possessed of it.

Reserve and cunning, though they may be for a time successful, are soon found out and appreciated at their true value, and in this as in other matters, the truth of the old adage is made evident that “honesty is the best policy.”

Truthfulness. We ought perhaps to have given an earlier notice of this virtue so important to society and to individuals, but as the leading obligations to its exercise are derived from justice, its importance will be better understood after the consideration of that virtue. Truthfulness is the virtue which leads us in our discourse to state things as they are even though the suppression would be to our advantage.

Truth, says Cicero (*de Inven. Rhet. Lib. ii.*, chap. 53), is that by which things present, pas-

or future, are said as they are. The importance of observing an exact measure of truthfulness in all our promises need hardly be insisted upon ; society, indeed, could not be held together unless the conscience of man, as well as a regard for his own interests, induced him to observe with a fair average exactitude the promises or contracts he may have entered into. Relying upon this, the merchant will entrust large sums of money or goods to one in a distant country whom he has never seen, and concerning whom the only knowledge he may have is the character he has hitherto borne for probity and honour.

Every man from an early age to the most advanced period of life is continually performing actions in dependence upon the sanctity of promises. The obligation to perform promises arises in the good from innate moral principles or conscience, which also in some degree influences all men. But with the majority of men, immersed in the hurry and business of life, there are motives which influence the conduct in this and other respects, apart from any consideration of the abstract principles of right and wrong.

Amongst the influences which may be said to sway human conduct may be mentioned those from education, custom, opinion, and the punishments awarded to particular actions.

By means of these influences the mind is framed to a particular standard, and to view things according to the opinions of those around

us, so that often a judgment which appears most free is really controlled and settled by influences without.

In the case of promises, a desire to preserve our respectability, the knowledge that a failure to keep one's engagement leads to discredit, and to those engaged in commerce, ruin, are motives sufficient to induce even unprincipled men to observe their promises with some degree of exactness.

Dismissing for the present any further discussions upon motives,* we shall proceed to consider in what sense promises are to be interpreted, and in what cases promises are not binding.

1. Promises are to be interpreted when admitting of more senses than one in that sense in which the promiser apprehended it at the time the promisee received it.

Temures promised the garrison of Sebastia that if they would surrender no blood should be shed. The garrison surrendered, and Temures buried them all alive—here the promise was fulfilled in the sense the promiser intended it, but not in that in which the garrison received, which last sense, according to our rule, was the sense in which he was in conscience bound to have performed it. (Paley.)

2. Promises are not binding where the performance is impossible, though the promiser is guilty of a fraud if he be secretly aware of

* See Appendix 1. Note D.

the impossibility at the time of making the promise.

3. Promises are not binding when the performance is unlawful, such for instance as the promise of Herod to the daughter of Herodias.

4. Promises are not binding when extorted by force, as in the case of highwaymen, who, by a threat of personal violence, extort a promise of receiving money from their victims.

The Courts of Equity will release men from the consequences of promises improperly obtained, whence equity has been defined by Aristotle as the corrector of the law, supplying and filling up its deficiencies. (See also Cicero, *de Off. Lib.*, c. 10.)

AUTHORITIES.—Same as last Chapter. Also Paley's "Moral Philosophy," Book iii. Chapter on Promises.

CHAPTER V.

Social duties.—From the family tie.—From friendship.—From benefits received.—From contracts.—From citizenship.—
1. Duties from the relation of parent and child, husband and wife, &c.—2. Duties arising from friendship.—3. Kinds of friendship.—4. Duties from benefits received.—5. Duties from contracts.—Contracts of four kinds.—When not binding.—5. Duties resulting from citizenship.—Importance of these duties.

THE duties we have hitherto been considering are such as belong to man in his intercourse with his fellows, considered as a member of one community, and we have now to devote our attention to those which arise from our social relations. These may be divided into the five heads of duties from the family relation, from friendship, from benefits received, from contracts, from citizenship.

Under the first head are comprehended all those arising from the spontaneous feelings of man as developed in the family, viz., those of parent and child, husband and wife, and those which bind together children of the same parent. The duties of parents and children, respectively, are of the highest importance to society. The parent owes protection, care, and nurture to

the being he has brought into the world, the child respect, love and support to the author of his days.

We might almost test the morality of a nation by the manner in which these duties are discharged, especially that of the child towards the parent. The natural love of the latter towards his offspring is so great that instances are comparatively rare where the duties resulting from it are in any considerable degree neglected, but the converse is by no means the case. The man when arrived at maturity knows nothing of the anxious care bestowed upon him during the long tedious days of childhood, or knowing it remembers it only to forget.

Hence, in all virtuous and primitive communities, seeing that the duties of the child to the parent cannot be left wholly to the bond of nature, since the obligations owing by the one are greater than he can ever appreciate, the inculcations of such feelings in the mind of the child has ever been considered an object of extreme importance.

A certain authority over the destinies, and in some instances the lives, of children has been entrusted to the father, and every means used to cultivate the feeling of respect and duty owed by the child to the parent; and so long as the community remained uncorrupt, this sentiment has remained in full vigour. The weakening of the parental tie has resulted from an ingrowing corruption which, after

invading the social relations of a nation, extends to the destinies of the nation itself.

The duties which are owed in the conjugal relation need no long discussion; they are in some sense the spontaneous offspring of nature, and are also comprehended in those Christian ethics with which most of us may be supposed to be acquainted. Two points, however, may be mentioned, as their neglect even by persons who are attached to each other, contributes in no small degree to the misery often found existing in that relation. These are the duties of confidence and the observance of the forms of external politeness.

A connection which must last for life should necessarily be attended with a frank communication of all matters of mutual interest; their interests are one and common; so also should be their sentiments; any reserve or dissimulation on the part of husband or wife, even in matters of secondary importance, is the commencement of a feeling of distrustfulness which will operate as a canker on affection.

The maintenance of the external forms of politeness and respect is also of great efficacy in conducing to the harmony of wedded life. The proverb that too much familiarity breeds contempt is as true in the conjugal as in other relationships, and if the same civility and external regard were preserved after marriage as often constitutes the great attraction before, the happiness of marriage would be greatly

promoted. Still less need be said of the duties resulting from the bond of a common parentage. Those whom nature has united should also be united in sentiment and action; the feeling of a common origin should unite brothers and sisters in the feeling of mutual desire to be of assistance to each other, and not to forget when separated by the diverse fortunes of life the bond of a like parentage and all the tender associations of home.

From the domestic affinities the transition is easy to the subject of friendship.

Man being formed for society, must necessarily in his intercourse with his fellows be more attracted by certain qualities of those with whom he associates, and desire to cultivate the acquaintance of those in whom he perceives the quality, so that in the communion of a congenial spirit he may realise the fine definition of Friendship—"One soul in two bodies."

According to that author, there are three kinds of friendship:—1. For the sake of utility. 2. For the sake of pleasure. Both these kinds are easily dissolved, and hardly constitute proper friendship. 3. The friendship of the good and of those who are alike in virtue is perfect.—(Aristotle's "Ethics," Lib. viii., c. 3.)

Our duties with reference to our friends may be considered under these heads:—

1. As to the selection of friends.
2. The manner we should treat our friends when thus selected.

1. The choice of our friends is evidently a matter of considerable importance; and it is not too much to say that a great deal of the happiness of our life is concerned in this selection.

A community of interests or identity of sentiments, though desirable in themselves, should not be the chief consideration, but moral excellence of character. Persons to whom we can safely entrust our most important confidences, and on whose counsels we can implicitly rely on matters of high import, should not be selected at haphazard or from the mere acquaintances of a day.

Having thus used all proper care and deliberation, when we have made our selection we must give our entire confidence to our friend and treat him in such a manner as we should wish to be treated—espouse his true interests, and even prefer his advantage to our own.

The consideration of the duties arising from the domestic affinities and friendship naturally leads to a consideration of the gratitude we should feel to those from whom we receive benefit.

Ingratitude to benefactors is a vice of so odious a cast as to be deservedly unpopular even amongst barbarous nations, where it is considered a mark of great unworthiness of character.

Our feelings towards those who have obliged us should be of a warm and earnest character; the consideration of what they have done for us should excite in us a lively desire to requite

the benefit we have received by performing one of a similar kind.

Contracts.—Another branch of duties which remains to be considered is that arising from the contracts we voluntarily enter into.

"A contract," says Paley, "is a mutual promise, and is of four kinds:—Contracts of sale, of hazard (insurance of risks against fire, on lives, &c.), of lending and labour." The first thing which is incumbent upon us is the practical discharge of the obligation, no matter whether it may be to our advantage or not.

We must act also in this manner even if we are not legally bound to perform the contract; i.e., if it has been entered into freely and of our own accord, we are morally bound to perform it; but if the obligation to perform the contract has been obtained by fraud or violence, moralists then generally allow that we are excused from the performance of such contracts.—(De Off. Lib. i., c. 10.)

Under these heads are comprehended the duties of master and servant, and generally of all forms of social relationship where agreement is made for certain services in return for certain advantages.

In all these cases reciprocal duties are involved. On the part of the master, not merely the bare performance of the letter of the contract, but that he should have an interest in all that concerns the real welfare of those under his control: on the servant's, that he should exe-

cute his work with a real view to his master's interest and be faithful on all occasions. The relative duties of employers and employed is summarised with pregnant brevity by Cicero, "*Operam exigendam, justa præbenda.*"—(De Off. Lib. i., c. 13), that labour is to be exacted and justice to be done.

Under our last division are included the important duties of citizenship, obedience to the laws, defending our native land from foreign or internal aggressions, and of endeavouring to advance the moral and material welfare of our fellow-citizens.

Love to our country is one of the instinctive feelings of our nature, and this love should comprehend not merely the soil but the laws, institutions, and government of country; in a word, all that which really makes it to be what it is. And this should be especially the case in a free country where each citizen has a share in the government and the making of those laws to which his obedience is owing.

The circumstance, too, that he is a member of a free state renders it incumbent upon him to defend that state against the attack of a foreign foe or the more dangerous consequences of domestic rebellion.

So instinctive is this preference for our soil and institutions that even he who is crushed down under the tyranny of a despotic government at home feels emotions of indignation at the idea of a foreign invasion; the tyranny of

his own countrymen he rightly prefers to that of strangers.

But the duties of the citizen are not merely limited to the obedience to the laws and defence of his native country ; his patriotism must be of an active nature, and lead him to desire to improve the moral and intellectual state of his countrymen. He must consider whatever of leisure he has or of talents a sacred deposit entrusted to his use for which an account will be hereafter required.

In proportion as a state increases in morality and civilisation, this duty, incumbent on all its members, will be better appreciated, and although much remains to be done, the active philanthropy of our day is a noble recognition of this principle.

AUTHORITIES.—Cicero, *De Officiis*, Lib. i; Brown's "Moral Philosophy;" Paley's "Moral Philosophy," Book iii, part 3.

CHAPTER VI.

On the Duties we owe to ourselves.—Recapitulation.—Duties we owe to ourselves connected with the consideration of the final good of Man.—The *summum bonum*.—Different opinions concerning it.—Aristotle's definition of Happiness.—Light thrown by Christianity on this part of Morals.—Our duty in this life considered as a state of probation.—Duties we owe to ourselves. 1. The due control of our passions.—Why the passions must be subject to control.—Ascetism to be avoided. 2. The cultivation of our moral and intellectual improvement.—Conscience an infallible guide.—To what we must have recourse when the conscience becomes blunted.—Happiness.—Definition of.—Suicide forbidden.—Reasons for this.

THE progress of our undertaking has now brought us to a consideration of the duties owed by man to himself.

Duties at the onset were divided into those we owe to society and to ourselves.

The former we considered under the heads of negative and positive duties; commencing the consideration of the last with the four cardinal or leading virtues, and thence continuing to trace the subject through its various phases until we arrive at those duties which result from our domestic relations. These having been discussed, our plan leads us in the last place to the consideration of the duties we owe to ourselves. The discussion of this question was

considered by the ancients as necessarily connected with the object which man ought to pursue, or, in other words, the *summum bonum*. This was laid down by some to be "pleasure intellectual or sensual;" as "a life according to virtue;" the "subjection of the passions to an entire control;" the "love of wisdom, the pursuit of happiness." Happiness is defined by Aristotle ("Ethics," Lib. i., c. 7) as an energy of the soul according to the best virtue in a perfect (or complete) life.*

By a perfect or complete life is meant such a life as was no way deficient either as to its duration, its bodily health, and its being attended with a proper competence of external goods and prosperity.

Christianity, however, has thrown a new light upon morals; and though it is very desirable to avoid the importation of theology into moral science, and rather to leave each science to rest on its own independent basis, it is impossible not to touch upon a point so connected with the final good: our life, we are taught, is one of probation or trial, the object of which is to fit us for a better and higher existence, in which it is probable that our degree of happiness will be proportionate to the fitness we have arrived at for pleasures purely intellectual.

Our main object in life being then to render ourselves fit for this life of futurity, our duty to ourselves will consist in the pursuit of such

* *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.*

objects, and the cultivation of such a character as may best enable us to attain to this great end.

Under this head may be comprehended the due control of the passions, and the cultivation of everything connected with our well-being. The passions belong to the least noble part of the soul, and are possessed by us in common with inferior creatures. Their use will cease entirely or in a great measure with the present life, and even here the abuse of them leads to so many evils as to render the coercion of laws necessary.

Our passions, therefore, must be subject to the just control of reason, nor attempt to lead where they should only follow.

These feelings, however, it must be remembered are still parts of our nature, and any attempt totally to ignore their influence will be attended with effects injurious to society and to the individual. There is a proper and fitting use to be made of this part of our nature. We may and ought to be capable of an honest indignation for what deserves contempt, a righteous anger for the pretence of goodness, and an honourable feeling for an object deserving of such an attachment. The apathy of the Stoics and the asceticism engrafted on Christianity are alike false and contrary to nature; they ignore an essential part of man's nature and involve in their practice their own punishment.

2. The cultivation of everything conduced to well-being, *i. e.*, our moral and intellectual improvement.

Under this head is comprehended a due regard to our health, our social well-being, and the improvement of our moral and intellectual faculties.

The connection between the mind and our bodily organisation is so close that anything which affects the one must distress the other. An observation of the ordinary duties of cleanliness, moderation in food and drinking, the control of the appetites, of sense, are so essential to our well-being that the neglect of such plain and evident particulars would appear almost incredible were it not of daily occurrence.

Viewing man as being susceptible of continual improvement, this great work of self-discipline should begin in early childhood and continue as long as our life is spared. Moral excellence must be our aim; we must institute an examination of our feelings, sentiments, and passions, and bring them at the bar of conscience.

In conscience, if we will but listen to her dictates, we have an infallible guide who will not only point out what is right and wrong, but magisterially order us to pursue the one and avoid the other.

But the edge of conscience may be blunted by the frequent commission of crimes; the remedy for this is the constant comparison of our standard of rectitude with the moral law of the Scriptures and the practice of the just and good. The improvement of our intellectual

faculties is also a duty. Knowledge is power, and its possession gives us the opportunity of improving both our own condition and that of others. The process of education is one that should last our lives ; we should be continually aiming at a higher standard not only of moral but of intellectual excellence, knowing that in so doing we are not only obeying the dictates of our nature, but influencing our future destiny in a higher order of existence. Happiness consists in the due exercise of our moral and intellectual faculties, and in the proper subjection of the passions to the control of reason.

Perhaps it is hardly necessary to add that, under the duties we owe to ourselves are comprehended the preservation of our own being. Suicide is a cowardly withdrawal from the station in which Providence has placed us ; it is both a crime and a mistake—a crime because we have no right to take away life, the highest gift of God, imparted to us for noble and exalted purposes ; a mistake, because the very circumstances which cause our despair may be only of a temporary nature and are subordinate in any case to the decree of a Higher Power.

Our life and its events form a continuous chain, only one portion of which is visible to our gaze at one time, and the events we deplore to-day may be the necessary precursors of a happier future.

AUTHORITIES.—Whewell's "Elements of Morality." Paley, Book iv. Butler's "Sermons on Human Nature."

CHAPTER VII.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Psychology.—What it is.—Division of Mental Phenomena—Classifications of Aristotle, Reed, Brown, Stewart, Thiel, Morell, Bain.—The mind one and indivisible, and the division in faculties merely an arrangement of convenience.—Method here adopted.—Sensation.—The Understanding.—The Will.—Why we must begin with Sensation.—The Brain the great organ of Sensation.—Description of the nervous system.—Different kinds of sensations.—Physical, Intellectual, and Moral.—The Five Senses.—Account of each.—Sensations which affect our system without coming through the medium of the Five Senses.—Difference of opinion between philosophers as to how much of our knowledge is derived from the senses.—The Sensualists.—The Idealists.—On Perception and the theories concerning it.—Idealists.—Realists.—Scheme of Sir W. Hamilton.—Opinions of Malebranche, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibnitz, Reid.—Laws of Perception.—Concerning the origin of Abstract ideas.—1. Subjective theory.—2. Objective theory.—3. Attempt to reconcile the two.

PSYCHOLOGY or Mental Philosophy is the science which treats of the soul and of the conditions under which we acquire our external and internal knowledge; it is an attempt to solve the problem of the human mind and to give a satisfactory answer to the many questions it suggests.

In every human action of the simplest kind two elements at least must be involved, an act of the mind by which the subject is apprehended, and a mental determination to carry out that act. To the first of these elements the name is given of the understanding; to the latter, that of the will. But this is not all; the mind acts, and is acted upon by the external world, by materials furnished to it in a great measure by the senses. To the will, therefore, and the understanding, must be added sensual perception, the link between the external and internal worlds. The above is considered to be a convenient mode of observing mental phenomena, and will be here adopted; but other classifications have been adopted by various writers.

According to Aristotle, the soul is divided into the rational and irrational parts. The rational part is subdivided into that part which obeys reason, and that which possesses reason properly and in itself. The latter is again divided into that which is conversant with necessary matter, *i.e.*, first principles, and that which is conversant with contingent matter. ("Ethics," Lib. i., chap. 15. Lib. vi., chap. 1.) Reid adopts the classification of the intellectual and active powers of man; Brown, the external and internal affections; the internal affections he divides into intellectual and emotional states. Dugald Stewart adds to the classification of Reid, man considered as a member of a body politic.

M. Thiel's classification is into sensation, intelligence, activity ; Bain into the emotions, the intellect and the will. Morell considers mind under the heads of intelligence, feeling and will ; and attributes to each of these certain progressive stages according to this scheme :*—

Stage.	Intelligence.	Feeling.	Will.
1st ..	Sensation ..	Pleasures and Pain	Will.
2nd ..	Intuition ..	Sentiment ..	Practical Instinct.
3rd ..	Representation ..	Affections ..	Act.
4th ..	Thought ..	Love ..	Freedom.

The classification which may be adopted is unimportant ; the essential point to remember is, that the soul is a unity, and that a division of it into faculties is merely an accommodation to the weakness of the human intellect.

The soul is one and indivisible, and can perform no act without its whole essence being engaged in it. The proof of this will be found on analysing any one of these acts. We shall find a sensual perception, an act of understanding, and an act of the will are all concerned in it, though not perhaps in an equal degree.

When, therefore, we speak of any act of one of sensation, or the understanding, or will, we merely mean that the soul is, for the time being, in a predominant state of sensation, understanding or will, not that there is any absolute division of the soul into these or any other faculties.

Psychology is, as we have said, an account of

* *Elements of Psychology*, pp. 93—100.

the soul, an attempt to explain the way in which man acquires his knowledge.

To do this with any accuracy, we must commence from the state in which the mental powers are the least developed, and trace the gradual progress of the soul until it arrives at the full possession of its acquirements; in other words, we must begin our inquiries from infancy, though our researches must be in a great degree speculative, inasmuch as no one can remember with any accuracy the dawn of his own intellect, still we may get some approximation to the truth by analogies.

§ We have, therefore, to treat of sensation in the first instance, that being evidently the dormant state of infancy or childhood.

The great essential organ of sensation is the brain with its appendages, particularly the nerves that issue from it to certain organs, which are more strictly termed the organs of sense, as it is there the immediate objects or external senses of sensation, the particles of light, for example, in vision, or of odour in smell arise, as it were, and come into contact with the sensorial substance.

But it is not only the brain which is connected with the nervous system. The whole frame is permeated by a delicate tissue of fibre-like nerves conveying the impressions received at one part to another in an instant of time. If we can imagine, says an able writer, the bones, muscles, and skin of the human form to

disappear, and the nervous system alone to remain, the remainder would present to our view the entire human form figured out towards the circumference in the most delicate fibrous trace-work.

The fibres, however, of which it consists approach more and more towards a solid mass in proportion as you get nearer the central line or axis of the body, first uniting together in the spinal cord, and then developing at the summit of the spine into the whole complex structure of the encephalon.

Every portion is more or less permeated by these nerves and fibres, and the impression which is made upon any point of the circumference can be transmitted with unerring precision towards the central line still upwards to its final expansion in the brain. In the lowest form of animal life, the spinal cord, with its ganglionic knots, forms the only centre of nervous influence. As we approach the higher and especially the vertebrated form of animated nature, the spinal cord expands into a mass of sensory ganglia which gives rise to progressively higher modes of sensitive life. The cerebrum next appears, which is at first in the lower vertebrate very small in comparison with the other portions of the encephalon, but it becomes relatively greater and greater until it attains that vast preponderance which we see in the human frame. Accordingly, there are three main centres of nervous force apparent.

in the structure of the animal frame:—1. The spinal cord, from which proceeds the entire power of exciting muscular movement. 2. The sensory ganglia, from which flow the various forms of sensitive life. 3. The cerebrum itself, which is found in man to subserve the higher purposes of intellectual and voluntary activity. The nervous system of man, like that of other animals, is composed of ganglionic centres and nerve trunks, the former being composed of vesicular substances made up of cells of various forms, the latter consisting entirely of nerve fibres of various shapes, but in their most perfect form tubular. By means of the extensive ramifications of the nerve trunks, and the power of instantaneous transmission which they possess, almost every part of the body is brought into such close relation with the central sensorium that impressions made even at points most remote from it are immediately felt (provided the nervous communication be perfect), whilst the influence of mental states in determining movement is exercised no less speedily and surely upon the muscular apparatus. For the transmission of these two sets of impressions—the centripetal and the centrifugal—two distinct sets of fibres are provided, neither of which is capable of taking on the function of the other; they are termed respectively the *afferent* and *efferent*. The afferent nerves are commonly designated “sensory,” but this is not strictly correct, since they frequently convey impressions which

do not give rise to sensations. The efferent nerves, though generally motor, are by no means necessarily so; of the mode in which the former terminate in the central organs towards which they pass, and in which the latter commence their course in the same organs, no general statement can as yet be made, but it is quite certain that in many instances at least there is an absolute continuity from one form of the nerve-tissue to another. The sensations and the sentiments they occasion in the mind may be divided into three classes—physical, intellectual, and moral.

Physical sentiments are those which emanate from the body and are placed in its various parts. Whenever the mind perceives a truth or conceives an idea which seems beautiful, it experiences a feeling of well-being; and on the contrary, from the contemplation of the false or ugly, it experiences sentiments of uneasiness and disgust. These sentiments, as they arise from the impressions made on the mind by acts of understanding, are called intellectual, or, in common language, pains and pleasures of the mind, whilst the merely physical sensations are called pains and pleasures of the senses. The moral sensibility is that which arises from the exercise of our voluntary activity. If the mind has resolved to accomplish its duty, and willingly to conform itself to the moral law, a feeling of peace and harmony possesses the soul: it approves of the determi-

nation it has arrived at, and desires to experience a return of the agreeable feelings excited by it; when, on the contrary, it has violated the laws of morality, a feeling of remorse ensues and a disgust at its own conduct.

These are the means provided by nature for communicating between man and the external phenomena by which he is surrounded. For how much of our knowledge we are indebted to sensation will ever remain a vexed question. One school of philosophers consider that we derive all our knowledge in this way. In their view the mind of man, on his entrance into the world, is a *tabula rasa*—a sheet of white paper having nothing inscribed on it, but potentially capable of everything. The opposite school maintain that there are certain ideas with which the mind of man is furnished on his entrance to the world, and that it is impossible to attribute to sensation the notions we have of time, space, and other abstract names.

The subject will be considered more at length in another place; at present it may be sufficient to remark that it can hardly be denied that sensation plays a great part in the process by which we acquire general notions. It will be noticed by any attentive observer that young children derive much of their knowledge (if not all) from sensual impressions rectified by experience. Whatever may be the knowledge possessed by the mind on its first entrance into the world, this knowledge without the rectification

of experience would be insufficient to preserve the child from the most constant mistakes.

Various theories have been propounded as to the manner in which man perceives the external world or the phenomena of nature; and one philosopher at least has gone so far as to deny the objective existence of matter altogether. Of these theories we intend to give some account shortly, proceeding now to the more important and immediate object before us, viz., a consideration of the five senses, smelling, taste, touching, seeing, and hearing. Sensation, it must be borne in mind, always supposes some movement in the nervous system, but it does not follow that everything which acts upon the nerves is an object of mental apprehension. On the contrary, the nervous system may be affected by sensations which may never, however directly, affect our consciousness.

There are affections of the muscles, and even some states of feeling, which must be distinguished from sensation, properly so called, which implies a certain amount of mental activity, resulting from the attention given by the mind to the sensation presented to it. Amongst these undefined feelings of sensation we may include all those feelings by which we are made conscious of the present state of our whole physical organisation, such as a feeling of health, of sickness, of sleepfulness, hunger, thirst, and also those different muscular feelings which exist independently of any apparent external

impulse, such as shuddering, twinging, cramp, arising from the particular state of the muscles. In all these it is clearly an affection of the nervous system, a transition to the sensorium and an awakening of the mind to the condition of the moment.

Before going any further, it would appear to be necessary to distinguish between sensation, perception, and consciousness. Sensation denotes the impression made on the nervous system by some material object. Perception the knowledge we possess of the accidents of matter, as length, breadth; and consciousness, the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts. Returning to the five special organs, the undoubted vehicle of our knowledge of the external world, it will be evident that the senses of smell and taste form one pair distinguished by certain peculiar features; and that seeing and hearing form another, also similarly separated off, leaving the sense of touch to stand alone, characterized by many remarkable and distinctive features. Seeing and hearing have been called the theoretic or objective senses, as being most closely connected with our intellectual operations, whilst the other pair are of a more practical character, subserving the most important purposes in the economy of animal life, providing pleasures as well as selecting suitable sustentation for the body.

Smell.—The sense of smell is, as we all know, situated in the nostrils and the adjoining nerves.

It is a simple feeling, excited in the mind by the presence of an object proper to excite such feeling.

Natural philosophy informs us that all vegetable and animal bodies, and probably most other bodies, are continually throwing off effluvia of a vast subtlety, not only in their states of growth, but also of putrefaction and decay. It is by these effluvia that the sense is called into operation, and the important purposes it effects need no long discussion, as being of daily occurrence.

In conjunction with the sense of taste, it furnishes us with a guide for our selection of those alimentary substances proper to the nourishment of man; it also, according to some philosophers, contributes, like the other senses, to the gradual evolution of our mental faculties. For instance, when a certain rose is presented to me, the feeling of smell is excited, and in its absence it may still be remembered. Moreover, I may picture to myself a certain rose which I have never seen; in this way the faculties of memory and imagination are called into play. Nor can we say how far the unconscious performance of acts of sensation may not strengthen these faculties. Philosophers like Condillac have contended that all our ideas, and every mental act and faculty, can be accounted for by the operation of sensation on the *tabula rasa* of the mind; but without affirming anything of this kind, it is probable that the recurrence of cer-

tain sensations, and the recollections of them, may go far to account for the existence of such faculties as the memory, &c.

Taste.—The position which this sense occupies, guarding as it were the entrance to the alimentary canal, gives evidence of design and selection. The sense of taste, conjoined with that we have been just considering, are so placed in our bodily organism that everything that enters the stomach must undergo their scrutiny. It is plain they are intended by nature to guard us in selecting what is wholesome from what is noxious to our constitutions; and it is probable that were our senses not corrupted and in a more primitive state of society, they would be a sufficient guide to us in these important respects. We see in the case of birds and animals that they unhesitatingly reject certain kinds of food, though in this as other instances we attribute what we cannot understand in the actions of the brute creation to instinct. Yet any one who diligently examines the proceedings of animals under such circumstances will be of opinion that the senses of smell and taste (especially the former) have much to do with the discrimination displayed. It is also certain that, so far as our species are concerned, these senses can be educated to a much greater perfection than their normal condition. Persons whose business it is to purchase articles requiring careful discrimination, such as drugs and teas, are enabled at once to decide upon the

merit of the samples presented to them by the aid of one or both of these senses, oftenest by smell alone.

The different kinds of taste are infinite; in hundreds of samples of wines no two would probably present exactly the same characteristics. Plato and Galen reckon seven species of simple tastes. Aristotle and Theophrastus eight. Boërhaave and Linnæus ten; and Haller twelve.

* Hearing.—Sounds have probably no less variety of modifications than either taste or odours; the differences of tone in sound are infinite, not only in kind, but in degree. If we compare, for instance, any number of musical instruments, what a multiplicity of sounds, what varied combinations are presented to us. One of the noblest purposes of sound is undoubtedly language, without which mankind would hardly be able to attain to any degree of improvement beyond the brutes. Language is nothing but the combination of certain natural sounds suggested to us by nature and available by compact for mutual communication.

Sight.—To understand the mechanism and functions included in this sense, we ought to have some acquaintance with the science of optics, the laws which preside over the diffusion of light, their refraction and reflection—each of these rays can be decomposed into seven other different colours, and these various kinds of rays absorbed by, or reflected from bodies, are

* Morell's "Elements of Psychology," pp. 112—116.

the cause of the various colours we imagine we perceive in objects, whereas the colour is in the eye not in the object. These rays, reflected with various colours, penetrate through the narrow aperture of the eye, and impress, as it were on a tablet, the images of the objects whence they proceed. The eye in its wonderful structure may be compared to an obscure chamber carefully provided with everything for the reception and retention of the impressions received. The cornea re-unites the rays and makes them converge to the opening where the pupil is placed like a glass mirror. The optic nerve then receives the images which come within range of its influence and transmits the impression to the brain. Amongst the phenomena of vision more immediately connected with the philosophy of the human mind, the most important are those which depend upon the distinction between the original and the acquired perceptions of sight. Prior to experience all that we perceive by this sense is superficial extension with the varieties of colour and illumination. In consequence, however, of a compromise between the perceptions of sight and of touch, the visible appearance of objects, together with the correspondent affections of the eye, become signs of their tangible qualities and of the distance they are placed from the organ. In some circumstances our judgment proceeds on a variety of these circumstances combined together, and yet so rapidly is the

intellectual process performed that the perception seems to be perfectly instantaneous.

Touch.—The senses we have hitherto considered are simple and uniform, each of them exhibiting only one kind of sensation, and thereby indicating only one quality of bodies, but this organ combines to a certain degree the functions of all the rest, being sometimes objective in its suggestions and sometimes subjective, sometimes creating physical pleasures and at another intellectual ideas, enabling us by manifold comparisons to repair the loss of the other senses whilst itself can never be replaced by all put together. The sense of touch is spread over the whole surface of the body, but the hand is more particularly appropriated to this mode of perception, in consequence partly of its anatomical structure and partly of the greater degree of attention we give to impressions made by it. Some of the qualities perceived by this sense are primary, others secondary; in all its different perceptions there is one common circumstance, that we are not only made acquainted with the existence of some quality or other, but with the particular part of the body to which the external object is applied.

It is probably owing to this that we can refer to touch a variety of sensations which have little or no resemblance to each other.

All of these suggest to us the local situation of their existing cause, and hence we refer them to the same class.

The hand is useful in two respects:—1. For examining the properties of bodies and the laws of the material world. 2. For the practice of the mechanical arts. The importance of this organ to man sufficiently intimates the intentions of nature with respect to his ordinary posture, and affords a refutation of those theories which attempt to classify him with quadrupeds.

§ On Perception and the theories concerning it.


The manner in which the communication between the mind and the material world is carried on has ever been a vexed question, and has divided philosophers into the two great classes of Idealists and Realists.

Idealists.—According to the ancient theory of perception, sensible qualities are perceived by means of images or species propagated from external objects to the mind by means of the organs of sense. These images which, from the time of Descartes, have been called Ideas, were supposed to be resemblances of sensible qualities, and like the impression of a seal on wax to transmit their form without their matter. All the idealistic philosophers agree in the main point that we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of perception must be some object present to the mind.

The Realists.—The Realists, on the other hand, maintain that the object of consciousness in perception is a quality, mode, or phenomenon, of our external reality, in immediate relation to

our organs. Before proceeding to give a brief account of the different phases of opinion, we present the scheme of Sir W. Hamilton.*

In relation to the perception of an external world—



Having shortly explained the ancient theory of Perception we shall now give the opinions of some of the more prominent thinkers since the revival of learning in Europe.

MALEBRANCHE, 1638—1715.—After laying it down as a principle common to all philosophers that we do not perceive the objects themselves, but by means of images and ideas, proceeds to enumerate all the possible ways in which the ideas of sensible objects may be presented to the mind; either, first, they come from the bodies we perceive ; or, secondly, the soul has the power of producing them itself ; or, thirdly, they are produced by the Deity, either at creation or occasionally, as there is need for them ; or, fourthly, that the soul has in itself, virtually and eminently, as the schoolmen say, all the perfections it perceives in bodies ; or, fifthly, the soul is

* See W. Hamilton's edition of "Reid," page 818. See also Appendix 1. Note E.

united with a being possessed of all perfection, who has in himself the ideas of all created things.

Malebranche devotes several chapters to a refutation of the first four, and then argues in favour of the fifth, which is his own. His theory is, shortly, that we perceive objects of sense in the ideas of the Deity.

DESCARTES, 1596—1650. — This philosopher assumed as granted that what we immediately perceive must be either in the mind itself or in the brain, to which the mind is immediately present. The impressions made upon our organs, nerves, and brains could be nothing according to this philosopher but various modifications of extension, figure, motion. There could be nothing in the brain like sound or colour, taste or smell. These are sensations in the mind, which by the laws of the union of soul and body are raised on occasions of certain traces in the brain, and though he gives the name of ideas to these traces in the brain, he does not think it necessary that they should be perfectly like the things they represent, any more than words and signs should be like the things they specify. The perceptions of sense are to be referred solely to the union of soul and body; they commonly exhibit to us only what may hurt or profit our bodies, and rarely and by accident only exhibit things as they are in themselves. It is by observing this that we must learn to throw off the prejudices of sense, and to attend

with our intellect to the idea presented in it by nature. By this means we shall understand that the nature of matter does not consist in those things that affect our senses, such as colour or smell, but only in this, that it is something extended in length, breadth, and depth.

LOCKE, 1632—1704.—The views of this celebrated writer do not differ in any material respect from those of Descartes. Speaking of the reality of our knowledge, he says that it is evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is only real in so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what should be the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with the things represented?

Locke was aware, like Descartes, that the doctrine of ideas made it necessary, and at the same time difficult, to prove the existence of a material world without us, because the mind, according to that doctrine perceives nothing but a world of ideas in itself.

He attempts to remove this difficulty but feebly, and concludes his remark with the observation, "That we have evidence sufficient to direct us in attaining the good and avoiding the evil caused by external objects, and that this is the important concern we have in being made acquainted with them;" a position which would be granted by those who deny the exist-

ence of a material world, as the celebrated Berkeley.

BERKELEY, 1657—1753. — This philosopher maintains, and thinks he has proved by a variety of arguments, founded upon principles universally received, that there is no such thing as matter in the universe ; that sun and moon, earth and sea, our own bodies and those of our friends, are nothing but ideas in the minds of those who think of them, and that they have no existence, when they are not the object of thought ; that all that is in the world may be reduced to his categories, viz., mind and the ideas in the mind.

Although Berkeley has stated his views in this open and trenchant manner, the way had been prepared for him by other philosophers ; in fact, on the idealistic hypothesis, the great difficulty in the way is to prove the existence of matter. Descartes, for instance, thought that the existence of objects of sense is not self-evident, but requires to be proved by argument ; and though he endeavours to find these arguments, the attempt was not altogether satisfactory. Mr. Norris, a follower of Descartes, declared that the existence of an external world is only probable and by no means certain.

Malebranche thought it rested on the authority of revelation, and that the arguments from reason were not perfectly conclusive.

Berkeley's argument (on the idealistic hypothesis being granted) is almost conclusive that

if we have no knowledge of anything which does not resemble our ideas or sensations, it follows that we have no knowledge of anything whose existence is independent of our perceptions. "It is evident," he says, "to anyone who takes a survey of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted in the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas framed by help of memory, either compounding, dividing, or barely reflecting those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways."

MR. HUME, 1711—1776.—Mr. Hume commences by distinguishing what authors from the time of Descartes had called ideas, into two kinds, impressions and ideas; comprehending under the first all our sensations, passions, and emotions, and under the last the faint images of these when we remember to imagine them. Having laid down the principle that all the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two kinds, impressions and ideas, he leaves us to guess whether this proposition is held forth as a first principle, which has evidence in itself, or whether it is to be received upon the authority of philosophers. Mr. Hume adopts the theory of ideas in its full extent, and shows that there is neither matter nor mind in the universe—nothing but impressions and ideas. What we call a body is only a bundle of sensations; what we call a mind is only a bundle of thoughts, passions, and emotions without any subject. It

will be thus seen that two philosophers of very opposite views on other points—the Spiritualist Berkeley and the Sceptic Hume—were led by the same philosophical hypothesis, one to disbelieve the existence of matter, the other to disbelieve the existence both of matter and mind.

LEIBNITZ, 1646—1716.—Leibnitz's system of pre-established harmony, taking for granted the impossibility of any immediate connection between two substances essentially different, as mind and matter, represents the human mind and body as two independent machines adjusted at their first formation to an invariable correspondence with each other: like two clocks made to correspond in all their movements, the hand of one pointing invariably to the same hour with that of the other, while the mechanism of each is a whole within itself, independent of the influence of any foreign forms. By means of the same hypothesis he endeavours to account for the phenomenon of voluntary motion. Our minds and bodies are united in such a manner that neither has any physical influence on the other, each performs all its operations by its own internal springs and powers, yet the operations of the one correspond exactly with the other by a pre-established harmony.

According to this system all our perceptions of external objects would be the same, though external ideas had never existed, our perception of them would continue, although by the power

of God they should this moment be annihilated. We do not perceive external things because they exist, but because the soul was originally constituted so as to produce in itself all its successive changes independently of the external objects. Every perception or appreciation, every operation, in a word, of the soul is a necessary consequence of the state preceding it, and so backwards, until you come to its first formation, which produces necessarily and by necessary consequences all its successive states to the end of its existence, so that in this respect the soul may be compared to a watch wound up, which, having the spring of its motion in itself, by the gradual evolution of its own spring produces all the successive motions we observe in it.

REID, 1707—1796.—The first serious attack on the principle of ideal perception was made by Reid, founder of the Scotch School of Philosophy, and the reviver of the principles of Xenon, or Philosophy of Common Sense.*

Common Sense.—Attacking the scepticism of Berkeley and Hume, he observes that after philosophy has done its best and worst, there remains the great heritage of principles common to human nature, which he who disputes isolates himself from humanity, and is beyond the pale of argument. The ability to know these truths demands neither art nor education,

* For a full account of the principles of this Philosophy see the learned dissertation of Sir W. Hamilton in the Appendix to Reid's collected works.

but only a mature reason exempt from prejudices. There are two kinds of truths, accidental or contingent, and necessary.

1. Accidental truths are those the evidence of which is closely allied with the facts proved by experience, and amongst these he enumerates the principle that what we perceive clearly by our exterior senses exists really out of us, for it is natural to give credence to the evidence of our senses. It is thus we learn to know the objects round us, and the idealism of Berkeley is only a philosophic absurdity.

2. Fundamental or necessary truths are those which depend upon no hypothesis, and every science rests ultimately for its support on certain necessary truths or axioms. Thus, not only in mathematics are axioms found, but in logic, as "two terms which agree with one and the same third term agree with one another"; in grammar, as every sentence must contain a verb expressed or understood; and even in harmony and music.

According to Dugald Stewart, an able follower of Reid, the following are the laws of Perception : —1. The object either immediately or by means of some material medium makes an impression on the organ. 2. By means of the organ an impression is made on the nerves. 3. By means of the nerves an impression is made on the brain, but with respect to the manner in which this process is carried on we are ignorant.

The views of Reid and his school on perception have been generally adopted, and the ideal

hypothesis may now be considered all but exploded.

Origin of our Ideas.—Having given a brief account of the various theories of perception, some notice must be taken of the origin of our ideas, a subject about which philosophers have broached widely discordant theories, no opinion in fact being too extravagant or absurd not to have met with some respectable defenders.

Since the earliest times philosophers have been divided into the two great schools of Idealists and Sensualists, the first asserting what is called the subjective view, that our ideas originate in the mind; the latter the objective theory, viz., that all our ideas are derived from external sources, chiefly or entirely by sensual perception. To these schools have been added in modern times a third division, in the persons of those who have endeavoured with more or less success to combine the subjective and objective view of the origin of ideas.

The real founder of the Idealist School was Descartes, although the famous "Ideas" of Plato have long had the credit of having given rise to these opinions. Plato's views, as we shall shortly show, are not, however, reconcilable with this hypothesis. It was Descartes who, starting from the sentiment of personal consciousness, erected his philosophy mainly on the basis of innate ideas, by which he meant certain knowledge or powers with which the soul is furnished on its entrance into the world.

That the mind does not derive its main knowledge from the senses is a principle in which all Idealists concur, but whence these ideas are derived is by no means equally agreed upon. Descartes holds the doctrine of ideas naturally present to the mind; Leibnitz, who though differing much from Descartes, still belongs to his school in this respect, asserts by his doctrine of pre-established harmony that the soul is independent of the impressions derived from the material world by means of the senses; and several German philosophers, as Fichte, consider that the ideas necessarily proceed from the essential laws of thought.

The class of philosophers who derive our ideas *ab extra* are not more agreed in their views than the Idealists.

Plato, strange as it may seem to classify him with the sensualists, really held views more consistent with their theory than with that of the Idealists.* The $\epsilon\delta\eta$ of their philosophy were not considered to be any part of the mind's furniture, but rather as eternal archetypes stored up in the soul of the Deity, after whose similitude everything in mind and matter is fashioned. This view, however far removed from the sensualism of Hobbes or Condillac, has this in common with them, that it derives our ideas from without.

* "The ideas of Plato represent the real forms of the intelligible world in contrast to the unreal images of Sense." Sir W. Hamilton. Appendix to Reid, page 926. See also Note E.

. Malebranche, as we have seen, derives our ideas from the union of the soul with God, whilst others, as Bonald, derive them from revelation. Locke derives them from sensation and from the reflection of the mind on the sensual impressions presented to it, whilst the extreme school of this opinion, as Hobbes and Condillac, derive them entirely from sensation.

The philosophers who aim at combining the subjective and the objective theories also hold different opinions as to the source of ideas. Reid would appear to derive them from certain primitive intuitions of the mind, to which the name of common sense has been given, whilst Kant derives them from the laws of the understanding.

What were the opinions of Aristotle on this subject is not so clear, and his authority has been claimed by all the three. Probably one great reason of the obscurity arises from the different terminology adopted in ancient and modern philosophy, whereby words apparently identical in meaning are used in senses widely different.

We shall state shortly what appears to be his opinion on the subject.

Our knowledge, according to him, is derived in three ways. 1. From the senses, the knowledge of particulars. 2. Knowledge acquired by reasoning and deduction. 3. Primitive notions, like mathematical axioms, not furnished by reasoning, but serving as a basis to it, nor

by the senses, since they only perceive what is before them at a certain epoch, and can have no knowledge of that which is everywhere and always, and still less of that which must necessarily be. The faculty which has the power of perceiving and recognising these primitive truths is called by Aristotle *νοῦς*.

It will be thus seen that his views on the whole approximate most closely to those of Reid and the Scotch school.

AUTHORITIES.—Sir C. Bell's "Anatomy," Vol. ii, page 472; Dr. Carpenter's "Elements of Physiology," page 1040; Morell's "Elements of Psychology," pp. 93—116.

CHAPTER VIII.

INTELLIGENCE.

The Intelligence.—Recapitulation.—Means by which our mental ideas are classified.—Consciousness the earliest stage of intelligence.—Conception, or Simple Apprehension.—Theories about Conception.—Memory, a faculty of an arbitrary kind, evolved by the exercise of the senses according to the Sensualists.—Difficulties of this theory—Imagination a complex faculty of instincts, productive and creative.—Distinction between Conception and Imagination.—Abstraction and Generalization.—Their use in forming common terms.—Great importance of these processes.—Association of ideas.—Stewart's classification of the circumstances which regulate the succession of our ideas.—Seem to be connected with the Will.—Illustrations of their modes of operation.—The great rapidity with which they operate.—Require to be checked by the power of attention.—Influence on the mind and on language.—Judgment.—Distinguished from Conception and Testimony.—Necessary and Contingent Judgments.—Office of Judgment.—Agreement of Ideas.—Percept and Concept.—Intuitive and Deductive Judgments.

THE result of our inquiry into mental phenomena has been prosecuted up to a certain point. Sensation, the incipient state of the mind awakening to the sense of its own consciousness has been considered under its forms of physical, intellectual, and moral sensibility; the various theories of perception briefly commented upon, and the mode in which our ideas originate,

illustrated by the opinions of various philosophers.

We have now to discuss higher forms of mental development, comprehended under the generic term, intelligence. The mind, whether by means of the senses, or as is more probable by the conjoint action of sensual perception and primitive intuitions has been furnished with a large amount of impressions and ideas ; we have now to consider the various processes by which these ideas are classified, associated, remembered, and made available by means of language for carrying on the operations of judgment and reason. The chief of these are consciousness, conception, memory, imagination, abstraction, generalization, association of ideas, judgment, and reason.

Consciousness is the recognition by the mind of the fact of its own existence ; but the sense of the term will perhaps be better understood by taking its opposite, unconsciousness. By this term, we evidently imply an absence of mental power and a loss for the time being of the feeling of individuality. Consciousness then implies the full possession of mental powers and the feeling that these powers are our own, and not another's. It is evidently the earliest stage of intelligence ; before the mind can proceed further in the classification of the phenomena furnished by the means of senses, it must be certain of its existence and personal identity. This feeling seems intuitive to man, and is so fully recognised as to

appear in the most ordinary phrases of language ; we talk of a person being aware, or not aware, conscious or not conscious, of what they are doing or thinking of ; to act in a manner inconsistent with this feeling would plainly indicate some aberration of intellect and madness is nothing more than the loss, partial or entire, of the feeling of consciousness.

CONCEPTION.—After consciousness comes the operation called conception, which is identical with the simple apprehension of logicians. Conception is the grasping by the mind of an idea or mental impression, and enters as ingredient into every mental operation ; our senses cannot give us the belief of any object without giving us some conception of it ; in every operation of the mind, in everything we call thought, there must be conception. In bare conception, however, it must be noted there is neither truth nor falsehood ; to use a logical illustration, conceptions are nothing more than words, which do not express any opinion of the person who utters them as to their truth or falsehood. The difference between sensation, perception, and conception, has been already adverted to, and should especially be kept in mind by the student.* As to the mode in which conception takes place in the mind there have been various theories.

The idealist asserts that it is a necessary consequence of the impression produced on the

* Page 109.

brain by the ideas or images, whether innate or furnished to us from the senses. The realist, that it results either directly from the presence of an object cognizable by the senses or from the reflection of the mind on its own operations. There is an ambiguity in the word conception against which we must be on our guard—it sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, and sometimes the thing conceived, which is called a concept by Sir W. Hamilton.

MEMORY.—Memory is the fact of recalling by the mind a fact, impression, or idea. This is a faculty which appears in a great degree of an arbitrary kind; it varies in different men and at different periods in the life of the same man, nor can we trace how it originates in the mind. The impressions of sense, as we remarked before, may have much to do with the evolution of our faculties, and Condillac and other materialists have shown with much plausibility that, presuming the mind were possessed only of one or two of the five senses, many of the mental faculties would necessarily result.

Take, for instance, the sense of smell; when an object was presented to the cognizance of the sense, proper to awaken the exercise of its functions, a certain impression would be made; when the object was removed it would leave a pleasurable or disagreeable trace in the mental record. This impression might be recalled, and so memory constituted. No doubt there is some

truth in this, but still it leaves the question much where it found it as to the origin of memory; presuming there is a certain innate faculty, the exercise it would receive from sensual impressions would greatly contribute to bring it to the perfection it might be capable of, but no sensual impression can account *per se*, for the existence of a recording faculty; how is it that the mind, when once an object of sense has been brought before it, does not require that it should be again presented before it, in order to recall the impression, but can mentally represent the object with all its attributes and accidents just as if it were present? On the whole this is one of those subjects upon which philosophers can only elaborate ingenious theories which convey no real information.

IMAGINATION.—Imagination is a power of the mind closely connected with memory. It is not a simple faculty, but comprehends within it abstraction, conception, and taste; its office is to select qualities and circumstances from a number of different objects, and by combination and arrangement to form from these a new creation. Imagination has been divided into two kinds, productive and creative; the office of the first is to store the mind with ideas, and that of the latter to form out of them a new creation. The great part played by this faculty in the arts of poetry and painting need not be insisted upon.

Conception and imagination are thus distin-

guished: the province of the first is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have formerly felt and perceived; that of the latter (imagination) to combine certain qualities and to form a new production. Imagination is restricted by some to objects of sight. "It is the sense of sight," says Addison, "which furnishes imagination with its ideas," and Reid observes that "imagination, properly, signifies a lively conception of objects of sight," but Stewart thinks that this limitation of imagination to one class of perception is quite arbitrary. He considers that the other perceptive faculties contribute their share: many pleasing images are formed from the fragrance of the fields, or the melody of the groves, and even the gross sensation of taste may form the subject of an ideal repast in the hands of the poet.

The faculty of imagination is the great spring of human activity, and the principal source of human improvement. As it delights in presenting to the mind scenes and characters more perfect than those with which we are acquainted, it prevents us from ever being completely satisfied with our past attainments, and engages us perpetually in the pursuit of some untried enjoyment, or of some ideal excellence. Hence the ardour of the selfish to better their fortunes, and to add to their present accomplishments, and hence the zeal of the patriot and philosopher to advance the virtue and happiness of the human race. Destroy this faculty, and the con-

dition of man would become as stationary as that of brutes.

Abstraction and Generalization.—The name of abstraction is given to the power by which, when a variety of qualities are presented to the mind, it attends to certain qualities and withdraws its attention from the rest. Generalization is the power by which the mind observes the attributes common to many objects. The purpose to which abstraction and generalization subserve are many and important with reference to the formation of general conceptions and general terms their signs.

Let us consider for a moment what would be the position of the mind deprived of these powers but furnished with the aid of the other faculties we have described. By means of external perception the mind would be stored with a vast number of ideas, still further increased by its own reflection on these ideas; by consciousness it would acquire a knowledge of its own powers and of its personal identity, and by memory it would possess the power of reproducing vanished impressions. These powers are considerable, but something more is needed to fix the knowledge, floating as it were, in the brain; some power which can reduce and bring into order the mind's furniture, assign to each idea its suitable place, and render certain the knowledge at present vague and diffuse.

These important purposes are subserved by abstraction and generalization, which combine

the multitudinous ideas existing in the mind into general conceptions, whence they are further developed into general terms or common nouns. The provinces of abstraction and generalization are, as we see, closely connected with the origin of language, but the discussion hardly now falls within our province. The mind, by a process of elimination and generalization, gradually forms out of the individual existences by which it is surrounded, certain common notions which comprehend under them many separate ideas, united by some common points of resemblance. Language fixes these ideas by embodying them in certain arbitrary signs which serve for all future time as the record of the long mental process by which they were originally formed.

The powers of abstraction and generalization are the most important of our mental acquisitions; they furnish a strong point of difference between man and brutes, and perhaps present a more characteristic distinction than that usually assigned, reason, for certain animals, as the dog and the elephant do appear gifted in some sense with a power of consecutiveness approximating to reasoning, if not reason, but we have no cause to believe that they share in the faculties we have been discussing. Brutes, like men, perceive external objects, but the impression is merely simple and momentary; they have no power of combining or classifying their impressions. The powers of abstraction and generalization are also conceived by some moralists to be closely connected

with the discernment of the morality of actions which we ascertain by an induction of particulars.

On the Association of Ideas.—The name of association of ideas has been given to our mental habit of connecting together different thoughts in such a manner that the one seems spontaneously to follow from the other. The faculties of memory, and of attention, (to be hereafter considered,) seem to have a close connection with the habit we are considering. The following are enumerated by Stewart as some of the most remarkable of the circumstances which regulate the succession of our thoughts, viz., resemblance, analogy, contrariety, vicinity in place, relation of cause and effect, relation of means and end, and relation of premises and conclusion. Of these some are formed on an obvious relation—as resemblance and analogy, contrariety, vicinity in time and place; whilst the relations between the others can only be discovered by time and stade.

We are ignorant of the causes which produce this regulation of the laws of association, but the operation of our will seems connected with them; for instance, though we cannot summon up a particular thought until it offers itself, we can, out of a number which present themselves, select and reject. By the indirect influence of our will we can, by an effort of attention, check the spontaneous course of our ideas and give effect to certain associating principles, and we can also by habit strengthen a particular asso-

ciating principle. The manner in which some of the circumstances mentioned operate will appear from a few cursory illustrations:—

The lover of poetry, for instance, on perusing some striking description of nature, will be led by resemblance to remember other remarkable passages of a similar kind he has met with in his reading; an account of the death of Charles I. will naturally suggest that of Louis XVI.; and the stormy scenes of the French revolution will bring before us its lesser antitype in the revolution at Corcyra. The mode in which vicinity in time and place operate are sufficiently obvious; in going over, either actually or in thought, the scene of any celebrated event in history, we are naturally led to think of the celebrated persons who played a part in those events; in a similar manner, when considering any remarkable character living in a particular epoch of history, one's thoughts revert to his contemporaries and friends. These illustrations may suffice to give some idea of the manner in which this principle of association operates; we now proceed to consider some circumstances worthy of note in relation to these phenomena.

1. The extreme rapidity with which the mind traverses from one end to the other of an extensive chain of circumstances, the omission of any one of which would destroy the mental coherence of the whole, is well worthy of admiration; so rapid is the progress that the mind is often ignorant of many of the connecting links, and is

surprised that one idea should suggest another which seems to be unconnected with it.

A gentleman, on mention being made of the town of Leicester, remarked that no one should convince him that any modern actor was equal to Garrick, a remark which, notwithstanding his well-known character for absence of mind, excited some merriment, and not least in the person the occasion of it, who was unable to conceive how the town of Leicester should become connected in his mind with a celebrated actor; yet the missing links could easily be supplied, the person in question was fond of the study of history, and the mention of Leicester would naturally suggest the great battle of Bosworth fought in its immediate vicinity, which in its turn would bring before him the rivals in that bloody contest. From Richard III. to the great Shakespeare, who has immortalised the contests of the rival houses of York and Lancaster, the transition would be easy, and no less so to the great actor who, by his revival of the representation of our national poet, contributed more than any one else to his late apotheosis.

2. The rapidity of our mental action, and the circumstance that we can only remember a portion of the process we have gone through, assimilates this phenomenon to that of our dreams. Dreams would appear to result from the anomalous exercise of some of our faculties, unregulated by the restraining principle of the will. And it is probable that the great rapidity

with which in our dreams we are able to connect a series of events, apparently spread over years into the compass of a few minutes, may be owing to the fact that this principle of association operates unrestrained by any controlling influence. In considering the important part played by the association of ideas on our thoughts, mental characteristics, and even on our language, we are led to remark, in the first place, that this principle requires to be placed under the controlling influence of a sound will, or it will lead to mental weakness and a want of power of concentration on any subject in hand. Great readers generally experience much difficulty in concentrating their thoughts on any particular subjects ; other ideas than these they wish will come into their minds, leading them away from the point they are desirous of attending to, and men of ability but subject to this weakness will often have much difficulty in expelling intruding ideas not german to the topic. It is to check this wandering disposition of mind that mathematics and logic are so useful, and, in fact, can hardly be dispensed with in any system of education deserving of the name.

3. The influence of this principle rightly directed on our mental characteristics is very great ; by an exercise of will, strengthened by habit, we can summon a particular class of ideas into our mental repository, and banish those of an alien or unsuitable character. The effect of this habit is twofold ; in the first place we are

enabled by the exclusion of extraneous ideas clearly to lay down what we know about the subject we are treating about, and, secondly, the concentration of the mind's attention on ideas of a particular order leads to the begetting of new ideas naturally produced from them. Great discoveries arise in this way by the elaboration of new ideas naturally proceeding and yet distinct from those we already possess. The influence of this principle in moulding our characters into a certain form extends from our earliest infancy; each person is placed within a circle of associations whereby his notions, opinions, and beliefs are essentially affected without he himself being in any way conscious of the practice.

How few of our opinions can be properly called our own! This we owe to education, that to our early associations; we are of this or that form of religion, because we were instructed in it by our parents; we hold certain speculative opinions on politics, because we have been brought more closely in connection with the party professing them; whilst other opinions we derive from the common sentiments of Englishmen, a sort of unwritten tradition, gradually accumulated in the course of ages.

4. The influence of the principle of association on language appears in alliteration and metaphors. The practice of alliteration, so common in our old poetry and in our proverbs, probably originated from a mental association of corresponding sounds, even before any attempt was

made to connect the meaning of one with another. The use of metaphors is founded upon the principle of association ; the mind by this principle connects a certain quality characteristic of a particular existence with some other existence, in which it is occasionally observed. Thus the notion of courage long connected with lion, was by association transferred to man or other subjects, in which the quality appeared to inhere. There is also reason to believe that the principle of association connected with abstraction and generalization has a great share in the formation of general conceptions and general terms.

The principle of the association of ideas was first alluded to by Aristotle, and more fully explained by Hobbes. Hartley in the 18th century constructed his system of mental philosophy from this starting point.

The consideration of the influences of the processes just enumerated on the formation of general terms, leads us to the subject of language, and the power it exercises on the reasoning processes. Without going so far as the extreme nominalistic views of Archbishop Whately, that reasoning could not be carried on unless language existed, it is evident that we can have no experience of any reasoning not carried on by this medium ; it is therefore necessary to consider how far the reasoning powers and the higher powers of the mind are assisted by the use of language.

Let us consider the stage at which we have arrived in our analysis of the mental powers. By the aid of perception and conception, the mind has been stored with a variety of ideas, whilst the aid of memory enables us to recall at pleasure those which have vanished for the time from the mental repository. Abstraction enables the mental vision to select out of a number of ideas some striking common point for consideration to the exclusion of all others, and generalization to observe the one attribute common to many subjects. Lastly, the principle of association of ideas regulates in a great measure the succession of our thoughts.

The progress thus made and the knowledge stored up are considerable ; but something further is needed before the reasoning powers can assume any consistency. Our ideas want fixing ; they run too much into each other, and are destitute of the clearness and precision necessary for argument, for the discovery or application of truth : in short, we want an "outward verification of the inward process,"* and this is supplied to us by the use of common terms and of language generally. When once a word has been formed answering to some general idea, we have fixed a distinctive mark on that idea, and are no longer in danger of confounding it with others, or of ignoring its existence. Moreover, the word preserves for us the result of all the mental processes which

* Morell's "Elements of Psychology."

have been concerned in its formation, and we can use it as a kind of mental shorthand, representing in all certainty the complex process of which it is the sign.

Judgment or Understanding.—The office of judgment is to decide upon the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, and the form it assumes in language is that of a proposition. Judgment is a mental act which enters into most other operations of the mind, but not into conception or simple apprehension, from which it must be carefully distinguished. Conception is the mere recognition by the mind of an idea presented to it, and implies neither truth nor falsehood; but judgment must take the form of a proposition, and be either true or false.*

Judgment must also be distinguished from testimony. The latter is the answer we give to a question put relative to some matter which has come under our cognizance, but does not necessarily express our own judgment in the matter. In testimony also a man pledges his veracity to the truth of his assertion, so that a false testimony is a lie; but a wrong judgment is not a lie, but an error.

The judgments we form are either of things necessary or contingent; that four times four equal sixteen, and that all the parts taken together are equal to the whole, are judgments about things necessary: our assent to these

* "Words and names by themselves signify neither truth nor falsehood." Aristotle. *De Interp.*, 1.

propositions is not grounded upon any operation of sense, of memory, or of consciousness, nor does it require their concurrence, nor is it accompanied by any mental act except simple apprehension, which must accompany every judgment. There are certain indubitable axioms which the mind apprehends naturally and instinctively, without the aid of any testimony or evidence whatever. Judgments of that kind are called by some logicians pure judgments. Our judgment of things contingent must always depend upon some other operation of the mind, such as sense, memory, consciousness, &c. That I visited the Great Exhibition, that I am writing this sentence on the 23rd March, are contingent circumstances, which I judge by perception or memory to be indubitably true, but which carry no conviction of self-evident truth to the mind of any other person.

In judgment about things contingent, all mankind are on a level—the ignorant and unlettered with the philosophers and scientific; nay, in the special judgments relating to matters which have come under their own experience, the former will have the advantage over the latter; it is in judgment about things abstract and necessary that the latter will have a decided advantage.

It is the opinion of Reid and some other writers that the exercise of judgment is necessary in the foundation of clear and distinct notions of things, and is not to be restricted to

the mere agreement or disagreement of the terms in a proposition. The first notions furnished to us by the senses are neither simple, accurate, nor distinct; and before we can have any clear understanding of the mass of ideas floating in the mind, it must be analysed, the heterogeneous parts must be separated in our conceptions, and parts which had before lay hid must be combined into one whole. The exercise of judgment is necessary to the formation of all general and abstract conceptions, whether more simple or more complex, in dividing, defining, and in general in forming all and distinct conceptions of things which are only fit materials for reasoning. This process becomes by habit so easy that the mind is apt to overlook them.

The first thing which the mind attempts after it has acquired the use of this new fund of abstract and general ideas, is to compare the terms which express them one with another, so as to estimate their relative agreement or disagreement. "These judgments may be classified under three heads: we may compare an abstraction with an abstraction, or a generalization with a generalization, or the two together.* As an instance of the comparison of an abstraction with an abstraction, we may take the abstract terms white and dazzling, and compose the proposition, White is dazzling; of one generalization with another, Silver is a metal; and

* Morell's "Elements of Psychology," page 208.

thirdly, of an abstract with a general term in the proposition, "The tiger is fierce." When the mind has once become apt in the use of language, and accustomed to employ words according to their defined logical signification, it is a very easy step to make use of terms without ever having experienced the phenomena that lead to their formation. And it is quite possible, and indeed of daily occurrence, that we may get as adequate a notion of the nature of the thing signified as one who has actually experienced the existence in question. Further than this it would be unsafe to go. The statement of Morell, that a person who has never seen an hippopotamus may be better acquainted with it —i. e., have a clearer notion of what was signified by the term than an African who had constantly seen the animal, appears very doubtful. The impression produced on the mind by the presence of the simple object must be at least equal to that acquired by reading and the information of others.

Philosophers denote the different kind of knowledge which two persons might under such circumstances have of the same object by the terms Percept and Concept.

A percept denotes an idea derived from immediate sensual perception; a concept, the knowledge derived either from the definition of the term or by its relationship to other terms.

We have already drawn a distinction between the two kinds of judgments—intuitive judg-

ments, sometimes called axioms and first principles, and those which are founded upon reasoning. The first are naturally apprehended by all men, ignorant as well as learned; the second, to use the words of Locke, require a certain search and casting about—a power which appears to require practice. The power of reasoning is gradually acquired, and resembles in this the exercise of walking, which is acquired by use and exercise. Nature prompts and has given us the power of acquiring it, but must be aided by repeated exercise before we are able to walk. After repeated efforts, many stumbles and falls, we learn to walk, and in a similar manner we learn to reason. But the power of judging self-evident propositions which are clearly understood, may be compared to the power of swallowing our food. It is purely natural, and therefore common to all.

NOTE.—The reader desirous of further information on the subject of this chapter, may consult Morell's "Elements of Psychology," part i, chap. 6; Sir C. Bell's "Anatomy," vol. ii; D. Stewart's "Collected Works," vol. ii, chap. 4; and Ganot's "Traité de Physique," page 464.

CHAPTER IX.

First Principles.—Difference of opinion amongst Philosophers how far reason is indebted to them.—Opinion of Reid.—Necessary and contingent first principles.—Reason.—Confusion between Reason, the Understanding and Reasoning.—Reason of two kinds; Transcendental and Logical.—Kant on the pure use of Reason.—Means by which Reason effects her work.—Observation.—Reflection.—Tendency of the Sciences to Unity.

THERE is a great difference of opinion amongst philosophers about first principles, and how far reasoning is indebted to them. Some think principles self-evident which others consider to require serious proof. Before Descartes it was taken for granted that the sun, moon, the earth, &c., really existed; but that philosopher thought that proof was required, and Berkeley, as we have seen, denied their objective existence altogether.

Philosophers also differ as to whether these axioms are self-evident, or were derived in the first instance from actual experiment. The ancient philosophers, and especially the perapatetics, allowed that all knowledge must be grounded upon these principles, and Reid, amongst moderns, seems to be of the same opinion. “All knowledge, he considers, which is got by reasoning, must be built on first prin-

ciples, as surely as every house must be built upon a foundation. If we examine, by analysis, the evidence upon which any proposition is supported, we shall find as an ultimate result that it rests upon axioms or self-evident propositions. These first principles do not, however, all yield conclusions equally certain, but depend in this respect upon the nature of the subject with which they are conversant from the highest degree of probability to the lowest. In games of chance, for instance, it is a first principle that every side of the die has an equal chance to be turned up, and that in a lottery every ticket has an equal chance for a prize, whence we may deduce, by demonstration, the precise degree of probability of every event in these games."

The following is Reid's enumeration of necessary and contingent first principles :—*

I. Contingent first principles.—1. Consciousness is an operation of the understanding which cannot be well defined, but of which every one is fully persuaded ; that we are conscious of our being, mental attributes, passions and feelings is of the nature of self-evident proposition.

2. That the thoughts of which we are conscious are the thoughts of a being called myself, of my mind.

3. That these things did really happen which I distinctly remember.

4. Our own personal identity as far back as we can remember.

* Sir W. Hamilton's edition of Reid, page 442.

5. That these things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we perceive them to be.

6. That we have some degree of power over our own actions, and the determinations of our will.

7. That the natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from falsehood are not fallacious.

8. That there is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we converse.

9. That certain features of the countenance, sound of the voice and gestures of the body indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind.

10. That there is a certain regard to be paid to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.

11. That there are many events, depending upon the will of man, in which there is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances.

12. That in the phenomena of nature what is to be will probably be like what has been under similar circumstances.

The necessary first principles are various, according to the sciences to which they belong. Even grammar has its first principles, certain rules existing in all languages and of universal application. Logic has its canons, upon which rest all affirmative or negative reasoning ; and the axioms in mathematics are too well known to need illustration. That there are

axioms in matters of taste, in morals, and metaphysics could also easily be shown. In philosophy, however, it is not so much disputed, as to the necessity of certain first principles, as it is to the manner in which they were originally derived.

Reason.—The highest mental faculty is reason, which it now remains for us to consider, and its precise functions and importance will be better understood by considering the progress made in our analysis and the exact office performed by judgment. The primary office of judgment is to decide upon the agreement or disagreement of two terms or ideas which are brought into juxtaposition. It has no power of combination or of creating new terms and propositions; its power is merely judicial—given two terms, to decide whether they agree together or not. Many errors have arisen in philosophy by a confusion of the provinces of judgment (or the understanding) and reason, and also by confounding the latter with reasoning. By the older writers the understanding and reason were used in a great measure as synonyms, and it is to S. T. Coleridge that we owe (so far as England is concerned) the clear distinction between the two, which has since been universally accepted.

By some two kinds of judgment were enumerated; first, the ordinary facultative judgment, in the sense here used; and, secondly, a higher power conversant about first principles.

But in the latter point of view judgment becomes reason, according to the ordinary definition. Reason, too, is often used as the equivalent of reasoning, or the drawing a conclusion from certain premises, and the student must therefore clearly keep in mind the distinction between the three.

According to Kant, reason may be said to be of two kinds, formal or logical reason, and transcendental reason; the first is concerned in drawing conclusions from premises (and would appear therefore equivalent to reasoning); but the last contains in itself certain principles which it does not borrow from any other source. The distinction is so clearly put by Kant that we shall transfer his account to our pages.

"All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition, and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, that is a logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all the contents of cognition; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, not borrowed either from the senses or the understanding."

To draw a contrast between reason and understanding, the latter may be defined as the

faculty of rules, reason as the faculty of principles; the one a faculty for producing unity of phenomena by virtue of rules, the other a faculty for the production of unity of rules under principles. Reason therefore never applies directly to experience or any sensuous object; its object, on the contrary, is the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity *a priori* by means of conceptions, a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding, the formal or logical use of the reason. A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines three are three angles is an immediate cognition; but that three angles are all together equal to two right angles is an inference or conclusion. Now as we are continually employing this mode, and have become quite accustomed to it, we no longer remark the above distinction, and as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived what has really been inferred.

In every syllogism there is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second drawn from it, and finally a conclusion which contains the truth in the first, and the truth in the second, and that infallibly. If the judgment concluded is so contained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from it without the mediation

of a third notion, the conclusion is usually called an immediate consequence ; but Kant prefers the term conclusion of the understanding. But, if in addition to the fundamental cognition, a second judgment is necessary for the production of the conclusion, it is called a conclusion of the reason. In the proposition, "All men are mortal," is contained the proposition, Some men are mortal. Nothing that is not mortal is a man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first. On the contrary, the proposition, "All the learned are mortal," is not contained in the main proposition, for the conception of a learned man does not occur in it ; and it can be deduced from the main proposition only by means of a mediating judgment.

In the every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of the understanding ; in the next place, I subsume (include) a cognition under the cognition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of judgment ; and, finally, I determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (the conclusion) ; consequently, I determine it *a priori* by means of reason. The relation, therefore, which the major proposition in the rule represents between a cognition and its condition constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. When, as often happens, the conclusion is a judgment which may follow from other given judgments, through which a perfectly different object is cognised, I endeavour discover in the understanding whether the

assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned can be subsumed under the given condition, then this condition follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition.

From this we see that *reason endeavours to subject the great variety of cognitions of the understanding to the smallest number of principles (general conceptions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity.*

On the Pure Use of Reason.—The problem which Kant considers requires a solution is this:—“Can we isolate reason? and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar source of conceptions and judgments which spring from it, or is it merely a subordinate faculty whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions—a form which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the understanding are subordinate to each other, and lower rules to higher in so far as they can be done by comparison. Manifold variety of rules and unity of principle is a requirement of reason for the purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself, just as the understanding subjects the manifold contents of intuition to conceptions, and thereby produces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no law to object, and does not contain any ground of the possibility of cognising or of determining as

such, but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the contents of the understanding. The purpose of the law is by a comparison of the conceptions of the understanding to reduce them to the smallest number possible, although at the same time it does not justify us in descending from objects themselves such a conformity as might contribute to the convenience and enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or in expecting that it will thus receive from them objective reality. In a word, does reason itself contain *a priori* synthetical principles and rules, and what are these principles? Kant resolves this question in the affirmative, after examining the effect of reason upon the material furnished by judgment.

II. Having now given some account of reason, logical and transcendental, we have to consider the means by which reason effects its object, viz., reducing the content of our intuitions to unity. And this is mainly in two ways
1. By observation. 2. By reflection on these observations.*

1. The reason observes; the various judgments furnished by the operation of the faculties of the mind lie before reason at a glance. It is her business to mould these judgments—frequently confused and erroneous—into shape and correctness; to select those which are congruous, and to subject them to the test of

* Kant, "Der Reinen Vernunft." English Translation, page 212—216, collated with the original.

her appreciation. It is in this way that the sciences and arts require consistency and arrangement. The reason selects out of the propositions submitted to her by the understanding correlevant and harmonious facts, and discards those alien to the completeness of the work. 2. The reason reflects upon the result of the observation on the materials furnished by intuition, with a view to still further simplification and unity;—to bring into unity the various facts in mind and matter, to show the great leading principle underlying every art and science, and by comparison and reflection on these principles to show the close connection of the ultimate results arrived at in all objective theories with the subjective realities in the mind; that is the task and business of reason. Hence, therefore, reason is essentially a progressive faculty, receiving new light and strength from every real addition to human knowledge. Out of multiformity arises unity; the more sciences and arts increase, the greater will be the progress of reason: they are all parts of one great whole—necessary to be comprehended in their entirety before the mind can realise the connection—resemblance and difference—between them. When human discovery and invention have reached their limits, reason too will be near the completion of her task, or rather, her one great task, incapable of being effected before, will remain, to reduce all sciences into one, embracing and explaining all those

difficulties, obscurities, and illusions which were inherent to the contemplation of the sciences as units. A magnificent prospect, which it may take ages to accomplish, but which will be certainly brought about one day, and which the tendency of modern thought and modern discovery seem hastening to produce.

AUTHORITIES.—Sir W. Hamilton's edition of Reid; English edition of Kant's "Reason;" Morell's "Elements of Psychology;" and Trendelenburg's "Elementa Logices Aristoteles."

CHAPTER X.

THE WILL.

The Will considered under the forms of attention, acts of motion, acts of volition.—1. Acts of attention.—What attention is.—How connected with other mental faculties.—Benefits resulting from it.—2. Acts of motion.—Cause of physical motion.—Motion of three kinds; circulating, respiratory, and muscular.—Examination of each.—Influence of instinct and habit on the Will.—The liberty of the Will.—How far it extends.—Possibility of the act.—Deliberation.—Determination.—The five circumstances accompanying voluntary action, and constituting collectively morality.

THE most simple analysis of human action will discover the element of will comprehended in it, and so clear is this fact, that amidst all the attacks of sceptical philosophy, its importance has never been seriously questioned. The will may be considered under the progressive forms of attention, acts of motion and volition. In the first of these our mental action is exercised upon the materials furnished by the understanding; in the second on matters generally, and in the third upon the faculties and powers of the mind.

1. Attention, like consciousness, is one of these mental states better understood than capable of an exact definition. Its office is to seize, retain, and fix the ideas conceived by the understanding, and by thus isolating them to render them more clear and distinct. The ideas which the understanding presents to us are often in a confused

form; but by an effort of attention we are enabled to apprehend what at first appeared obscure and mysterious.

Acts of attention may be divided into instinctive, habitual, and voluntary. Instinctive acts of attention are those which spontaneously and often unconsciously arise from the presence of any thing which excites our passions or feelings. The energy of these acts is proportionate to the intensity of the impressions giving rise to them. Habitual acts are these which ensue from the frequent performance of instinctive acts; the mind gets so accustomed to these acts that it reproduces them without either wish or will. Voluntary acts of attention are these to which the mind applies itself of its own free will.

Attention, like other powers, is limited in its exercise, and cannot be long employed, especially on abstract or obscure ideas, without leaving a sensible strain on the mind. Yet its powers may be strengthened by frequent exercise until it is able to devote a continuous application to one subject for a period, at one time deemed impossible.

Attention is closely connected with other mental states: turned inwardly it becomes contemplation; employed upon two ideas with a view to observe their points of resemblance, comparison,* which must not be confounded with

* Comparison is the effect of the mind to seize some point of connection between two ideas; when the mind decides that one agrees with the other, or disagrees, that is a judgment.

judgment. Lastly, in proportion as the power of closely fixing the attention upon any subject exists in an individual, will be the clearness of the impression left upon the brain, and consequently the strength of memory.

The benefits arising to our mental faculties from habits of attention are many and various. It gives increased force to the mental faculties proportionate to the intensity of the will which sustains it. Without attention our thoughts become feeble, indistinct, and incomplete; our sensations and perceptions pass unperceived, and are obliterated from the mind before they are formed. The understanding may be compared to a mirror which reflects objects, but which has no power to fix their fleeting images. These would entirely escape were it not that attention stays their flight and gives them life and duration.

II. Voluntary motion is the result of the influence of the will upon the muscles and motor nerves. Each muscle, composed of several bundles of straight but flexible lines, is penetrated transversely by nervous threads. These, under the action of the mind on the brain, contract alternately in a contrary direction, so that there results a compression of the fibres in a zig-zag direction. The muscles swell and contract, and so bring together the parts to which they are attached, and which are also united by the arteries.* This is the mechanism which

* Thiel's "Cours de Philosophie," pages 212—268.

explains the movement of our limbs and of the parts of our body.

These movements have been divided into three—circulating, respiratory, and muscular. Circulating movements, such as the contraction of the nerves, the pulsation of the artery, by which the blood goes from the centre to the extremes, and then returns to the centre by the nerves, are completely beyond the power of the will, which lays no claim to them. If the Will in any sort it produces them, it does so confessedly unconsciously. Respiratory movements are those by which the lungs perform their office, and inspire and expire the atmospheric air. Muscular movements are those by which we change the position of our bodies. Respiratory movements are partly under the influence of the will; without being able to hinder them, it modifies them, accelerates them, and can even suspend them, up to a certain point, and so judge of the control it has over them. Muscular movements depend almost entirely upon the will; it can ordinarily excite or repress at its pleasure the contractions which occasion motion. To these, therefore, the mind lays claim as the true efficient cause.

The movements of the muscles are, however, at first instinctive, like those of respiration or articulation, and during our life we produce a large number without wishing it or even knowing it. In nervous contractions there are movements which are produced without a

special will : such as those by which we stand up, walk, gesticulate, show on our features the traces of emotion, our articulations and modulations of the voice. At the commencement, each of these movements required an effort more or less felt, which is shown by the stiffness and awkwardness of children when commencing to walk. In time, and by reiteration, they become more easy ; the muscles, more supple and flexible, easily obey the will. This is the effect of habit, which not only makes us perform acts with greater ease, but even implants in us an inclination to reproduce movements become habitual, which far from requiring a special act of will, demand sometimes an energetic effort of will to prevent their recurrence.

Two things alien to our will, instinct and habit, exercise a powerful influence on the development of the principle of motion ; but the influence to which we may give the name of personal power, is the main regulating principle. It assigns to each of our members that proportion of energy and intensity necessary to produce the effect required. Movements of this kind are called voluntary. Amongst the more remarkable effects of the moving principle we may mention locomotion, the play of the features, gestures, cries, articulate sounds or language, the signs of our ideas and the instrument of thought.

III. The will arises from an effort of the mind to master, moderate, and develope its powers;

it arises spontaneously, and is apprehended by consciousness, even when in a state of inactivity, a circumstance which can be asserted of no other mental state. In revealing to us our volition and acts, consciousness does not leave us ignorant of the manner in which the mind produces them. It tells us that the will is exercised on all things and always, sometimes spontaneously forced or compelled to act by another power; sometimes after reflection and deliberation by a determination which proceeds from above. It points out, then, for the faculties which are within us two modes of exercise, the one necessary and obligatory, and the other not necessary; and for the mind two states, the one of dependence, the other of independence. It is only the will which in certain cases escapes from the control of fatality, and even delivers from its grasp for a time other mental powers, and causes them to enjoy a measure of independence subject, however, to its own control. Consciousness thus bears its testimony that dependence and necessity belong as the rule to the other powers of the mind, independence and non-necessity to the will. This liberty, however, is not absolute, but limited and relative.

The absence in certain cases and for the will alone of the irresistible constraint which weighs upon us in other circumstances, this is what we call freedom of the will; a kind of relative independence which differs as much from absolute independence as our being differs from the

Infinite Being. If man's nature were only slavish, and bound by the chains of necessity, he would neither have the notions of liberty and freedom, nor words to express them; if he were entirely independent of their influence, he would be alike ignorant of the idea and destitute of words to express them. The fact, then, that these terms, liberty and necessitarianism, are opposed to each other in all discussions shows the duality of man's nature, at once free and necessitarian. This free will, which is nothing else but the liberty of wishing freely, has for its limits in man the limits of his faculty of conception. We cannot, in fact, wish without wishing for something; and what we wish, after having conceived it, becomes the object of our volition.

Consciousness, on an analysis of the circumstances, shows us that in the exercise of the will there are three facts, distinct and yet closely connected.

1. The conception of the act as possible.
2. Deliberation ending in free intention.
3. Determination or reflective reason.

Deliberation is thus placed between the conception of the act and the determination. It is accompanied and followed by matters well worthy of observation. Whilst an act is without free intention, that is to say, when there is no deliberation, we see in it neither justice nor injustice, merit nor demerit, beauty not moral excellence; nor do we consider that it involves

in it any responsibility. We judge thus of our own actions and of those of others, whenever they appear to have acted without liberty ; and we attribute the responsibility of them, not to the passive agents, but the forces which caused the actions. When deliberation begins it is different ; at the very moment when we deliberate, the act upon which our deliberation is exercised, appears to us as ordered, permitted, forbidden. We feel within us the influence of a force which pushes or restrains us, excites us to do or forbear. A voice within us the conscience seems to say in reference to certain actions, "do," and to others "abstain from doing them." It addresses, as it were, an order to the will to pursue a particular line of action, or to refrain from some other. Yet the liberty of choice is left to the will. Conscience only acts irresistibly on the understanding to make it reveal the order to the will, leaving the liberty of decision for or against. To free determination succeed several judgments relative to this free act.

1. The reason informed by the memory of the order which has preceded the determination judges the act in accordance with this order. If the conscience has said "you should, or you may do so," the act is recognised, ordered, or permitted as just and conformable to order ; moreover, it is judged morally good, and that the agent who has performed it has done well. If the conscience has said, "do not do it, it is not permitted," it is judged morally bad ; it is

bad morality, and he who performs it has done badly. The responsibility of the act is reflected upon the agent, and we say that he has moral merit or demerit ; we judge of our own conduct and that of others according as it is just or unjust, as they deserve praise or merit blame. Very often the action is judged morally beautiful, and its contrary morally ugly, inspiring sentiments of hatred, aversion, and disgust. Just actions have a further effect ; being viewed by the mind as in accordance with order, they produce certain pleasurable feelings from whence arises the judgment that these acts are useful, and the contrary are prejudicial and not useful.

Such are the circumstances which accompany free action ; they are called moral acts, and constitute in their entirety the morality of man. They presuppose in us reason, liberty, and a certain prescription or order, and a forbidding which divides human actions into just and unjust. Whence it follows that morality is the will becoming free and enlightened by the revelations of the law, to which it ought to conform itself freely.

The five circumstances we have been describing are thus distinguished—the first accompanies deliberation and precedes determination. It is called Prescription—Order—Conscience. The four others follow free determination, and are :—
2. The moral judgment of the act.
3. The judgment of moral merit or demerit

in the agent. 4. The æsthetic judgment of moral beauty or ugliness. 5. The judgment of Utility.

1. From prescription or order, the internal voice of conscience, proceeds the idea and law of duty. The term law is so called because it is incumbent on us without constraint (*lex a ligando**), and imposes upon us an absolute moral judgment. It must emanate from a power conceived of as absolute and moral for our ideas of law duty; moral obligation could not come to us from the external world where everything proceeds on in a mechanical manner. They presuppose liberty and reason, and must necessarily emanate from a higher source, the being and author of all.

2. When once the determination is taken, the same power which obliges us to conceive the ideas of duty, moral obligation, compels us to decide that the conduct prescribed is just or unjust, and to declare it, in the first case good, in the second bad or evil.

3. The judgment which declares the act free, just or unjust, reflects also upon the responsible agent, and qualifies him with the title of just or unjust; moreover, in virtue of his responsibility, the agent is judged to have merit or demerit. By merit is meant to acquire rights to be happy; the object of merit is happiness, or a cause of

* I give in the text the derivation of M. Thiel, but that of Cicero from "Legere" appears more probable. *De Legibus*, Lib. I., c. 6.

happiness. It is what we call recompense, and which we endeavour to figure to ourselves by the various advantages, such as esteem, glory, riches. To demerit, implies the notion of punishment and the consequent loss of the advantages of property, character, and esteem.

4. An action just in its kind, or a virtuous line of conduct does not only seem to us meritorious in various degrees, it seems also beautiful, and an unjust action arising from selfishness or brutality morally ugly. Reason brings our actions to the standard of the idea of the absolutely beautiful, and decides upon their nearness of approach to this standard. This is the moral æsthetic judgment whence we derive our ideas of beauty, virtue, deformity, and vice.*

5. The intellectual satisfaction which follows the accomplishment of a duty, or the view of a just action, excites in us a sweet and agreeable emotion which increases in proportion to the merit that we attribute to the agent, and to the beauty which we find in the act itself. The moral circumstances which we have just mentioned are, as we see, very distinct, and it is in proportion more important not to confound them, as from each of them arises a particular motive of action.

1. From prescription, or Conscience, arises the absolute principle of duty.

* For the manner in which we derive our ideas of the Beautiful and Sublime, see Appendix I., Note E.

2. From the judgment of merit and demerit proceed the consideration of rewards and punishments.

3. From the æsthetic judgment the beauty of virtue and the deformity of vice.

4. From the judgment of utility, a rule of interest, private or common, a result of the calculation which balances the inconveniences of vice and the advantages of virtue.

AUTHORITIES.—Thiel's "Cours de Philosophie." Remusat, "Essais de Philosophie."

CHAPTER XI.

ON FREE WILL. ON HUMAN LIBERTY.

Human Liberty limited.—Phenomena which accompany Free Will.—1. Recognition by the mind of its own power. 2. Deliberation. 3. Determination. 4. An act of power.—States when this liberty is circumscribed.—Infancy.—Sleep.—Faintings.—Madness.—Passion.—Drunkenness.—Proofs of the freedom of our Will in the sense defined.—Influences which operate on human actions,—1. The emotions considered under the heads of Passions, Desires, Affections.—Passions - primitive; non - primitive. — Human instinct. — How distinguished from that of animals.—2. Principle of Self-Interest.—3. The Conscience.—Argument in favour of a Moral Faculty.—Views of Mr. Bain as to the origin of conscience discussed.

THE liberty of man, as we have had occasion to remark, is limited in its nature ; we can trace its commencement in the mind, and observe the intermissions and weaknesses to which it is subject. We can analyse the phenomena which accompany the will, and find that the following succeed each other in an invariable order.

1. The first is the recognition by the mind of its power. Before the will operates and secures its freedom, the mind is the mere instrument of the understanding, and must submit to all the varied impressions resulting from the play of the intellectual faculties. Its first step when

free is, as it were, to take possession and assert its own inalienable rights.

2. The second is deliberation, a complex process, calling into play most of our mental powers. The mind examines the various means and ends, and submits them to the scrutiny of reason, which groups and arranges them so as to be ready for the mental judgment.

3. To deliberation succeeds determination, or a choice from the materials presented to it.

4. An act of power, a grasping as it were of the thing comprehended in the mental volition. Human liberty, it has been remarked, has its periods of weakness and intermission, which we shall proceed to enumerate, and thus be able the better to define its limits. The periods when liberty appears circumscribed are infancy, sleep, faintings, madness, passion, or drunkenness.

1. In infancy, liberty only exists in the germ; the power is there, but latent from want of exercise and strength. The child may be considered as a being whose faculties and mental endowments are being progressively developed by his progress in growth, by education, and by association. Instinct and inclination are its main guides during the early periods of infancy, and reason is not consulted as a guide until the dawn of duty in the soul. When reason has made the child discover the obligation of duty, it becomes a moral being; up to that its reason is weak and uncertain, its will erring and unstable.

2. Our personality falls periodically under the influence of sleep, when our will ceases to act. Dreams, as we have remarked before, are the emanations of the understanding uninfluenced by our power of personality. The intellectual faculties are not affected equally with the will by the torpor of our bodily frame, and hence the influences of past events acting on the sensations, produce those images and phantasmata which we call dreams.

3. Fainting, though unlike sleep in many respects, has this in common with the latter that it supersedes the exercise of our will. The mind, exhausted by the weakness of its outward frame, loses its sense of possession and knowledge, until the interval of weakness be over.

5. Madness in all probability arises from the over excitation of certain faculties. In this state the mind has sometimes an extraordinary activity, and the will is in full play. What distinguishes this state from sanity is the absence of power over the will, which is hurried along by a tempest, and against the force of which in lucid intervals it struggles.

In the case of idiots, it is the understanding which is deficient, or which has not arrived at a sufficient degree of development. The will is often obstinate, but darkened and obscure; and there is no choice or deliberation. Incapable of discovering good from evil, these unfortunate beings act under the influence of passion or instinct.

6. Passion is a short madness, occasioned by a violent excitement of feeling. Drunkenness is an artificial folly, a factitious state of idiotcy, in which man from pleasure reduces himself below the condition of brutes. The law which places madmen and idiots in the category of infants, and secures to them all an immunity from their actions, does not admit drunkenness or passion as an excuse for responsibility, because our entering into these states depends upon our will, and that it is our duty to assist these impulses. Such are some of the states in which human liberty, or the power over the will, seems curtailed.

The general doctrine as to the freedom of the will has been asserted in another part of this treatise.* We may add to the arguments there adduced that not the least convincing proof of their conclusiveness is the conformity of the freedom of the will to the moral law: all notions of duty, of rewards and punishments, of merit and demerit, prove the liberty of man.

The active powers of man are subject to three kinds of influences. 1, those that result from the emotions, passions, and desires; 2, from self-interest; 3, from morality.

I. The words emotion, passion, and desire are often used in a loose way to signify much the same feeling. "Emotion," according to Mr. Bain (in whose treatise this portion of mental philosophy is treated with much ability),

* For the views of Aristotle, see Appendix I., Note C.

"comprehends all that is understood by feelings, states of feelings, pains, pleasures, sentiments, affections." Considering the emotion as the generic term, we shall treat of it under the heads of passions, desires, affections.*

a. The passions may be divided into primitive, or those passions which are excited by a force not without but within us, as hunger, thirst, need of repose; and non-primitive, or those whose moving principle is some external cause acting on the mind, as anger, revenge, fear, &c. The force which acts on the primitive passions has received the name of instinct, and the movements it gives rise to instinctive tendencies. The instinctive tendencies, feeble at their birth, continually increase under the power of habit, which has influence not only over instinctive acts and primitive passions, but also over voluntary actions and ulterior passions. As instinct, then, and habit exercise so powerful an influence over our mental organization, it will be necessary to discuss the subject at some length.

Instinct is a manner of preservative action implanted in us by the author of our being, impelling us to certain actions necessary for the preservation, amelioration, and propagation of life.† It is by instinct the infant breathes, seizes his mother's breast, sucks and swallows what it contains, that he cries when hurt and is afraid

* See also Appendix I., Note B.

† On the subject of the Human Instincts, the reader may consult Cicero. *De Off. Lib. I., c. 4.*

when alone. Instinct also incites us to an imitation of the acts and deeds of others, and also to join together in civil communities.

Human instinct is distinguished from that of animals in two ways. 1. The evidences of animal instinct are always the same—there is neither deterioration nor improvement; the dove which issued from the ark of Noah, and the dove which now builds its nest in our woods constructs it precisely in the same manner, and will continue to do so whilst the world remains in its present state. 2. All animals execute their task in a passive and blind manner; the arts on the other hand are invented by one man, improved by another, and then learnt by countless numbers.

That which instinct has made us do prematurely, we do naturally, even without wishing it under the influence of habit. The more any act is repeated, the greater will be the facility with which it is reproduced. Whether habit follows after instinct or the will, it produces in us very remarkable effects. It is habit which renders easy our walk and movements, which gives address to the hand, correctness to our glance, flexibility to the organs of speech, and helps to the expression of thoughts by gestures, sounds, and writing. It exercises an analogous influence on the faculties and operations of the intellect for all profit by continuous exercise. Without instinct, the child could not prolong its life, without habit man would remain a child

all his life, and be as weak, as awkward, and as dumb, as unskilful in every way at the end as at the commencement of his existenc. Habit is the principle of our success in the mechanical arts, and of our progress in science and literature. The extraordinary skill acquired by men, women, and even children, accustomed to the details of some handicraft requiring the utmost delicacy and nicety of touch is a proof of the influence of habit. Education, which constitutes a main difference between the gentleman and clown is the result of the continual acquisition of habits from the earliest days of infancy, when we imitate the tones and gestures of those around us, to our furthest progress in literature or art.

Primitive Passions.—The primitive passions have also received the name of appetites, and are distinguished from desires by their being accompanied by an uneasy sensation which is strong or weak in proportion to the longing we have for the object; in desires there is not any uneasy sensation proper to each and always attending it; they are not also periodical, but constant, not being with their object for a time as are appetites.

Hunger.—If we attend to the appetite of hunger or thirst, we shall find in it two ingredients, an uneasy sensation, and a desire to eat or drink. The desire keeps pace with the sensation, and ceases when it ceases. When a man is sated with eating, both the uneasy sensation and the desire to eat cease for a time

and return after a certain interval. So it is with the other appetites. In infants, some time after they come into the world, the uneasy sensation of hunger is probably the whole; we cannot suppose in them before experience any conception of eating or consequently any desire of it; they are led by mere instinct to suck when they feel the sensation of hunger. But when experience has connected with their imagination the uneasy sensation and the means of removing it, the desire of the last comes to be so associated with the first that they remain through life inseparable.

The ends for which our appetites are given are for the preservation of the individual and for the continuance of the species. The reason of man would be altogether insufficient for these ends without the direction and call of appetite. Though a man knew his life must be supported by eating, reason could not direct when to eat, or what, how much, or how often. To eat merely for appetite is neither good nor evil in a moral point of view; it is neither the object of praise nor blame. No one claims any praise because he eats when he is hungry or rests when he is weary. On the other hand, he is no object of blame if he obeys the call of appetite when there is no moral reason to hinder him.

b. The desires are distinguished from the appetites in these respects. 1. They do not take their rise from the body. 2. They do not operate periodically after certain intervals, and they do not

cease after the attainment of a particular object. The most remarkable of the active principles of this class are—1. The desire of knowledge or principle of curiosity. 2. The desire of society. 3. The desire of esteem. 4. The desire of power or principle of ambition. 5. The desire of superiority—principle of emulation.

1. Desire of knowledge.*—This principle is one of the strongest in the mind, and appears at an early age in children under the name of curiosity. In mature life this desire is distinguished from curiosity by being divested of that easiness and impertinence common to the latter, and which, though allowable in children, becomes disagreeable at a more advanced period. The important purposes subserved by this desire require no lengthened details in explanation; it may be said to be, if not the originator of all acts and the source of all improvement (for we must allow something to genius and chance), yet to play a very important part in the progressive advance of humanity. The desire we are considering is not a selfish one, for as the object of hunger is not happiness but food, so the object of curiosity is not happiness but knowledge.

2. The desire of society.—This desire originates in the instinctive feeling which leads men to associate with their fellows, and having once observed the advantages derived from a social

* D. Stewart, "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers," vol. I., pages 181—160.

over a solitary life habitually to prefer the former. Experience at once points out the superior attractions of social existence, and contrasts its comforts with the tedium and isolation of solitude. So great is the power of this desire in, unconsciously to ourselves, influencing our minds, that a continuous state of solitude is hardly bearable by any one, and even in a modified form is a punishment more dreaded by criminals than almost any external privation. There is, it has been remarked, a close connection between this desire and that of knowledge; when we have acquired information we are led by irresistible principles to desire to communicate it to others with whom we may be brought into contact.

3. The desire of esteem.—This is a desire which appears at a very early age, and would appear to be instinctive in the mind. The young child almost as soon as it begins to stand, shows some wish to commend itself to those who surround it, and displays annoyance if it has reason to believe that they are displeased. Its influence in after life is so powerful as even to overcome the strongest principle implanted in us by nature, the care for our own preservation. The instances of self-sacrifice recorded in the pages of history, and the melancholy details of modern suicides, alike prove the absorbing power of this sentiment. The desire of esteem, though in some sense a selfish principle, yet conduces to the good of society by impelling us to cultivate

those sentiments which we see appreciated by the moral feelings of mankind in general.

4. The desire of power.—To produce an effect of some kind, and that by our own forces, is highly pleasing to the human mind; and the pleasure is in general proportionate to the greatness of the effects, compared with the smallness of the exertion. Even the infant delights to exhibit its little strength in removing the obstacles placed in its way, and the games of boyhood are all suggestive of the idea of power. As we advance to mature life, we gradually endeavour to extend the sphere of our influence by the superiority of fortune, of situation, or intellectual powers. The idea of power is at the bottom of the pleasure we receive in making new or surprising discoveries which place us in a position of advantage with regard to our fellow-men. So the foundation of an attachment to property, the passion of avarice, and even the love of liberty, proceed in part from the same source. The possession of the first and the savings which are the result of the second gives us a pleasureable feeling of superiority as compared with the other not possessed of such advantages, whilst liberty is dear to us because constraint impairs our powers.

Although this desire of power when pushed to an excess tends to an ambition fatal alike to individuals and nations, yet its beneficial influences are many and widely diffused. It

furnishes the most powerful stimulus to action, and we may say that without it the progress of society towards civilization would be greatly retarded. The desire of establishing oneself in a position of influence whence we may command the wills of others is a principle most natural to mankind. It leads men to forego all present enjoyment, to sacrifice many comforts, in pursuit of a distant object the issue of which is uncertain.

To this principle may also be referred the phenomenon of laughter, the cause of which has given rise to so many various theories. Laughter arises from a feeling of our power and superiority. When any person or circumstances appear to us in a humiliating or ridiculous position, the mind of the beholder institutes an involuntary and instantaneous comparison between its own situation and theirs. Laughter is a tribute we pay to a notion of our own power and a feeling of contempt for those who occasion it.*

5. Desire of superiority.—The principle of emulation has often been classified by Reid with the malevolent affections, but as the desire of superiority is the leading feature in it, and the ill-will sometimes entertained towards rivals only a secondary and concomitant circumstance, Stewart thinks it best to range it amongst the

* "Laughter," according to Mr. Bain, "arises from the rebound from a position of constraint; it is a re-action from a fatiguing state of tension."

desires. The principle of emulation is closely connected with that of power, if not a branch of that principle. We desire to be superior to our fellows, with a view to some end ; it is true the feeling itself may cause pleasure, but it is not cultivated with this view. It is for a certain fixed and determinate end in view that we exert our energies to outstrip a rival, and the feeling of superiority or emulation seems only a concomitant circumstance.

Emulation, when accompanied with malevolent affection, assumes the name of envy. The distinction between the two is thus stated by Bishop Butler : — “ Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or of equality and superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. To desire the attainment of this superiority by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy.”

c. The affections are naturally divided into benevolent and malevolent* affections : — 1. Under the head benevolent affections are comprehended the affections of kindred, love, friendship, patriotism, universal benevolence, gratitude, pity to the distressed.

1. The benevolent affections would seem to be susceptible of a reduction to the funda-

* By the term “ malevolent,” is not meant anything necessarily criminal, but merely the temporary ill-will towards the author of some injustice.

mental principle—Love. If this love is, as it were, suggested to us by nature, and exercised towards those with whom we are closely connected, it assumes the form of parental conjugal, and filial affection, friendship, &c.; and if it is more of an acquired sentiment, the fruit in a great measure of the society in which we move and from which we take our opinions, it has the name of patriotism, universal benevolence, gratitude, sympathy for the distressed.

The affections have certain points in common: they belong to the whole race of man; the vicious as well as the virtuous partake in greater or less degree of their influence, and have their happiness or misery augmented in consequence; they are attended with a certain feeling of pleasure arising from the mere exercise of the affections, irrespective of any success in the attainment of the object; nay, it may be said that in many instances the sentiment arising from the feeling causes a greater pleasure than results from the actual possession. The destiny which has written “Vanity, vanity, all is vanity,” on everything human, causes man to be as tired of the object desired as the child of the long-coveted plaything. 2. Under the head of Malevolent Affections are included envy, hatred, jealousy, revenge, all which in the opinion of many persons would seem to originate from the single principle of resentment.

Resentment has been divided by Bishop Butler and Lord Kaimes into two kinds:—

(a.) Instinctive, which operates in man exactly as in the lower animals, arising necessarily from any feeling of pain caused by an external object, and which prompts us to retaliate upon the cause of our suffering without any exercise of reflection or reason.

(b.) Deliberate resentment is excited only by intentional injury, and therefore implies a sense of justice, or of moral good and evil. It is plainly peculiar to a rational creature. Resentment, when restrained within due bounds, seems to be rather a sentiment of hatred against vice than an affection of ill-will towards our fellows; but as the imagination is prone to exaggerate the injuries that we have ourselves received, constant self-control is required to restrain this principle in the bounds of moderation, even in good men.

The feeling of indignation is a species of resentment. Injustice offered to others as well as to ourselves awakens our resentment against the oppressor, and prompts us to take part in the redress of their grievances. This sentiment interests society at large in the cause of the oppressed, and serves to protect the weak against the wrongs of the powerful.

According to Dr. Smith, our notion of justice arises from the principle of resentment, which, when excited by a personal injury, would set no bounds to its gratification, but would lead us to sacrifice everything for revenge. But as we find that others do not go along with us in

these views, we learn to adjust our retaliation, not to our own feelings, but to those of an impartial spectator. Hence the origin of justice, our regard for which arises from our desire to obtain the sympathy of society.

All the affections, the benevolent as well as the malevolent, exercise a great influence on the will. Man is a composite being, swayed and influenced by many contending influences. The dictates of reason are too successfully opposed by the impulses of passion—a prudential course of conduct calculated to promote real happiness, by the imperious mandate of some violent desire or the sway of some dominant affection. Hence it is the duty of every rational being to bring his passions under the control of reason—to regulate his desires to the attainment of possible and laudable objects, and to moderate his affections in accordance with the true law of his being.

We have now to speak of the influence exercised over the mind by the principle of self-love and by morality.

II. Of self-love.—The active principles which we have hitherto considered are common to man with the brutes, and his nature would be analogous did not his mental endowment go further. But the possession of reason, by enabling man to foresee consequences and weigh the advantages of different courses of action, as well as by placing him under the influence of certain moral principles, have drawn a wide line of demarcation between their two natures.

The brute is influenced and guided by some present sensation or impulse; but man is capable of self-government, and can refuse himself present gratification when it appears contrary to his true interests. In the terse words of Seneca, “*Animalibus pro ratione, impetus. Homini pro impetu, ratio.*”

There is an ambiguity about the word “self-love” which must be carefully guarded against. It does not mean that perverted feeling called selfishness, but such a reasonable care for our preservation as is recommended by reason and the constitution of our being.

A systematic course of life, invariably directed to certain objects, is more favourable to happiness than one which is influenced by occasional impulses and appetites. Even the man who is decidedly and uniformly unprincipled is free from much of the disquiet which disturbs the tranquillity of those whose characters are more mixed or more inconsistent. The principle of self-love is a kind of higher instinct: it teaches us to exercise a prudential regard for our happiness, and to do that on certain rational principles which the brutes, so far as their material welfare is concerned, perform by the mere promptings of nature. In the exercise of this principle there is nothing mean or sordid. It is incumbent upon us, if we would answer to the purposes of our moral being, to carry out that self-government without which there can be neither rational happiness nor success in life.

The mastery of an impetuous passion, the sacrificing of some darling scheme, the denial of some urgent request when justice to ourselves or others will not allow us to comply with it—all these are things which man may not only do, but which he must do if he will carry out that principle of moral government to perfect which is the great object of his creation, and should form the constant aim of his life.

III. In considering the influence of the moral faculty on the will, two points are to be borne in mind :—(a.) Is there such a thing as a moral faculty as a distinct principle of man's nature? (b.) Supposing there be, in what way does it exercise its influence? (a.) In another part of this treatise we have considered in a concise manner the leading arguments which tend to prove the existence of this faculty, noticing also the chief objections which have been urged against it.

We may here add that the attempt by Mr. Bain to prove that conscience is merely the reflex of human authority as embodied in laws does not appear to be very successful, although supported with much ingenuity and plausibility.*

Admitting that the consciences of the many and that their notions of right and wrong are in a great measure regulated by positive enactments, this cannot account for the first notions

* The "Emotions and the Will," page 313.

of right and wrong, or on what principle men qualify, and have always done so, and in all languages, certain actions as moral and others as immoral. It cannot be in accordance with any human standard or laws, because the actions must exist and be performed prior to any laws. There would be no sense in any law forbidding theft or murder if no theft or murder had ever occurred. If they had occurred, whence came the moral principle judging them to be bad and forbidding them?

We may observe, also, that so far from the conscience of man being invariably directed by human authority as embodied in the laws, it is only so far directed as these laws are in accordance with those instinctive notions of right and wrong implanted by the Deity in our breast. When the law runs counter to these, conscience revolts, and ultimately procures the repeal of the obnoxious measure. Duelling was long in force, but few ever engaged in a duel with a distinct notion that they were doing a meritorious action, or attempted to justify it on any but grounds of expediency. A mistaken principle of honour caused men to engage in these encounters, but it was rarely that conscience did not utter its silent remonstrance, only to be disregarded by the hardened and practised duellist.

(b.) The moral principle, as the source of our notions of right and wrong, and of moral obligation, acts upon man in two different ways :—

1. By the internal voice, which pronounces certain actions to be right and expedient, others to be wrong and inexpedient. 2. By engrafting its maxims in human laws.

These two, *i. e.*, the Conscience and human laws, act mutually upon each other and check their mutual aberrations. Should the conscience of an individual from any fault of nature or of education be so darkened as to become an unfaithful monitor, the voice of the law—the record, as we may say, of the universal conscience—stands as a check and barrier in this way. On the other hand, the enactments of the law are judged by the internal voice within us, and when from any cause they are contrary to true morality, it utters its protest against them. Under certain exceptional cases, laws may exist contrary to morality, contrary to the instinctive notions of right implanted within us. Against such conscience raises her voice, and aims to bring into harmony the laws of man with that higher law by which she is herself governed—the law implanted in the heart by the Governor of the Universe.

APPENDIX. No. 1.

NOTE A. REFERRING TO PAGE 58.

THE doctrine of a Moral Faculty, though not expressly alluded to by Cicero, would seem to be implied in his account of Law, which he defines as the "highest reason, ingrafted in nature, which orders what should be done, and prohibits the contrary. The same reason, when it is confirmed and deduced in the mind of man is Law." *De Legibus*, Lib. i., c. 6.

And in another place he speaks of law as "right reason, agreeable to nature, found amongst all men constant, everlasting, which calls to duty by ordering, and deters from fraud by forbidding; nor will there be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one at this time, another at another time; but one law everlasting and immortal will contain all nations in all time. And there will be one common, as it were, Master and Commander of all—God." *Frag. de Rep.*, Lib: iii.

From these passages the following conclusions may, I think, be justly drawn.

1. That Cicero distinguishes Natural Law, the law "written in the heart," from positive law, the enactment of men.

2. That this natural law has an objective existence apart from all human legislation.

3. That it calls men to virtue, and deters them from vice, and is the same in all countries.

4. That human law is, as it were, the copy and exemplar of Natural Law.

These propositions would certainly seem to imply the existence of a Moral Faculty as an innate power of man, for (to omit other considerations) how could man know that positive law was in accordance with the divine law, unless he had some internal principle to direct him in his search? And how is it possible to reconcile the statement that our notions of right and wrong are derived from Utility, Benevolence, Expediency, with the existence of this eternal and unchangeable law, the same everywhere and always.

The following table exhibits the various divisions of law :—

Law.	
Natural	Positive
Imperfect, Perfect, By, or Municipal Law.	

Moral Philosophy is distinguished from law or jurisprudence and Natural Religion in this way; the first looks at the motives of actions, the second only at the actual deeds; the one punishes man for his evil thoughts, the other for his evil actions. Natural religion is a belief in the certain great truths apart from all human testimony, such as the evidence of the existence and goodness of God as seen in His works; of the corruption and evil of man as seen in our own thoughts.

Each require the assistance and aid of the

other. Without morality to test the motives of our actions, laws would be vain and useless;

Quid Leges?
Sine moribus vanæ.

HORACE.

and without laws, to punish the wicked and encourage the good, morality would be weak and inefficient as a motive of action.

Lastly, Natural Religion supports both morals and jurisprudence, by inculcating the belief in the existence of a God and of a future state of rewards and punishment, "where virtue is to receive its complete and final reward, and vice its suitable and everlasting punishment."

**NOTE B. MR. BAIN'S ACCOUNT OF THE EMOTIONS,*
REFERRING TO PAGE 175.**

Emotion comprehends all that is understood by feelings, states of feelings, pains, pleasures, sentiments, affections. The Emotions are divided into Simple and Complex. 1. Simple Emotions comprising—

1. Feelings connected with the free vent of Emotion and its opposite of restrained or obstructed outburst. 2. Emotion of Wonder. 3. Emotion of Terror. 4. Tender Emotion. 5. Emotion of Self. 6. Emotion of Power. 7. Irascible Emotion. 8. Emotion of Action and Pursuit. 9. Emotion of the Intellect.

1. The feelings connected with the free vent of Emotion and its opposite may be considered in three points of view:—

a. Feeling of checked outburst when the expression of our feelings is forcibly restrained by some powerful incentive bearing upon the Will,

* The "Emotions and the Will," pages 62-226.

and the resulting state is usually a very painful one. In early life especially, great pain is often effected by this mode of compulsion. A rush of nervous power has been made to course towards the active members, when from another quarter a still more powerful rush has gone towards the same parts.

b. Feeling connected with unusual freedom and scope being given to the outgoings of the emotional wave which is of a pleasing and engaging kind.

c. The educated outburst of the feelings or the mode used by art to modify and partly supersede the natural manifestations such as the arts of song, music, the dance, with the forms and ceremonies used in the intercourse of society.

2. The Emotion of Wonder may be considered as a strong excitement often, though not always of a pleasurable kind. This emotion has a strong influence on the expression ; it affects all parts of our bodily organism, but especially the eye, and the arms and hands.

3. Emotion of Terror.—The Emotion may be considered as a peculiar excitement originating in pain, apprehension, uncertainty, or strangeness, causing a feeling of intense misery. Fear and dread are other names for the generic emotion ; anxiety, suspicion, pain, horror, despair are among the species.

4. The Tender Emotion comprehends the following species :—

a. Those comprehended under the following group. Mother and offspring, father and son, &c.

b. The benevolent affections generally, gratitude, sorrow, admiration and esteem.

c. Veneration and the religious sentiment. The religious sentiment is a composite one, resulting from the emotion of terror and the tender emotion; of awe for the greatness of the power presiding over the world, and gratitude felt towards the paternal and benignant aspect of the Deity.

5. Emotion of Self, of which the Specific forms are :—

a. Self-gratulation and esteem.

b. Love of admiration.

6. The Emotion of Power is one of the most powerful springs of human action. It is seen in the sports of children, and accompanies man in a greater or less degree according to his character through his life. " Whenever we are led to consider ourselves as the authors of any effect, we feel a sensible pride or exaltation in the consciousness of power and the pleasure is in general proportionate to the smallness of the exertion." [D. Stewart.]

7. The Irascible Emotion.—The efficient causes of this Emotion are chiefly persons, but occasionally inanimate things ; its species are anger, revenge, antipathy, hatred.

8. Emotion of Action and Pursuit.—This emotion involves all those feelings of interest which are called forth in working for any end. Field sports, contests, games of chance, the various occupations of life, all call forth a strong feeling of interest.

9. The Emotion of Intellect comprehends all those feelings experienced in the discovery or application of truth, or that arising from study generally.

2. Complex Emotions comprising—1. Emotion of the Fine Arts expressed by the single term

Beauty and the Beautiful. 2. Emotion connected with the Moral Sense.

NOTE C. REFERRING TO PAGE 174.

The question of the Freedom of the Will and of the voluntariness of virtues and vices is considered by Aristotle in the 5th chapter of the iii book of the Nicomachean Ethics.

One great argument of the Necessitarian School, the incompatibility of the freedom of the Will with the prescience of the Deity, it was not necessary for him to refute, because the doctrine of the providence of a Supreme Ruler of the universe was hardly known before the Christian era. That the Gods, as well as men, were bound by the chains of fate, appears to have been held by all heathen philosophers who believed in their existence at all; but the number was very few of these, who thought that the Deity exercised any practical action on human affairs.

The freedom of the Will and the consequent voluntariness of virtues and vices he establishes by the following arguments:—

1. Whenever we have the power to do a thing we have likewise the power not to do it, and whenever we have the power not to do, we have likewise the power to do.

2. That we have the power over our Will is shown by the enactments of legislators, for they punish people even for ignorance if they appear to be the cause of their own ignorance. And they punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws which they ought to know.

3. Vicious habits are voluntary as well as virtuous, for it would be absurd to suppose that

a man who does unjust actions does not wish to become unjust, or that the man who does intemperate actions does not wish to become intemperate; nevertheless, he will not be able to leave off being unjust when he pleases, for the sick man cannot become well, even though it should happen that he is voluntarily ill owing to an intemperate life and from disobedience to his physicians.

At one time, then, it was in his power not to be ill, but when he has allowed himself to become ill, it is no longer in his power, as it is no longer in the power of a man who has thrown a stone to recover it; and yet the throwing it was in his own power, for the origin of the action was in his power, and thus in the beginning it was in the power of the unjust and intemperate not to become such.

NOTE D. REFERRING TO CHAPTERS I. AND XI.

A Motive may be defined as a force exercising an influence on the Will.

Motives are primary or secondary: primary the desires sought after for themselves; secondary, those which are only aimed at with a view to something else; of the first kind are the desire of knowledge, of society, of esteem, of power, of superiority; of the second, the desire of wealth, of reputation, of a good character amongst those whose opinions we desire to influence; everything, in short, which we find to be useful for the attainment of an end in view.

The connection of the doctrine of Motives with the Necessitarian Scheme has been already indicated; that Motives do exercise an influence

on the Will, even the assertors of the doctrine of Free Agency admit, but they deny that the influence is a controlling one, and that the mind has not the power of rejecting the influence brought to bear upon it, however strong that influence may be.

It would be perhaps preferable to say that the influence exercised on the Will is not so much of any separate Motive as the conflict between two opposing forces, and that its freedom is shown in the choice it makes of the one in preference to the other. For every Motive when presented to the mind is balanced by some other opposing force which aims at swaying the Will in a contrary direction. Take the desire of knowledge or principle of curiosity; the man who makes up his mind to a life of laborious study, has to resist the opposing motive force resulting from a love of ease natural to humanity. Even in the case of the most ardent students this natural sentiment will occasionally rise superior to other considerations and gain for the time a victory. If, however, he be resolutely bent on the pursuit of knowledge, his Will will be steadily set in that direction; the assaults of the opposing force will gradually become weaker and weaker until such habits of patient industry are acquired as to become to him a second nature. To speak then of any individual action being governed by a special Motive seems a philosophical absurdity, for the commencement or first principle of the action is in the agent. In the end, it is true, he may appear to be influenced solely by some predominant desire or Motive, but this results from the influence of habit on what was originally a free volition. Secondary Motives have

considerable influence in moulding the characters of individuals and notions; the opinions of those by whom we are surrounded, the sentiments resulting from a particular education, or special religious training, all combine to make us view things under a particular aspect, and to act upon our conduct with a corresponding force.

The Will still remains free, because every one feels that he could break through the shackles of custom and habit, and on rare occasions he will do so, at least sufficiently often to vindicate the view here set forward.

NOTE E. ON THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL.

The origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful, like that of other abstract notions, has been greatly canvassed. Longinus in ancient times, the celebrated Mr. Burke, Mr. Hucheson, Dr. Blair, Knight, Reid, and Dugald Stewart, are the authors who have paid special attention to this topic. The most probable view would appear to be that the ideas of the sublime and beautiful are modifications of one and the same fundamental principle of the human mind, Taste, and that the difference between them is not a difference of kind, but arises from the character of the objects in nature and art which excite these feelings.

Taste has been defined by Reid as "that power of the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the beauties of nature, and whatever is excellent in the fine arts."*

Objects in nature may be considered to be of two kinds.

* Reid, 490.

1. Those that excite the feeling of beauty.
2. Those that excite the feelings of the sublime.

When the object beheld is something delicate or refined, imparting a feeling of calm pleasure, we call it beautiful; when awful, magnificent or terrible, sublime. Thus we speak of beautiful colours, beautiful form, or beautiful pieces of music, but the contemplation of the attribute of the Deity, of great and exalted virtue or suffering, we call sublime.

Hence, therefore, the beautiful may be defined as the natural appreciation of the mind for all that is good and lovely; the sublime, the feeling excited in the mind by the spectacle of the Vast, the Undefined, and the Terrible.

According to Mr. Burke, "the essence of the Sublime is the Terrible operating, either openly or more latently; Terror is in all cases either more openly or latently the ruling principle of the Sublime."* Dr. Blair considers that the solution of the problem is found in the idea of mighty power, and Mr. Knight in the influence of mental energy, exciting a sympathetic energy in the mind of the spectator or reader. Longinus contents himself with remarking one of its characteristics, that it fills the mind with a glorying and sense of unusual greatness.

The sentiment of the Sublime is not, however, excited by any one of these objects, but by all of them, and if by any one specially, by that of the Vast and the Undefined. In the notion of beauty there is always something limited and defined; in the sublime, of the vast and undefined. We speak of a beautiful garden, beautiful woman; but a mountain, whose

* "On the Sublime and Beautiful," part II, sec. 2.

summit is lost in the clouds, or the orbs of heaven rolling in the tranquil ether, excite the sentiment of sublimity in our minds.

The term answering in Greek to sublimity is *υψος*, height, and the etymology given in many dictionaries of Sublimity is *supra limum*, or an emotion similar to that of mounting upwards, and without attaching too much importance to these analogies, they show at least what has been considered a fundamental notion in the idea of Sublimity, Vastness, and the Undefined in height.

The emotion of terror to which Mr. Burke would refer the origin of the Sublime, would appear to have less to do with it than the other causes mentioned ; the feeling of sublimity is pleasing even if exciting, whereas that from terror is an undoubted pain. If then the emotion of terror gives even rise to the sublimity, it can only be when it is joined with some other of the exciting causes before-mentioned.

Lastly, when we apply the term sublime to any incident or action in human life, we do so figuratively, and because we observe in them something of that lofty and undefined character which assimilates the sentiment arising from their contemplation to that which would result from gazing on some object in nature proper to excite the feeling of Sublimity.

NOTE F. REFERRING TO PAGE 116, ON THE SCHEME OF
SIR W. HAMILTON.

In the perception of the external world, the object of which we are conscious may be considered either—1. As absolute and total ; or, 2. As relative and partial, i.e., vicarious or re-

presentative of another and principal object beyond the sphere of consciousness. Those who hold the former of these doctrines may be called Presentationists or Intuitionists; those who hold the latter, Representationists. The Representationists or Intuitionists constitute the object of which we are conscious in perception into a sole, absolute or total object, in other words, reduce perception to an act of immediate or intuitive cognition, and this either (A) by abolishing any immediate ideal subjective object representing, or (B) by abolishing any mediate real object represented.

Of the Realistic Presentative scheme which, as founded on the natural or common sense of mankind, merits the name of Natural, there are no subordinate varieties, except in so far as a difference of opinion may arise in regard to what qualities are to be referred to the object perceived, or *non ego*, and what to the percipient object, or *ego*.

1. There is the philosophical or developed form, according to which the primary or sensible qualities, as extension, figure and constitute the object of perception, and (2), a vulgar or undeveloped form, according to which, not only the primary qualities, but also the secondary as colour, savour are, as known to us, regarded equally to appertain to the *non ego*.

Returning again to the Table we observe—

1. That the Realists all agree in maintaining the existence of an immediate external object in perception, but the Natural Realists hold that we only observe the primary qualities of bodies, such as length, breadth, whilst the Hypothetical Realists maintain that we observe secondary qualities as well, such as colour,

savour. 2. The Idealists are divided into those who maintain that the object in perception is an image or idea in the mind, propagated from some object without us, or those who abolish any immediate real object represented, and therefore deny in effect the existence of a material world, or assert at least that such existence cannot be proved.

APPENDIX. No. II.

SELECTION OF QUESTIONS SET AT THE INDIA CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS BETWEEN THE YEARS 1856 AND 1864 INCLUSIVE.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

[The numbers refer to the sections in the text where information may be obtained as to the answers. For questions not fully answered, the reader is referred to the authorities at the end of each Chapter.]

1. Are the duties we owe to ourselves properly included under Obligatory Morality? Justify your answer. Chapter vi.
2. Specify as far as you are able the particular duties coming under the general head of Justice. Chapter iii.
3. What are the different views which may be taken as to the origin or derivation of Conscience in the mind? Chapter i. and page 188.
4. State the arguments for and against Utility; considered, 1 as the actual, 2 as the proper basis of Morals. Chapter ii.
5. Distinguish Morals from Natural Religion and Jurisprudence. Appendix, Note A.
6. Discuss the value of secondary Motives. Note D.

7. State and classify the various theories that have been proposed of Moral Obligation. Chapter ii.

8. Is the virtue of Prudence compatible with the highest forms of character? Chapter iv.

9. What points of ethical controversy were brought into especial prominence by the Reformation controversies?* Chapter iii.

10. Does ethical opinion control public action, or does the course of events modify ethical opinion in modern times? Page 190.

11. Describe and illustrate the moral qualities of Truthfulness, Delicacy, Prudence, and Magnanimity; and distinguish each from any other habit which may resemble it. Chapter iii.

12. State the chief grounds upon which human free agency has been denied. Chapter i.

13. Distinguish between Positive Law and the Law of Nature. Chapter iii.

14. Mention any of the Definitions of Justice. Chapter iii.

15. Give the different modes of classifying duties. Chapter iii.

16. State the various meanings of law and their ethical bearings. Note A.

17. Enumerate and define the four Cardinal Virtues. Chapters iii. and iv.

18. Give a concise account of the Moral System of Hobbes, Clarke, and Hume. Chapter ii.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

1. Are there any feelings of the nature of Sensation not included under the Five Senses. If so, what are they? Pages 108—109.

* The Controversies connected with Necessitarianism and Free Will. See Chapter i.

2. Illustrate the principle of Association by contiguity, in the case of alliance of objects with emotions. Chapter viii.

3. Describe the various circumstances which give rise to the pleasurable sentiment of Power. Chapter xi. and Note B.

4. Enumerate and characterise the Benevolent Affections, and indicate the fundamental Emotion they may be referred to. Chapter xi. and Note B.

5. Illustrate the uniformity of sequence of motives and actions in the Human Will. Chapter xi. and Notes C and D.

6. Are there any necessary truths besides those of Mathematics? Chapter ix.

7. Define and classify the Emotions. Note B.

8. Why were the words $\epsilon\nu\beta\iota\omega\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega$ added to Aristotle's definition of happiness? Chapter vi.

9. Define Instinct, and enumerate the instincts in man. Chapter x.

10. Give the different modes of classifying the intellectual powers. Chapter vii.

11. State briefly some of the theories as to the perception of an External and Material world. Chapter vii.

12. How can Imagination be defined and analysed? Chapter viii.

13. Give an account of Emotion in general as contrasted with the other regions of the mind. Note B.

14. Describe briefly the emotions of Wonder, Fear, Power, Anger. Note B.

15. What theories have been advanced with respect to the nature of the Beautiful? Note E.

16. How far may voluntary power be regarded as instinctive, and how far as acquired? Chapter xi.

17. What, if any, is the distinction between Psychology and Metaphysics? Chapter i.

18. Distinguish between Natural and Hypothetical Realism, and state which, if either, is in your judgment the true theory of Perception. Note F.

19. Explain the intellectual operation called Reasoning, and state what experimental laws of the mind it depends upon. End of Chapter viii., Chapter ix.

20. Define Memory, Taste, Judgment, Instinct. Chapters viii. and xi. Note E.

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